Contains a concise account of the United States Army's role in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in September 1994. Its stated objectives included the return to office of the democratically elected president of that country and the creation of a stable and secure environment in which democratic institutions could take hold.

Why does the United States sometimes seek multilateral support for its military interventions? When does it instead sidestep international institutions and intervene unilaterally? In Coalitions of Convenience, a comprehensive study of US military interventions in the post-Cold War era, Sarah Kreps shows that contrary to conventional wisdom, even superpowers have strong incentives to intervene multilaterally: coalitions confer legitimacy and provide ways to share the costly burdens of war. Despite these advantages, multilateralism comes with costs: multilateral responses are often diplomatic battles of attrition in which reluctant allies hold out for side payments in exchange for their consent. A powerful state's willingness to work multilaterally, then, depends on its time horizons--how it values the future versus the present. States with long-term--those that do not face immediate threats--see multilateralism as a power-conserving strategy over time. States with shorter-term horizons will find the expediency of unilateralism more attractive. A systematic account of how multilateral coalitions function, Coalitions of Convenience also considers the broader effects of power on international institutions and what the rise of China may mean for international cooperation and conflict.

This unique reference shows how the United States has intervened militarily, politically, and economically in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean from the early 19th century to the present day. What do baseball, American war crimes, and a slice of watermelon have in common in the annals of Latin American history? Believe it or not, this disparate grouping reflects the cultural and historical remnants of America's military and political involvement in the region. As early as 1811, the United States began intervening in the affairs of Central America, South America, and the Caribbean ... and it hasn't stopped since. This compelling reference analyzes both the major interventions and minor conflicts stemming from our nation's military operations in these areas and examines the people, places, legislation, and strategies that contributed to these events. In addition to documented facts and figures, the alphabetically organized entries in Encyclopedia of U.S. Military Interventions in Latin America present fascinating anecdotes on the subject, including why the United States once invaded Panama over a slice of watermelon, how an intervention in Nicaragua landed our country on trial for war crimes, and how the popularity of baseball in Latin America is a direct result of American influence. Primary source documents and visual aids accompany the content.

From the American Revolution to the global war on terror, U.S. Army doctrine has evolved to regulate the chaos of armed conflict by providing an intellectual basis for organizing, training, equipping, and operating the military. Walter E. Kretchik analyzes the service's keystone doctrine over three centuries to reveal that the army's leadership is more forward thinking and adaptive than has been generally believed. The first comprehensive history of Army doctrine, Kretchik's book fully explores the principles that have shaped the Army's approach to warfare. From Regulations For the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States in 1779 to modern-day field manuals, it reflects the fashioning of doctrine to incorporate the lessons of past wars and minimize the uncertainty and dangers of battle. Kretchik traces Army doctrine through four distinct eras: 1779-1904, when guidelines were compiled by single authors or a board of officers in tactical drill manuals; 1905-1944, when the Root Reforms fixed doctrinal responsibility with the General Staff; 1944-1962, the era of multiservice doctrine; and, beginning in 1962, coalition warfare with its emphasis on interagency cooperation. He reveals that doctrine has played a significant role in the Army's performance throughout its history-although not always to its advantage, as it has often failed to anticipate accurately the nature of the "next war" and still continues to be locked in a debate between advocates of conventional warfare and those who emphasize counterinsurgency approaches. Each chapter presents individuals who helped define and articulate Army doctrine during each period of its history-including George Washington and Baron von Steuben in the eighteenth century, Emory Upton and Arthur Wagner in the nineteenth, and Elihu Root and William DePuy in the twentieth. Each identifies the "first principles" set down in manuals covering such topics as tactics, operations, and strategy; size, organization, and distribution of forces; and the promise and challenges of technological innovation. Each also presents specific cases that analyze how effectively the Army actually applied a particular era's doctrine. Doctrine remains the basis of instruction in the Army school system, ensuring that all officers and enlisted soldiers share a common intellectual framework. This book elucidates that framework for the first time.

Haitian culture and military power -- Preventive diplomacy and military intervention -- Planning a military intervention -- Conducting a military intervention -- Intervention under the Blue Beret -- Aftermath -- Appendix: Oral history interviewees