This book explores the relationship of mutual trust and fundamental rights in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) of the European Union and asks whether there is any role for proportionality. Mutual trust among Member States has long been presumed by the Court in a manner that mutual recognition was prioritised in regard to, but to the detriment of, the protection of fundamental rights. After thoroughly reviewing this relationship, this book offers a comprehensive framework of proportionality and explores its impact on the protection of fundamental rights in a mutual trust environment. It applies a theoretical and a normative framework of proportionality to two case studies (EU criminal and asylum law) by reference to several fundamental rights, enabling a carefully constructed analysis with useful parallels. The book argues that such analysis, based on proportionality, is not always desirable and helpful for the protection of fundamental rights in this area and thoroughly explores its impact on the protection of fundamental rights vis-à-vis mutual trust.

The development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has transformed the European Union and placed fundamental rights at the core of EU integration and its principles of mutual recognition and trust. The impact of the AFSJ in the development of an EU standard of fundamental rights, which has come to the fore since the Treaty of Lisbon, is a topic of great theoretical and practical importance. This is the first systematic academic study of the AFSJ and its implications from the point of view of fundamental rights. The contributions to this collection examine the normative and jurisprudential development of the AFSJ in order to assess its effects on the overall construction of the scope and standards of protection of EU fundamental rights in this particularly complex and sensitive field of integration. The expert contributors systematically map and critically assess this area of EU law, together with the relevant case-law.

In the internal market within which the principle of mutual recognition originated, there was no need for a grand principle of mutual trust to counterbalance the potentially far-reaching consequences of mutual recognition.The creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) led to a change of paradigm, however. Mutual trusts suddenly came on stage in the field of judicial cooperation, stealing the limelight from the principle of mutual recognition and provoking the latter's transformation. Against this background, this article examines the intertwinement of the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust within the AFSJ and their relationship with fundamental rights. It is recalled that recognition is concerned not with fundamental rights but with integration. By flanking mutual recognition with the new principle of mutual trust, the CJEU and the EU legislator sought to foster mutual recognition on the basis of a virtuous, yet illusory, argument that (all) fundamental rights are equally safeguarded by (all) the Member States. In the early years of the AFSJ, the protection of fundamental rights was meant to be ensured through a combination of mutual recognition and mutual trust. Recently, however, the CJEU and the EU legislator have taken a more realistic approach by dispensing with the need for mutual recognition in exceptional circumstances where there is a failure to observe fundamental rights. On its face, that change suggests that the protection of fundamental rights may actually be at variance with mutual recognition and mutual trust. The main claim of this paper is that, within the framework of the AFSJ, a high level of protection of fundamental rights will be achieved by combining harmonisation with mutual recognition based on solid mutual trust grounded in reality. This calls for a major (re)thinking of the function and content of mutual trust in order for the latter to be at the service of mutual recognition.

This book analyses the new architecture for the protection of fundamental rights in Europe after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. As a starting point, it identifies how the EU has gained a prominent role in promoting and protecting fundamental rights at European level despite the absence of an unlimited mandate to address fundamental rights violations. This new setting affects the traditional relationship between the EU, the ECHR system and the Member States and, in the absence of EU accession to the ECHR, enhances the risk of tensions and conflicts between the case law of the two European Courts. Examples of these tensions and conflicts are explored in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice, which is one of the most fundamental rights-sensitive areas of EU law and one of the busiest areas of activity for the CJEU. The book offers new insights into existing rules on the resolution of conflicts between EU and ECHR law before mapping out techniques actually used by domestic courts to avoid or address such conflicts.

EU Criminal Law is perhaps the fastest-growing area of EU law. It is also one of the most contested fields of EU action, covering measures which have a significant impact on the protection of fundamental rights and the relationship between the individual and the State, while at the same time presenting a challenge to State sovereignty in the field and potentially reconfiguring significantly the relationship between Member States and the EU. The book will examine in detail the main aspects of EU criminal law, in the light of these constitutional challenges. These include: the history and institutions of EU criminal law (including the evolution of the third pillar and its relationship with EC law); harmonisation in criminal law and procedure (with emphasis on competence questions); mutual recognition in criminal matters (including the operation of the European Arrest Warrant) and accompanying measures; action by EU bodies facilitating police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters (such as Europol, Eurojust and OLAF); the collection and exchange of personal data, in particular via EU databases and co-operation between law enforcement authorities; and the external dimension of EU action in criminal matters, including EU-US counter-terrorism co-operation. The analysis is forward-looking, taking into account the potential impact of the Lisbon Treaty on EU criminal law.

Mutual recognition in the EU is both a goal and a principle in of itself, constructed and operationalised through individual provisions. The principle of mutual recognition is regarded as fundamental in enabling cooperation between Member States both in civil and criminal matters. The principle of mutual recognition has long ago outgrown the Internal Market and seeped through into judicial matters between Member States in the AFSJ. The accompanying realisation that the EU is not just an economic area is therefore evident. Since the inception of the idea of a Europe free of classical border checks facilitating freedom of movement was manifested, the fear of circumventing the application of judicial decisions became evermore real. Therefore, monumental changes in the fields of international criminal and international private law were expected and implemented in the European union (EU), through the principle of mutual trust and mutual recognition. Subsequently, classical concepts of private international and international criminal law gave way to Europeanised concepts of exequatur, the public policy exception, the principle of reciprocity, the principle of double criminality and the principle of specialty to name a few. It should be noted that these rules had been reserved to be enacted by the Member States. However, by loosening those principles the guarantees and freedoms which they either explicitly or implicitly guard are in danger of being sidestepped in order to enable mutual recognition. Therefore, at the forefront of the debate of mutual recognition of judicial decisions is the question of protecting fundamental rights and legal principles enshrined both in European and domestic legislation of the Member States. The balancing act that the EU preforms has to be careful enough to facilitate mutual recognition while not jeopardizing mutual trust between Member States. Today both EU private international law and EU criminal law work on the basis of the provisions which facilitate mutual recognition and limit it within the AFSJ. Since the basic idea behind mutual recognition is the same, i.e. free movement of judicial decisions, both their manifestations and their limits should strive to respect the basic framework of the field of law form which they stand. While the principle of mutual recognition has been slowly and methodically evolving, there is a sense of urgency with the development of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters.

This book develops a conceptual framework of the principle of mutual trust in EU criminal law. Mutual trust is a household term in the EU criminal law vocabulary and is widely regarded to be a prerequisite for a successful application of mutual recognition. But despite its importance, the parameters of the concept are not clear. The book demonstrates that mutual trust is multi-faceted: combining the elements essential to a successful EU criminal law, as part of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The book approaches trust from multiple angles. First, a study of social science literature. Second, a meticulous assessment of mutual trust in EU criminal law. Third, a study of trust in US interstate criminal justice cooperation. Finally, the book identifies a comprehensive approach to tackle trust related difficulties in EU criminal law. This timely book will be of great interest to anyone looking to gain a full picture of this core principle in EU criminal law.