This e-book is a compilation of the papers presented by the speakers during a two-day International Conference, curated around the theme ‘India and Japan: Growing Partnership and Opportunities for Cooperation’, organised by CPPR – Centre for Strategic Studies, Kochi in collaboration with the Consulate-General of Japan in Chennai on February 26–27, 2019 at Riviera Suites in Kochi. It consists of eight chapters providing a comprehensive outlook on India-Japan relations.

Contributed articles at a round table conference held at New Delhi on March 14-15, 2005.

This volume focuses on the rapidly expanding strategic relationship between India and Japan, expanding on the hitherto under-analyzed concept of “strategic partnership,” tracing the history of the interaction, and gauging its current and future trajectories. The rise of China and its challenge to U.S. dominance of the global system is the setting in which the partnership has assumed a major profile, incorporating both defence and economic cooperation on an unprecedented scale. The increasing congruence of Indian and Japanese interests is juxtaposed with the inherent limitations of the partnership to portray a complex picture of a kind of strategic relationship that has become a staple of contemporary international politics.

The emerging strategic relationship between India and Japan is significant for the future security and stability of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. It is also a critical emergent relationship for U.S. security objectives across the Asia-Pacific. India possesses the most latent economic and military potential of any state in the wider Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, India is the state with the greatest potential outside of the United States itself to contribute to the objectives of the "Rebalance to the Pacific" announced by Washington in 2011. This "rebalance" was aimed at fostering a stable, prosperous, and rules-based region where peace, prosperity, and wide respect for human rights are observed and extended. Implicit in the rebalance was a hedge against a China acting to challenge the existing post-World War II rules-based international and regional order. India and Japan share complementary, but not identical, strategic visions. Both seek to manage-and minimize-the potential negative impacts from the rise of China in accord with their own strategic perspectives. As of early 2017, Japan perceives China's growing assertive actions to be a great and rising strategic threat. India is concerned about China's increasingly worrisome behavior but finds itself relatively more dependent upon China for economic growth and less worried about its immediate physical threat than Japan. As a result, India has been, and will continue to be, less vocal in complaints about Chinese behavior, preferring to warn Beijing with subtle signaling and actions. There is broad bipartisan domestic support in Japan and India for enhancing bilateral strategic cooperation now and moving forward. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's role has been a critical factor in the rapid growth of the strategic relationship, and the partnership is unlikely to have moved as far or as fast without his leadership. However, Japan's important relationship with India has been institutionalized in special ways over the past decade that will make it durable-if not as dynamic-when Abe leaves the political stage in Japan. The same is largely true in India. Since mid-2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's personal approach and his special relationship with Abe have been a significant accelerant to the India-Japan strategic relationship. Indian strategic thinking is broadly supportive of continuing to grow strategic bilateral relations with Tokyo. There is a depth of support in both countries that will foster a robust strategic relationship well into the future. Japan provides India with economic, political, and diplomatic interactions that it cannot replicate elsewhere. Japanese economic assistance is special in that it can undertake projects of enormous scope and scale in the Indian economy-offering a competitive and often preferred alternative to Chinese bids on critical Indian infrastructure projects. As a technologically advanced industrial nation with an established defense industry, and one now enabled to export weapons platforms and technologies abroad due to a historic political evolution, Japan can help India advance its national military and defense capabilities. India provides Japan with a security partner of enormous latent potential and three main short-term advantages. India's border dispute with China causes Beijing to spend more on defense along the Indian border, limiting its attention and defense spending against contested island claims astride Japan. Growing Indian maritime capability will enable New Delhi to assume greater responsibility for Indian Ocean security, allowing Japan and the United States to allocate a greater proportion of their own resources to counter Chinese adventurism in the South and East China Seas. Finally, India has the potential to assist Vietnam to develop as a Japanese security partner in Southeast Asia, as both India and Vietnam currently have many of the same Russian military platforms.

This pioneering volume brings together a cross-generational group of top scholars and analysts from both India and Japan to study key areas of bilateral cooperation in economics, energy and climate change, security, and global governance and offer concrete policies both countries can undertake to impart vitality and longevity to their partnership. Specific issues covered include trade, investment, energy security, renewable energy, maritime security, peacekeeping, multilateral institutional reform, nuclear non-proliferation, and the rise of China.