A number of member countries have expressed interest in advice regarding disclosure and management of fiscal risks (defined as the possibility of deviations of fiscal outcomes from what was expected at the time of the budget or other forecast). This paper analyzes the main sources of fiscal risks and—building on an overview of existing practices in a wide range of countries—provides practical suggestions in this area, including a possible Statement of Fiscal Risks and a set of Guidelines for Fiscal Risk Disclosure and Management.

We construct the first comprehensive dataset of contingent liability realizations in advanced and emerging markets for the period 1990–2014. We find that contingent liability realizations are a major source of fiscal distress. The average fiscal cost of a contingent liability realization is 6 percent of GDP but costs can be as high as 40 percent for major financial sector bailouts. Contingent liability realizations are correlated among each other and tend to occur during periods of growth reversals and crises, accentuating pressure on the budget during already difficult times. Countries with stronger institutions are able to better control and address the underlying risks so that they are less exposed to contingent liability realizations.

Fiscal reporting is intended to warn of fiscal crises while there is still time to prevent them. The recent crisis thus seems to reveal a failure of fiscal reporting: before the crisis, even reports on fiscal risk typically did not mention banks as a possible source of fiscal problems. One reason for silence was that the risk arose partly from implicit guarantees, and governments may have feared that disclosure would increase moral hazard. The crisis cast doubt, however, on the effectiveness of silence in mitigating risks. This paper discusses how fiscal risks from the financial sector could be discussed in reports on fiscal risk, with a view to encouraging their mitigation.

Many governments have faced serious instability as a result of their contingent liabilities. But conventional public finance analysis and institutions fail to address such fiscal risks. This book aims to provide motivation and practical guidance to governments seeking to improve their management of fiscal risks. The book addresses some of the difficult analytical and institutional challenges that face reformers tooling up to manage government fiscal risks. It discusses the inadequacies of conventional practices as well as recent advances in dealing with fiscal risk.

This departmental paper investigates how countries in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) can improve fiscal transparency, thereby raising government efficiency and reducing corruption vulnerabilities.

This Fiscal Transparency Evaluation report highlights that Uzbekistan is embarking on a comprehensive reform program to strengthen public financial management and fiscal transparency. Wide-ranging reforms to improve the coverage, reliability, quality, and accessibility of fiscal reports are being developed and implemented, and some good progress already made. This assessment of fiscal transparency practices has been undertaken to support the government’s efforts to increase transparency by identifying priority areas for reform. An evaluation of practices against the IMF’s Fiscal Transparency Code (the Code) finds that tangible gains have been made over 2017 and 2018. In several areas where Uzbekistan’s practices do not currently meet the basic standard required under the Code, quick progress can be made. The report also provides a more detailed evaluation of Uzbekistan’s fiscal transparency practices and recommended reform priorities. Strengthening legislative oversight of the state budget with a view to reducing the extent to which in-year changes can be made to aggregate expenditures without prior parliamentary approval.

Investment in infrastructure can be a driving force of the economic recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic in the context of shrinking fiscal space. Public-private partnerships (PPP) bring a promise of efficiency when carefully designed and managed, to avoid creating unnecessary fiscal risks. But fiscal illusions prevent an understanding the sources of fiscal risks, which arise in all infrastructure projects, and that in PPPs present specific characteristics that need to be addressed. PPP contracts are also affected by implicit fiscal risks when they are poorly designed, particularly when a government signs a PPP contract for a project with no financial sustainability. This paper reviews the advantages and inconveniences of PPPs, discusses the fiscal illusions affecting them, identifies a diversity of fiscal risks, and presents the essentials of PPP fiscal risk management.