How do legal professionalism and politics influence efforts to structure the process of selecting and retaining state judges?

Haynes, Evan. The Selection and Tenure of Judges. [Newark]: The National Conference of Judicial Councils, 1944. xix, 308 pp. Reprint available January, 2005 by the Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ISBN 1-58477-483-5. Cloth. $85. * With an introduction by Roscoe Pound. Haynes offers a comprehensive overview of the factors that determine judicial selection in the United States. It is also a useful history of the subject from the colonial era to 1943. Written with input from Pound, Haynes offers a sociological analysis enriched with an impressive body of statistical data. He examines such factors as class and region affiliation, and whether elected judges are more liberal than their tenured colleagues. He also compares American practices to those in Great Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Scandinavia and Latin America. Warmly received when it was first published, it is recommended by Willard Hurst in The Growth of American Law: The Lawmakers (see p. 454).

...Summary of laws and policies of other states governing judicial selection with attention to the "missouri plan" and merit selection, judicial selection and tenure in mass., organization of the federal court, selection of federal judges, list of states adopting each method of selection with nominating body, date adoped and length of term...

In the United States, almost 90 percent of state judges have to run in popular elections to remain on the bench. In the past decade, this peculiarly American institution has produced vicious multi-million-dollar political election campaigns and high-profile allegations of judicial bias and misconduct. The People’s Courts traces the history of judicial elections and Americans’ quest for an independent judiciary—one that would ensure fairness for all before the law—from the colonial era to the present. In the aftermath of economic disaster, nineteenth-century reformers embraced popular elections as a way to make politically appointed judges less susceptible to partisan patronage and more independent of the legislative and executive branches of government. This effort to reinforce the separation of powers and limit government succeeded in many ways, but it created new threats to judicial independence and provoked further calls for reform. Merit selection emerged as the most promising means of reducing partisan and financial influence from judicial selection. It too, however, proved vulnerable to pressure from party politics and special interest groups. Yet, as Shugerman concludes, it still has more potential for protecting judicial independence than either political appointment or popular election. The People’s Courts shows how Americans have been deeply committed to judicial independence, but that commitment has also been manipulated by special interests. By understanding our history of judicial selection, we can better protect and preserve the independence of judges from political and partisan influence.