A study of the influence of German Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke, 1906-1914.

This book explores the influence of Helmuth von Moltke, Germany's Chief of the General Staff between 1906 and 1914. Based largely on previously-unknown primary sources, it shows that Moltke's influence on the Kaiser and on Germany's political decision-making to have been decisive, helping to foster an increasingly confrontational mood. The book also takes issue with the common perception of Moltke as a reluctant military leader, concluding that he was both bellicose and ambitious and played a crucial role in the outbreak of the First World War.

Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke is best known for his direction of the German/Prussian campaigns against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-71, yet it was during his service as chief of the General Staff that he laid the foundation for the German way of war which would continue through 1945. Professor Daniel Hughes of the Air War College, in addition to editing and assisting with the translation of this selection of Moltke’s thoughts and theories on the art of war, has written an insightful commentary on “Moltke the Elder” that places him in the broader context of Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s sometimes abstract philosophical ideas. The book also contains an extensive bibliographic and historiographic commentary that includes references to Moltke and his theories in the current literature in Germany, England, and the United States—a valuable aid to anyone doing research on the subject. This volume, in addition to its appeal to scholars, serves as an introduction to the theory of the German army, as well as a summary of Moltke’s enduring theoretical legacy. Praise for Moltke on the Art of War “Moltke molded the Prussian and ultimately the German army at a time of technological and economic change. For that reason . . . this book deserves a much wider audience than those interested in nineteenth-century military history. Readers will be particularly grateful for the editor’s careful explanation of terms that are easily mistranslated in English, and for concise and useful footnotes and bibliography. A model of fine editing.”—Foreign Affairs Magazine “This valuable work ably compiles the selected writings on the art of war of one of military history’s greatest geniuses. [Moltke’s] impact on American military thinking persists, especially in various military staff college curricula. Strongly recommended.”—Armed Forces Journal “A thoughtfully edited, well-translated anthology that merits a place in any serious collection on the craft of war in the modern Western world."—Journal of Military History

With the creation of the Franco-Russian Alliance and the failure of the Reinsurance Treaty in the late nineteenth century, Germany needed a strategy for fighting a two-front war. In response, Field Marshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen produced a study that represented the apex of modern military planning. His Memorandum for a War against France, which incorporated a mechanized cavalry as well as new technologies in weaponry, advocated that Germany concentrate its field army to the west and annihilate the French army within a few weeks. For generations, historians have considered Schlieffen's writings to be the foundation of Germany's military strategy in World War I and have hotly debated the reasons why the plan, as executed, failed. In this important volume, international scholars reassess Schlieffen's work for the first time in decades, offering new insights into the renowned general's impact not only on World War I but also on nearly a century of military historiography. The contributors draw on newly available source materials from European and Russian archives to demonstrate both the significance of the Schlieffen Plan and its deficiencies. They examine the operational planning of relevant European states and provide a broad, comparative historical context that other studies lack. Featuring fold-out maps and abstracts of the original German deployment plans as they evolved from 1893 to 1914, this rigorous reassessment vividly illustrates how failures in statecraft as well as military planning led to the tragedy of the First World War.

More than a hundred years after it began, the question of the origins of World War I remains contested. Based on Mombauer's The Origins of the First World War (2002), this thoroughly revised and expanded volume surveys the long debate, taking the analysis from 1914 to the centenary and beyond. The causes of the First World War were in dispute before the first shots had even been fired. Recriminations intensified following the Treaty of Versailles when the victors accused Germany and its allies of starting the war. This was the start of a heated blame game. To shift the responsibility to former enemies, historians and politicians on all sides became embroiled in a war of documents and publications. The author examines the circumstances that fuelled these international disagreements, offering an extensive analysis of a complex historical controversy which has been shaped by political and ideological concerns. This volume provides students, teachers, scholars, and non-specialist readers with a comprehensive guide through the maze of conflicting interpretations and arguments over evidence.

The seminal event of the 20th century, the origins of the First World War have always been difficult to establish and have aroused deep controversy. Annika Mombauer tracks the impassioned debates as they developed at critical points through the twentieth century. The book focuses on the controversy itself, rather than the specific events leading up to the war. Emotive and emotional from the very beginning of the conflict, the debate and the passions aroused in response to such issues as the ‘war-guilt paragraph’ of the treaty of Versailles, are set in the context of the times in which they were proposed. Similarly, the argument has been fuelled by concerns over the sacrifices that were made and the casualities that were suffered. Were they really justified?

For the first time in a generation, here is a bold new account of the Battle of the Marne, a cataclysmic encounter that prevented a quick German victory in World War I and changed the course of two wars and the world. With exclusive information based on newly unearthed documents, Holger H. Herwig re-creates the dramatic battle and reinterprets Germany’s aggressive “Schlieffen Plan” as a carefully crafted design to avoid a protracted war against superior coalitions. He paints a fresh portrait of the run-up to the Marne and puts in dazzling relief the Battle of the Marne itself: the French resolve to win, and the crucial lack of coordination between Germany’s First and Second Armies. Herwig also provides stunning cameos of all the important players, from Germany’s Chief of General Staff Helmuth von Moltke to his rival, France’s Joseph Joffre. Revelatory and riveting, this is the source on this seminal event.