The central question in political philosophy is whether political states have the right to coerce their constituents and whether citizens have a moral duty to obey the commands of their state. In this 2005 book, Christopher Heath Wellman and A. John Simmons defend opposing answers to this question. Wellman bases his argument on samaritan obligations to perform easy rescues, arguing that each of us has a moral duty to obey the law as his or her fair share of the communal samaritan chore of rescuing our compatriots from the perils of the state of nature. Simmons counters that this, and all other attempts to explain our duty to obey the law, fail. He defends a position of philosophical anarchism, the view that no existing state is legitimate and that there is no strong moral presumption in favor of obedience to, or compliance with, any existing state.

This 2005 book discusses whether there is a duty to obey the law and the state.

The central question in political philosophy is whether political states have the right to coerce their constituents and whether citizens have a moral duty to obey the commands of their state. Christopher Heath Wellman and A. John Simmons defend opposing answers to this question. Wellman bases his argument on Samaritan obligations to perform easy rescues. Simmons counters that this, and all other attempts to explain our duty to obey the law, will fail.

The question, 'Why should I obey the law?' introduces a contemporary puzzle that is as old as philosophy itself. The puzzle is especially troublesome if we think of cases in which breaking the law is not otherwise wrongful, and in which the chances of getting caught are negligible. Philosophers from Socrates to H.L.A. Hart have struggled to give reasoned support to the idea that we do have a general moral duty to obey the law but, more recently, the greater number of learned voices has expressed doubt that there is any such duty, at least as traditionally conceived. The thought that there is no such duty poses a challenge to our ordinary understanding of political authority and its legitimacy. In what sense can political officials have a right to rule us if there is no duty to obey the laws they lay down? Some thinkers, concluding that a general duty to obey the law cannot be defended, have gone so far as to embrace philosophical anarchism, the view that the state is necessarily illegitimate. Others argue that the duty to obey the law can be grounded on the idea of consent, or on fairness, or on other ideas, such as community.

This book is the culmination of over 15 years of research on terrorism, secession, and related concepts such as the obligation to obey the law, pacifism, civil disobedience, non-violent direct action, political violence, revolution, and assassination. It is sincerely hoped that the content of this book is construed as an ethical and philosophical attempt to advance human understanding of some of life’s most intractable problems, namely, terrorism and more generally, political violence. This book is proffered as a propadeutic to further study of these issues and is not to be interpreted as the author’s final word on them. For the pursuit of truth and avoidance of error is never wholly complete, but at best a life-long process of continual reflection, analysis and argument. And it will please the author of this book if it brings even a modicum of knowledge to the difficulties it investigates. Some of the chapters of this book have been published or have otherwise experienced the critical assistance of various public academic forums, and I am sincerely grateful to those who have shaped my thinking about terrorism and its related concepts. Among those who have provided critical and helpful insights concerning various sections of the contents of this book are: David Copp, Richard Falk, Joel Feinberg, Richard W. Miller, and Thomas Pogge.

Whether we should obey the law is a question that affects everyone’s day-to-day life, from traffic laws to taxes. Most people obey out of habit, but the question remains: why are we morally required to do so? If we fail to obey, the state may enforce compliance, but is it right for it to do this, and if so, why? In this book, George Klosko, a renowned authority on political obligation, skillfully probes these questions. He considers various prominent theories of obligation and shows why they are unconvincing, contending that only an approach that interweaves multiple principles, rooted in "fair play," is fully persuasive. Klosko develops the fullest statement of his own well-known theory of political obligation while providing a clear overview of the subject. The result is both an essential introductory text for students of political theory and philosophy and a cutting-edge, original contribution to the debate.

People obey the law if they believe it's legitimate, not because they fear punishment--this is the startling conclusion of Tom Tyler's classic study. Tyler suggests that lawmakers and law enforcers would do much better to make legal systems worthy of respect than to try to instill fear of punishment. He finds that people obey law primarily because they believe in respecting legitimate authority. In his fascinating new afterword, Tyler brings his book up to date by reporting on new research into the relative importance of legal legitimacy and deterrence, and reflects on changes in his own thinking since his book was first published.