God, Evil, and Human Learning explores the age-old question: How is it possible to believe in the God of the Christian faith when the world contains so many grievous evils? Author Fred Berthold Jr. examines the most influential argument used by Christian theologians to answer that question, the "free will defense," which holds that God is not responsible for the evil in the world, but that evil arises from the human misuse of free will. He points out the weaknesses of this defense and provides a more adequate concept of free will. Berthold argues that free will is a complex of abilities which are acquired—if acquired—through human learning in the context of experiences of actual goods and evils and their consequences. He revises the "free will defense" and offers a new view of the relationship between God and his creatures.

This Element has two aims. The first is to discuss arguments philosophers have made about the difference God's existence might make to questions of general interest in metaethics. The second is to argue that it is a mistake to think we can get very far in answering these questions by assuming a thin conception of God, and to suggest that exploring the implications of thick theisms for metaethics would be more fruitful.

The incursion of evil has always caused people to turn to the divine, to gods or to a god, in order to reorientate their life. Ingolf U. Dalferth studies the complexity of this procedure in three thought processes that deal with the central concepts in the Christian understanding of malum as privation (a lack of good), as evil-doing, and as a lack of faith. In doing so, he provides a detailed discussion of theories of theodicy, the argument from freedom, and the religious turn to God, in which the author explores the traces of the discovery of God's goodness, justness, and love in connection with the malum experiences in ancient mythology and biblical traditions.

Everyone has experienced pain. No one is immune from loss and suffering. With all of the evil in this world, how can anyone rationally believe in a good and loving God? People who believe in God experience intense evil, yet they still retain their faith, claiming that God helps them in times of need. Still others claim that this same evil is proof that God does not exist; that if God were real, he would limit the suffering. If you have ever thought that it seems that things should be a certain way, that you are inclined toward believing, or not believing, in God because of the existence of evil, you are part of the conversation of the abductive problem of evil. This book does more than just explore what modern philosophers on both sides of the aisle have claimed about God and evil. It also illuminates an intricate world that is crafted for people having free will, for people who make moral choices. For it is within the realm of this intricate world that we may find the answers we seek.

Noted philosopher William Hasker explores a full range of questions concerning the problem of evil. Hasker forges constructive answers in some depth showing why the evil in the world does not provide evidence of a moral fault in God, the world's creator and governor.

Why do bad things happen, even to good people? If there is a God, why aren't God's existence and God's will for humans more apparent? And if God really does miracles for some people, why not for others? This book examines these three problems of evil - suffering, divine hiddenness, and unfairness if miracles happen as believers claim - to explore how different ideas of God's power relate to the problem of evil. Keller argues that as long as God is believed to be all-powerful, there are no adequate answers to these problems, nor is it enough for theists simply to claim that human ignorance makes these problems insoluble. Arguing that there are no good grounds for the belief that God is all-powerful, Keller instead defends the understanding of God and God's power found in process theism and shows how it makes possible an adequate solution to the problems of evil while providing a concept of God that is religiously adequate.