This book explores the trail-blazing Theory of Constitutional Rights of Robert Alexy. The authors combine critical analysis of the structural elements of Alexy’s theory with an assessment of its applied relevance, paying special attention to the UK Human Rights Act and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Alexy himself opens the book with an insightful contextualisation of his theory of fundamental rights within his general legal theory.

This book, which originated from the broadly held view that there is a lack of Rule-of-law in Mexico, and from the emphasis of traditional academia on cultural elements as the main explanation, explores the question of whether there is any relationship between the system of constitutional review ― and thus the ‘law’ as such ― and the level of Rule-of-law in a given state. To do so, it elaborates a theoretical model for achieving Rule-of-law and compares it to the constitutional review systems of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Mexico. The study concludes that the two former states correspond to the model, while the latter does not. This is fundamentally due to the role each legal system assigns to ordinary jurisdiction in carrying out constitutional review. Whereas the US and Germany have fostered the policy that constitutional review regarding the enforcement of basic rights is the responsibility of ordinary courts, Mexico has relied too heavily on the specialized constitutional jurisdiction.

This book develops an analytical legal framework for determining the substantive fundamental rights obligations of corporations.

This book examines the European system for the protection of fundamental rights. The aim is to identify the constitutional dynamics that occur as a result of the interaction between state and transnational human rights standards. Fabbrini compares the European system with the US federal system based on four case studies.

The relationship between the state and the national government is among the most contested issues in the United States. And questions about where power should reside, how decisions should be made, and how responsibility should be allocated have been central to the American experiment in federalism. In Polyphonic Federalism, Robert A. Schapiro defends the advantages of multiple perspectives in government, arguing that the resulting ''polyphony'' creates a system that is more efficient, democratic, and protective of liberties. This groundbreaking volume contends that contemporary views of federalism are plagued by outmoded dualist notions that seek to separate state and federal authority. Instead, Schapiro proposes a polyphonic model that emphasizes the valuable interaction of state and federal law, one that more accurately describes the intersecting realities of local and national power. Through an analysis of several legal and policy debates, Polyphonic Federalism demonstrates how a multifaceted government can best realize the potential of federalism to protect fundamental rights.

One of the most important modern developments in American constitutional law has been the extension of the Bill of Rights to the states. The most important guarantees of the first eight amendments have been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, along with the doctrine that these are rights that are so "fundamental" that any restriction is subject to judicial "strict scrutiny." The process has nationalized fundamental rights, giving them a preferred dignity and majesty. In this volume, the renowned constitutional scholar, Milton Konvitz, traces the development of fundamental rights from the early days of American jurisprudence through twentieth-century cases involving the right to privacy, racial discrimination, voting rights, censorship, and abortion laws. In Konvitz's astute view, the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the United States, like the Ten Commandments, places no priority among protected or guaranteed rights. He argues that values, ideals, rights, liberties, and privileges need to be placed in a hierarchical order or scale. The Supreme Court, acting on a case-by-case basis, has slowly and cautiously moved to designate some rights as superior to others. This idea that some rights are of a "fundamental" nature, while others are not, can be traced back to the early days of the nation's government. Konvitz shows that there may be said to be not one, but two or even three bills of rights, one for the Federal government and one for the States. Still another, may be an unwritten but evolving Bill of Rights. The Court has recognized rights or liberties that are in no written constitution, as for example, a right to marry, a right to have a family, a right to choose education of one's children in a private, even a religious, school, rather than a public school. In an illuminating fashion, Konvitz, whose writings have been cited in Supreme Court decisions, traces the controversial and very uneven line of development of such "fundamental rights." This volume is likely the first book on the subject and a pioneering work in the history of American constitutional law. Accessibly written for a general and scholarly audience, it will be of particular interest to political scientists, historians, and constitutional scholars.

The ever increasing relevance of European law which involves replacement or supplementation of and interaction with national law not only affects the states in Europe but also, and foremost, the citizens. The rights of the citizens in Europe are protected by the European Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The aim of this textbook is to grasp and illustrate the meaning of these rights and to integrate it into a coherent system. For this purpose the book not only deals with the pertinent law of the European Union and the European Community, but also with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which, too, is becoming more and more important. In addition, regard is had to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union which forms part of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Although the Charter is not yet legally binding since the Constitution has not been ratified by all EU Member States, the Community Courts already make reference to it as a concentrate of the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. It therefore does not seem entirely unlikely that the Charter might be included into the existing Treaties irrespective of the future constitutional developments on the EU level. On a similar anticipatory basis the book also takes into account those Protocols to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms that have not yet entered into force.