This book is an examination of how the law understands human identity and the whole notion of ‘human being’. On these two notions the law, usually unconsciously, builds the superstructure of ‘human rights’. It explores how the law understands the concept of a human being, and hence a person who is entitled to human rights. This involves a discussion of the legal treatment of those of so-called "marginal personhood" (e.g. high functioning non-human animals; humans of limited intellectual capacity, and fetuses). It also considers how we understand our identity as people, and hence how we fall into different legal categories: such as gender, religion and so on.The law makes a number of huge assumptions about some fundamental issues of human identity and authenticity – for instance that we can talk meaningfully about the entity that we call ‘our self’. Until now it has rarely, if ever, identified those assumptions, let alone interrogated them. This failure has led to the law being philosophically dubious and sometimes demonstrably unfit for purpose. Its failure is increasingly hard to cover up. What should happen legally, for instance, when a disease such as dementia eliminates or radically transforms all the characteristics that most people regard as foundational to the ‘self’? This book seeks to plug these gaps in the literature.

This collection of articles critically examines legal subjectivity and ideas of citizenship inherent in legal thought. The chapters offer a novel perspective on current debates in this area by exploring the connections between public and political issues as they intersect with more intimate sets of relations and private identities. Covering issues as diverse as autonomy, vulnerability and care, family and work, immigration control, the institution of speech, and the electorate and the right to vote, they provide a broader canvas upon which to comprehend more complex notions of citizenship, personhood, identity and belonging in law, in their various ramifications.

Many questions about moral and legal judgments hinge on how we understand the identity of the agents. The intractability of many of these questions stems, this book argues, from ignoring how we actually connect actions with agents. When making everyday judgments about the morality or legality of actions, we do not use Aristotelian logic but what is termed “character logic”. The difference is crucial because implicit in character logic is an understanding of personal identity that is both coherent and intuitively familiar. A person, as we conceptualize him in moral and legal contexts, is a character of resolve. By unpacking what it means to be a character of resolve, this book reveals what underwrites our most fundamental beliefs about a person’s rights and responsibilities. It also provides a new and useful perspective on a variety of issues about rights and responsibilities that perennially occupy philosophers. This book discusses the following: • How we can make better sense of “human rights” if we think of them as “personal rights”. • How the right to be civilly disobedient, in contrast with ordinary law-breaking, can be justified as a personal right. • What basis we have for holding that someone’s responsibility is diminished. • How it makes sense to hold someone responsible for acting irresponsibly. • How it makes sense to distinguish a juvenile offender from someone who should be tried in criminal court. • What kind of correction we should expect from our correctional institutions and how we should design them to achieve that. By making explicit the axioms of character logic and exploring their origins and justification, the book provides a conceptually powerful tool for interpreting the protocols of a person-respecting society.

Présentation de l'éditeur: "This work offers a new theory of what it means to be a legal person and suggests that it is best understood as a cluster property. The book explores the origins of legal personhood, the issues afflicting a traditional understanding of the concept, and the numerous debates surrounding the topic."

The European Union places the 'individual' or person, 'at the heart of its activities'. It is a central concept in all of EU economics, politics, society and ethics. The 15 chapters in this innovative edited collection argue that EU law has had a transformative effect on this concept. The collection looks at the mechanisms used when 'constructing the person' in EU law. It goes beyond traditional literature on 'Europe and the Individual', exploring the question of personhood through critical and contextual perspectives. Constructing the Person in EU Law: Rights, Roles, Identities brings together contributions and debates from experts around Europe to this key question.

By analysing the European Court of Human Rightsa (TM) jurisprudence and philosophical debates on personal autonomy, identity and integrity, the book offers a critical analysis of the possibility of different versions of personal freedom emerging in the case law which may restrict rather than enhance personal freedom.

How do we sustain agency and identity amidst the frailty of advanced old age? What role does care play in this process? Pushing forward new sociological theory, this book explores the theoretical and practical issues raised by age and infirmity. It begins with a theoretical examination of the fourth age, interrogating notions of agency, identity and personhood, as well as the impact of frailty, abjection and ‘othering’. It then applies this analysis to issues of care. Exploring our collective hopes and fears concerning old age and the ends of people’s lives, this is essential reading on one of the biggest social issues of our time.