Seminar paper from the year 2008 in the subject Politics - Topic: European Union, grade: 1,3, University of Hamburg (Master of Arts European Studies), course: The European Economic and Monetary Union: challenges and perspectives , language: English, abstract: While the economic integration of the EU is already on an advanced level due to the establishment of the Single Market and the European Monetary Union (EMU), it can be stated that some significant fields are lagging behind. Amongst others, the harmonisation of indirect taxes within the EU is a controversial topic (Genschel 2002: 16, Randzio-Plath 1999: 665). Any fiscal harmonisation hardly alludes to the funding basis of the public budget of the several MS. In the range of indirect taxes, value added tax (VAT), which is especially problematic for allocation politics, is already harmonised on a high level, while at the same time other excise duties were harmonised only hesitantly. The aim of this paper is to examine the question of whether there is more harmonisation than competition in the field of indirect taxation in the EU. In general, the paper will deal with the question of what fiscal harmonisation actually is and which consequences can arise from a situation of competition for the government.

Seminar paper from the year 2008 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: European Union, grade: 1,3, University of Hamburg (Master of Arts European Studies), course: The European Economic and Monetary Union: challenges and perspectives, language: English, abstract: While the economic integration of the EU is already on an advanced level due to the establishment of the Single Market and the European Monetary Union (EMU), it can be stated that some significant fields are lagging behind. Amongst others, the harmonisation of indirect taxes within the EU is a controversial topic (Genschel 2002: 16, Randzio-Plath 1999: 665). Any fiscal harmonisation hardly alludes to the funding basis of the public budget of the several MS. In the range of indirect taxes, value added tax (VAT), which is especially problematic for allocation politics, is already harmonised on a high level, while at the same time other excise duties were harmonised only hesitantly. The aim of this paper is to examine the question of whether there is more harmonisation than competition in the field of indirect taxation in the EU. In general, the paper will deal with the question of what fiscal harmonisation actually is and which consequences can arise from a situation of competition for the government.

Opening Europe's borders in 1993 makes the allocation of resources more vulnerable to differences in the national tax rates. The first part of the paper demonstrates that direct consumer purchases will imply distortions resulting from diverging VAT rates and it clarifies why the frequently cited exchange rate argument is of no help. The second part shows that, in the case of direct taxation, a harmonization of tax bases is more important than a harmonization of tax rates. Either the combination of true economic depreciation and residence taxation or the combination of immediate write-off and source taxation will result in an efficient international allocation of capital, independent of the national tax rates. The paper concludes with a verdict on tax competition arguing that free migration renders a policy of income redistribution, which is interpreted as insurance against the risk of lifetime careers, impossible.

The European Union (EU) was the largest single market in the world. The idea of harmonizing the corporate tax rate, to further the goal of a single market that provides similar conditions to companies across national borders, has been floated in the EU for sometime now but has not been acceptable to all the countries. As investment conditions within the EU become more homogeneous, individual countries like Ireland have used tax competition as a means of differentiating themselves and attracting foreign investment. The expansion of the EU on May 1 st 2004 has brought the issue back into the limelight. High tax member states like Germany have strongly argued for tax harmonization and a minimum corporate tax rate, while low tax member states like Ireland and the new EU members have opposed any such proposal.

This is an updated study of a 1998 publication, "Tax competition in the European Union". The introduction covers the recent history of tax policy within the EU, and examines the current situation in corporate taxation, taxation of savings, taxation of labour, and indirect taxation (VAT and excise duty). A comparative analysis provides a detailed survey of how direct taxes - corporate and personal - are levied within the EU. The final section discusses the main issues in the current debate on the alternative approaches of competition and co-operation in the taxation field.

Since the tax policy of a country has become an important determinant in locating foreign capital and labor, countries around the world have started to compete with each other on the basis of the taxes they levy. This development has been a worry for tax collectors. Both the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD) and the European Union have been quick to take steps to contain 'harmful' tax practices of member and non-member countries, which according to them could lead to the erosion of tax revenues for governments around the world in a destructive 'race to the bottom'. A strong case is being made for 'tax harmonisation' - standardisation of tax rates among nations. The case helps to discuss the developments and implications of this tug-of-war.

Tax competition in the form of harmful tax practices can distort trade and investment patterns, erode national tax bases and shift part of the tax burden onto less mobile tax bases. The Report emphasises that governments must intensify their cooperative actions to curb harmful tax practices.