Abstract: "We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals." (author's abstract)

In this article, I explain the inadequacy of our current state of knowledge regarding the effectiveness of antitrust policy towards mergers. I then discuss the types of data that one must collect in order to be able to perform an analysis of the effectiveness of antitrust policy. There are two types of data one requires in order to perform such an analysis. One is data on the relevant market pre and post merger. The second is data on the specific predictions of the government agencies about the market post-merger. A key point of this article is to stress how weak an analysis of only the first type of data is. The frequent call for retrospective studies typically envisions relying on just this type of data, but the limitations on the analysis are not well understood. As I explain below, retrospective studies that ask whether prices went up post merger are surprisingly poor guides for analyzing merger policy. It is only when the second type of data is combined with the first type that a reliable analysis of antitrust policy can be carried out. There is a need both to collect the necessary data and to analyze it correctly.

This volume contains a selection of papers that were presented at the CRESSE Conferences held in Chania, Crete, from July 6th to 8th, 2012, and in Corfu from July 5th to 7th, 2013. The chapters address current policy issues in competition and regulation. The book contains contributions at the frontier of competition economics and regulation and provides perspectives on recent research findings in the field. Written by experts in their respective fields, the book brings together current thinking on market forces at play in imperfectly competitive industries, how firms use anti-competitive practices to their advantage and how competition policy and regulation can address market failures. It provides an in-depth analysis of various ongoing debates and offers fresh insights in terms of conceptual understanding, empirical findings and policy implications. The book contributes to our understanding of imperfectly competitive markets, anti-competitive practices and competition policy and regulation. Contents:Competition:Market Consolidation and Pricing Developments in Grocery Retailing: A Case Study (Ratula Chakraborty, Paul W Dobson, Jonathan S Seaton and Michael Waterson)The Price Effects of Mergers in Airline Networks (Kai Hüschelrath and Kathrin Müller)Pattern Asymmetry in the Pass-Through of Input Price Shocks in the Road Fuels Sector: New Evidence on the United Kingdom (Enrico Pesaresi, Conor Flanagan and Boryana Miteva)Better Product at Same Cost: Leader Innovation vs Generic Product Improvement (David J Balan and George Deltas)Industry Structure and Pricing Over the Business Cycle (Yossi Spiegel and Konrad Stahl)Price Competition between Platforms: The Case of eBay vs.Yahoo! Auctions (Stefan Behringer)Anticompetitive Practices:Cartel Sales Dynamics when Monitoring for Compliance is More Frequent than Punishment for Non-Compliance (Joseph E Harrington, Jr and Juan-Pablo Montero)Exploitation and Induced Tacit Collusion: A Classroom Experiment of Corporate Leniency Programs (Jeroen Hinloopen and Adriaan R Soetevent)Quantity Discounts and Market Power: The Michelin Case Revisited (Liliane Giardino-Karlinger)Technology Transfer, Contracting, and Product Market Competition (Frago Kourandi, Sabina Sachtachtinskagia and Nikolaos Vettas)Competition Policy and Regulation:How Can Competition Policy and Competition-Policy Economics Contribute to Solving the Healthcare Crisis? (Michael L Katz)Regulation Mismatch in Tackling CO2 Emissions (Claude Crampes)Public Policies in Investment-Intensive Industries (Giovanni Immordino and Michele Polo)The Role of Legal Principles in the Economic Analysis of Competition Policy (Harold Houba, Evgenia Motchenkova and Quan Wen)Deterrence in Competition Law (Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Cristiana Vitale)The Risks and Tricks in Public–Private Partnerships (Elisabetta Iossa, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Mercedes Vellez) Readership: Young researchers and doctoral students looking for new avenues and possibilities for future research; researchers looking for up-to-date treatment of a number of key competition issues; general public practitioners interested in analyzing competition policy. Key Features:Unique and up-to-date treatment of a number of topics in competition economics and regulationWritten by experts in their respective fields in a simple and accessible manner and will be of interest to researchers, PhD students and practitioners in competition economics and regulationProvides an in-depth analysis of various ongoing debates and offers fresh insights in terms of conceptual understanding, empirical findings and policy implicationsKeywords:Competition Policy;Sectoral Regulation;Pattern Asymmetry;Market Consolidation;Grocery Retailing;Pricing Developments;Industry Structure;Price Effects of Mergers;Input Price Shocks;Quantity Discounts

Competition authorities are increasingly interested in understanding the impact of their activities on markets and consumers. The goal is to improve competition policy rules and decision-making practices and to get robust evidence on the benefits of competition and competition policy for society as a whole. Discussions with competition authorities, practitioners and academics have shown the need to take stock of the experience gained in this field by the European Commission and to present it in an easily accessible way. The studies collected in this volume – prepared by senior Commission officials and competition policy experts – range from the ex post evaluation of specific policy interventions to the assessment of the broader impact of competition policy. The issues and topics examined include the following: objectives and scope of evaluations by the European Commission; description of counterfactual evaluation techniques used; conditions for a successful ex post evaluation of a competition policy intervention; a wide selection of individual cases covering a variety of economic sectors; applications in merger control, antitrust and State aid; direct benefits of competition policy interventions for consumers; deterrent effects of such interventions on market participants; and macroeconomic outcomes in terms of job creation, productivity and GDP growth. This matchless book assembles within a single volume all that is needed for competition policy analysts and practitioners to undertake ex post economic evaluations. While its collection of state-of-the-art ex post evaluation studies has a clear value for competition authorities, it is sure to be welcomed as well by competition law practitioners in the private sector, who will greatly appreciate the effort made to cast a critical eye on decisions taken in the past. Moreover, it allows for addressing some of the new challenges facing competition policymakers. Fabienne Ilzkovitz is Principal Advisor responsible for the economic evaluation of competition policy within the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission, and since 2014, she has coordinated various ex post evaluation projects in the Directorate-General. She is also Associate Professor of Economics in the Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium. Adriaan Dierx is Senior Expert on ex post economic evaluation within the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission. He has managed a number of studies aimed at assessing the economic impact of the European Commission’s competition policy interventions.

Sustainable economic development has played a major role in the decline of global poverty in the past two decades. There is no doubt that competitive markets are key drivers of economic growth and productivity. They are also valuable channels for consumer welfare. Competition policy is a powerful tool for complementing efforts to alleviate poverty and bring about shared prosperity. An effective competition policy involves measures that enable contestability and firm entry and rivalry, while ensuring the enforcement of antitrust laws and state aid control. Governments from emerging and developing economies are increasingly requesting pragmatic solutions for effective competition policy implementation, as well as recommendations for pro-competitive sectoral policies. A Step Ahead: Competition Policy for Shared Prosperity and Inclusive Growth puts forward a research agenda that advocates the importance of market competition, effective market regulation, and competition policies for achieving inclusive growth and shared prosperity in emerging and developing economies. It is the result of a global partnership and shared commitment between the World Bank Group and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Part I of the book brings together existing empirical evidence on the benefits of competition for household welfare. It covers the elimination of anticompetitive practices and regulations that restrict competition in key markets and highlights the effects of competition on small producers and employment. Part II of the book focuses on the distributional effects of competition policies and how enforcement can be better aligned with shared prosperity goals.

Competition policy is an integral and prominent part of economic policy-making in the European Union. The EU Treaty prescribes its member states to conduct economic policy ‘in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition’. More precisely, the goal of EU competition policy is “to defend and develop effective competition in the common market” (European Commission, 2000: 7). Under its Commissioners van Miert, Monti and, most - cently, Kroes the EU Commission has stepped up its effort to pursue and achieve the aforementioned goal. A number of so-called hard-core cartels, such as the - torious “vitamin cartel” led by Roche, have been detected, tried in violation of Art. 81 of the Maastricht Accord and punished with severe fines. Also Microsoft was hit hard by the strong hand of the Commission having been severely fined for - ploiting a dominant market position. Economic analysis has been playing an increasingly significant role in the Commission’s examination of competition law cases. This holds true in particular for merger control. Here, however, the Commission has had to accept some poi- ant defeats in court, such as the Court’s reversals of Airtours-First Choice or GE- Honeywell. Among other things, the European Court of Justice found the e- nomic analysis as conducted by the EU’s Directorate General for Competition to be flawed and the conclusions drawn not to be convincing. These rejections by the courts have stirred up the scholarly debate on the conceptual foundations of Eu- pean competition policy.