Seminar paper from the year 2009 in the subject Politics - Region: Far East, grade: 2,3, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (Institut für Politikwissenschaft), course: East Asia in World Affairs, language: English, abstract: After its devastating defeat in World War II, Japan has become one of the major economic powers in the world, ending the twentieth century as the world’s second largest economy. Although Japan has grown to economic great-power status, its political weight in international politics lags far behind. Why is that? During the Cold War, Japan linked itself closely to the United States as the dominant regional force in East Asia. By renouncing war and the possibility to become a major military power again, Japan laid its national security almost fully in the hands of the United States. Japan’s dependence on U.S. power marginalized its role in world affairs. On the other hand, however, the security guaranteed by the United States provided the basis for Japan’s economic rise. Since the end of the Cold War, the parameters of the U.S.-Japan alliance have been called into question. Japan’s post-war foreign policy – known as “Yoshida Consensus” – which rejected the use of military might to achieve political ends and contained several self-imposed restrictions on the use of military has been softened more and more. A development that has been documented best in the deployment of Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) in Iraq by the Koizumi administration. Although the U.S.-Japan alliance is arguably stronger than ever before, the role of Japan within it is probably less secure than ever before. To understand this, it is necessary to analyze the circumstances which motivated Japan to change its long-time security approach. Indeed, the Asian region has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Japan is now facing several new challenges, mostly important the rise of China, that haven’t played a role during the era of the iron curtain. Do those challenges require new policies? Is there a “new” Consensus about Japan’s foreign policy? What will be Japan’s strategy for the twenty-first century? Those are the questions this paper is about. The paper is separated into three parts. First, I will analyze the factors by which Japan’s foreign policy is determined. A step that is crucial to understand possible future security options. In the second section I will present different security options, Japan has in the future. Finally, I will sum up some of the results and will present a few of my own thoughts about Japan’s future.

Long constrained as a security actor by constitutional as well as external factors, Japan now increasingly is called to play a greater role in stabilizing both the Asia-Pacific region and the entire international system. Japan's Security Agenda explores the country's diplomatic, political, military, and economic concerns and policies within this new context.

For decades after World War II, Japan chose to focus on soft power and economic diplomacy alongside a close alliance with the United States, eschewing a potential leadership role in regional and global security. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the rise of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan's military capabilities have resurged. In this analysis of Japan's changing military policy, Andrew L. Oros shows how a gradual awakening to new security challenges has culminated in the multifaceted "security renaissance" of the past decade. Despite openness to new approaches, however, three historical legacies—contested memories of the Pacific War and Imperial Japan, postwar anti-militarist convictions, and an unequal relationship with the United States—play an outsized role. In Japan's Security Renaissance Oros argues that Japan's future security policies will continue to be shaped by these legacies, which Japanese leaders have struggled to address. He argues that claims of rising nationalism in Japan are overstated, but there has been a discernable shift favoring the conservative Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party. Bringing together Japanese domestic politics with the broader geopolitical landscape of East Asia and the world, Japan's Security Renaissance provides guidance on this century's emerging international dynamics.

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's security environment has changed significantly. While, on the global level, the United States is still Japan's most important security partner, the nature of the partnership has changed as a result of shifting demands from the United States, new international challenges such as the North Korean nuclear programme and the rapid rise of China. At the same time, Japan has been confronted with new, ‘non-traditional’ security threats such as international terrorism, the spread of infectious diseases, and global environmental problems. On the domestic level, demographic change, labour migration, economic decline, workplace insecurity, and a weakening impact of policy initiatives challenge the sustainability of the lifestyle of many Japanese and have led to a heightened sense of insecurity among the Japanese public. This book focuses on the domestic discourse on insecurity in Japan and goes beyond military security. The chapters cover issues such as Japan’s growing perception of regional and global insecurity; the changing role of military forces; the perceived risk of Chinese foreign investment; societal, cultural and labour insecurity and how it is affected by demographic changes and migration; as well as food insecurity and its challenges to health and public policy. Each chapter asks how the Japanese public perceives these insecurities; how these perceptions influence the public discourse, the main stakeholders of this discourse, and how this affects state-society relations and government policies. Governing Insecurity in Japan provides new insights into Japanese and international discourses on security and insecurity, and the ways in which security is conceptualized in Japan. As such, it will be of interest to students and scholars working on Japanese politics, security studies and international relations.

The sudden end of the Cold War took the Japanese foreign policy community by surprise. The Yoshida Doctrine which served Japanese foreign policy so well during the Cold War is no longer a viable foreign policy option. This dissertation examines the restructuring of Japanese foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Through a series of 56 interviews with Japanese foregin policy elites, the changes in Japanese foreign policy are put into the context of the foreign policy literature.