Paradoxically, Japan provides massive amounts of development aid to China, despite Japan's clear perception of China as a prime competitor in the Asia-Pacific region. This clearly written and comprehensive volume provides an overview of the way Japan's aid to China has developed since 1979. It explains the shifts that have taken place in Japan's China policy in the 1990s against the background of international changes and domestic changes in both countries, and offers new insights into the way Japanese aid policy making functions, thereby providing an alternative view of Japanese policy making that might be applied to other areas. Through a series of case studies, it shows Japan’s increasing willingness to use development aid to China for strategic goals and explains a significant shift of priority project areas of Japan’s China aid in the 1990s, from industrial infrastructure to socio-environmental infrastructure. The book argues that, contrary to the widely held view that Japan's aid to China is given for reasons of commercial self-interest, the objectives are much more complex and dynamic. Using original material, Takamine shows how policy making power within the Japanese government has shifted in recent years away from officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to politicians in the Liberal Democratic Party.

This book examines Japan’s development assistance as it transitions away from "Official Development Assistance" and towards "Development Cooperation." In this transition, the strong relationships between Japanese development policy and comprehensive security, diplomacy, foreign, domestic and economic policies are likely to become even more integrated. Written by a multidisciplinary team of contributors from the fields of poltical science, international relations, development, economics, public opinion and Japan studies, this book sets out to be innovative in capturing the essence of the changing patterns of development cooperation, and more importantly, Japan’s role in within it, in an era of great change.

When this volume was published in 1993 it was the first comprehensive analysis of the major policy issues confronting Japan’s massive foreign aid programme. It deals with the philosophy behind Japan’s aid, Japanese reactions to the severe criticisms of its programmes and the beginnings of meaningful administrative reform of the complex aid system. Alan Rix goes on to examine the widespread innovation in programmes and policies to make Japan’s aid more responsive and the impact of the Asian bias in Japan’s aid.

Japanese and Chinese foreign aid play significant roles in each nation's foreign policy strategies as well as overseas development worldwide. Foreign aid and investment's importance has increased for both the People's Republic of China and Japan, especially as strategic competition between the two nations has increased since 2000. Many scholars have analyzed the similarities and differences in the two nations' aid strategies and distribution but have not yet closely examined and compared the sub-national players who determine aid policy in practice. As the agents that implement aid projects, these players translate upper-level strategy into action and, as a result, determine said strategy's success. This thesis investigates: how do the domestic bureaucracies in both Japan and China process various flows of information, interact with other actors, set agendas, and attempt to influence aid policy? Key factors in an aid agency or ministry's ability to shape aid decision-making include its autonomy relative to upper-level government organizations, its network with partner countries as well as domestic firms and financial institutions, and the cohesiveness of its bureaucratic culture. In the Japanese case, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) enjoys a high level of both formal and informal autonomy from the prime minister, cabinet and National Security Council, has maintained a close and distinct network with partner country bureaucrats and private sector actors, and has developed its own internal cultural norms that emphasize humanitarian and developmental impact. In contrast, China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), its primary aid coordinator, maintains some informal autonomy from the State Council, but lacks the agenda-setting power, networks, and bureaucratic culture to exert substantial decision-making power at the aid project level, particularly after the 2018 founding of the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA). The various other aid and investment implementers in both nations operate in similar institutional contexts where decision-making influence is determined by differences in information, networks, and internal values as well as formally delegated powers. As a result, in the Japanese case, lower-level agents and their understanding of partner country conditions more heavily influence aid decision-making, whereas high-level strategic directives are more determinative of Chinese aid decision-making.