While growth figures are high for Soviet industry in general, they are especially impressive for the MBMW sector which has far outperformed other sectors of the economy. The question widely debated in the U.S.S.R. now is whether these impressive figures actually reflect the growth of physical output. To put it differently, did the Soviet economy receive more machines and equipment as a result of this growth, and, if so, was the rate of real growth the same as the growth in value terms? But why would one raise such a question in the first place? To answer this and similar questions, the procedures of Soviet measurement of output, productivity, costs and prices have been analyzed in this study. Special attention is given to the processes of planning quality improvements and pricing new technological items. An analysis of procedures and methodological instructions used in planning and pricing MBMW products may be helpful in revealing possible discrepancies between prices of new goods and their quality characteristics.

Why did the Soviet economic system fall apart? Did the economy simply overreach itself through military spending? Was it the centrally-planned character of Soviet socialism that was at fault? Or did a potentially viable mechanism come apart in Gorbachev's clumsy hands? Does its failure mean that true socialism is never economically viable? The economic dimension is at the very heart of the Russian story in the twentieth century. Economic issues were the cornerstone of soviet ideology and the soviet system, and economic issues brought the whole system crashing down in 1989-91. This book is a record of what happened, and it is also an analysis of the failure of Soviet economics as a concept.

The Seventh Edition of Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure offers students a balanced perspective in understanding the Soviet past and Russia's present and future. With thorough coverage of the Soviet legacy, the transition, and the contemporary Russian economy, the text allows instruction from either ahistorical or contemporary perspective. *NEW! A major update of the critical economic issues in contemporary Russia at the dawn of the twenty-first century. *NEW! Increased coverage of the critical energy and agriculture sectors of key issues such as privatization where more and better evidence is now available. *NEW! An assessment of a full ten years of Russian economic performance under transition, including increased emphasis on the basic issues in transition and the important differences between Russia and other transition economies. *NEW! Updated terminology for easier reference by students. *Allows flexible teaching choices. New contemporary focus still allows instructors the flexibility to teach the course from a historical perspective. *Authors are established, active scholars who are widely known and well respected in the field of comparative economic syste

In countries such as the Soviet Union, where wealth is mainly stored in monetary assets, the behavior of the money to income ratio is a poor indicator of the growth of undesired monetary balances (monetary overhang). In those countries a monetary overhang is primarily a wealth overhang, which has to be analyzed by evaluating deviations of actual from desired wealth holdings; this requires an empirical analysis of consumption and saving decisions. In this paper, we present estimates of a consumption function for the Soviet Union, from which an evaluation of the monetary overhang existing at the end of 1990 is derived.

For half a century the Soviet economy was inefficient but stable. In the late 1980s, to the surprise of nearly everyone, it suddenly collapsed. Why did this happen? And what role did Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's economic reforms play in the country's dissolution? In this groundbreaking study, Chris Miller shows that Gorbachev and his allies tried to learn from the great success story of transitions from socialism to capitalism, Deng Xiaoping's China. Why, then, were efforts to revitalize Soviet socialism so much less successful than in China? Making use of never-before-studied documents from the Soviet politburo and other archives, Miller argues that the difference between the Soviet Union and China--and the ultimate cause of the Soviet collapse--was not economics but politics. The Soviet government was divided by bitter conflict, and Gorbachev, the ostensible Soviet autocrat, was unable to outmaneuver the interest groups that were threatened by his economic reforms. Miller's analysis settles long-standing debates about the politics and economics of perestroika, transforming our understanding of the causes of the Soviet Union's rapid demise.

The Disintegration of the Soviet Economic System (1992) examines in detail the collapse of the Soviet economic system, and is set in its political context, both international and domestic. The collapse is looked at from a macroeconomic point of view, both real and financial, as well as from a mesoeconomic viewpoint, with chapters on such important sectors such as agriculture and the railways. Because the USSR is such a large country it is also looked at in a regional perspective, with chapters on Central Asia and the allocation of investment between republics, and attention is also paid to the welfare of the population, their health and the development of their consumption, and the environment and technical progress.