In the wake of its creation in 1948, the state of Israel was confronted with the challenge of establishing foreign relations with key players in the region, in the face of opposition from most of the Arab states. Howard Patten explores the genesis and development of Israel's foreign relations with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia, known as the 'Policy of the Periphery'. Highlighting the pragmatism and Realpolitik at the heart of this policy, Israel and the Cold War analyses the national interests and mutual concerns which shaped relations and strategy at the United Nations during the critical moments of the establishment of the State of Israel and the following forty years, before the ramifications of the Iranian Revolution became apparent. During this period, Israel made efforts to create pragmatic alliances behind closed doors at the UN, even as ambivalence and hostility reigned in the public sphere. Patten thus examines the implications that the Cold War system of ideological combat had on these attempts to maintain implicit, yet cordial understandings, as world events - such as the Suez Crisis of 1956, successive crises over Cyprus and the Ethiopian and Iranian Revolutions - tested the 'Policy of the Periphery'. 'Israel and the Cold War' traces the development of Israel's relations with these three states, from their initial beginnings to consolidation, then rejection and subsequent efforts to realign. Patten highlights the extensive diplomatic and military reverberations that occurred throughout the region, and the way in which these were played out at the UN. Based primarily on UN documents, this book is a vital primary resource for those researching the period in question and the formulation of foreign policy in the Middle East.

The first study of Israeli foreign policy towards the Middle East and selected world powers, since the end of the Cold War to the present.

Russia's forceful re-entry into the Middle Eastern arena, and the accentuated continuity of Soviet policy and methods of the 1960s and '70s, highlight the topicality of this groundbreaking study, which confirms the USSR's role in shaping Middle Eastern and global history. This book covers the peak of the USSR's direct military involvement in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The head-on clash between US-armed Israeli forces and some 20,000 Soviet servicemen with state-of-the-art weaponry turned the Middle East into the hottest front of the Cold War. The Soviets' success in this war of attrition paved the way for their planning and support of Egypt's cross-canal offensive in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Ginor and Remez challenge a series of long-accepted notions as to the scope, timeline and character of the Soviet intervention and overturn the conventional view that détente with the US induced Moscow to restrainthat a US-Moscow détente led to a curtailment of Egyptian ambitions to recapture of the land it lost to Israel in 1967. Between this analytical rethink and the introduction of an entirely new genre of sources-- -memoirs and other publications by Soviet veterans themselves---The Soviet-Israeli War paves the way for scholars to revisit this pivotal moment in world history.

Israel's relations with each of the superpowers was determined by global factors. The dilemma facing Israel was how to reconcile its interests with those of the United States, having failed to do so with the Soviet Union. Moreover, throughout the cold war the United States considered Israel a burden rather than an asset and had to accommodate support for Israel with keeping the Arab states within the western orbit. Partisan policy could have dealt a mortal blow to the fundamental assumption of American global strategy. Namely that the Middle East should not be allowed to become a cold war arena. The book shows how the fledgling state of Israel had to manoeuvre between the superpowers to survive.

This study moves from a history of the American-Israeli strategic relationship since 1967 to an assessment of the permanency of US-Israeli strategic ties, their purpose in the eyes of both partners, and their susceptibility to future pressures. It includes an examination of the relationship under the strain of the 1991 Gulf War.

In the wake of its creation in 1948, the state of Israel was confronted with the challenge of establishing foreign relations with key players in the region, in the face of opposition from most of the Arab states. Howard Patten explores the genesis and development of Israel's foreign relations with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia, known as the 'Policy of the Periphery'. Highlighting the pragmatism and Realpolitik at the heart of this policy, Israel and the Cold War analyses the national interests and mutual concerns which shaped relations and strategy at the United Nations during the critical moments of the establishment of the State of Israel and the following forty years, before the ramifications of the Iranian Revolution became apparent. During this period, Israel made efforts to create pragmatic alliances behind closed doors at the UN, even as ambivalence and hostility reigned in the public sphere. Patten thus examines the implications that the Cold War system of ideological combat had on these attempts to maintain implicit, yet cordial understandings, as world events - such as the Suez Crisis of 1956, successive crises over Cyprus and the Ethiopian and Iranian Revolutions - tested the 'Policy of the Periphery'. 'Israel and the Cold War' traces the development of Israel's relations with these three states, from their initial beginnings to consolidation, then rejection and subsequent efforts to realign. Patten highlights the extensive diplomatic and military reverberations that occurred throughout the region, and the way in which these were played out at the UN. Based primarily on UN documents, this book is a vital primary resource for those researching the period in question and the formulation of foreign policy in the Middle East.

At the height of the Cold War, the John F. Kennedy administration designed an ambitious plan for the Middle East-its aim was to seek rapprochement with Nasser's Egypt in order to keep the Arab world neutral and contain the perceived communist threat. In order to offset this approach, Kennedy sought to grow relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and embrace Israel's defense priorities-a decision which would begin the US-Israeli 'special relationship'. Here, Antonio Perra shows for the first time how new relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel which would come to shape the Middle East for decades were in fact a by-product of Kennedy's efforts at Soviet containment. The Saudi's in particular were increasingly viewed as 'an atavistic regime who would soon disappear' but Kennedy's support for them-which hardened during the Yemen Crisis even as he sought to placate Nasser-had the unintended effect of making them, as today, the US' great pillar of support in the Middle East.