Substate nationalism is often studied as a question of political identity and cultural recognition. The same applies to the study of multinational federalism – it is mainly conceived as a tool for the accommodation of minority cultures and identities. Few works in political philosophy and political science pay attention to the fiscal and redistributive dimensions of substate nationalism and multinational federalism. Yet nationalist movements in Western countries make crucial claims about fiscal autonomy and the fair distribution of resources between national groups within the same state. In recent years, Scottish nationalists have demanded greater tax autonomy, Catalan and Flemish nationalists have viewed themselves as unfairly disadvantaged by centralized fiscal arrangements, and equalization payments and social transfers in Canada have exacerbated tensions within the federation. In Fiscal Federalism in Multinational States contributors from political philosophy and political science disciplines explore the fiscal side of substate nationalism in Canada, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Australia. Chapters examine the connection between secessionist claims and interregional redistributive arrangements, power relations in federations where taxing and spending responsibilities are shared between orders of government, the relationship between substate nationalism and fiscal autonomy, and the role of federal governments in redistributing resources among substate national groups. Fiscal Federalism in Multinational States brings together scholars of nationalism and federalism in a groundbreaking analysis of the connections between nationalist claims and fiscal debates within plurinational states.

World’s leading theorists of multinational justice on sub-state national minority groups Almost without exception, multinational states across the West are facing existential crises precipitated by the resurgence of sub-state national minority groups. This edited volume brings together many of the world’s leading theorists of multinational justice in order to analyse two of the most frequent areas of debate and dispute in multinational federations: recognition and redistribution. The authors address questions such as the following: What are the most appropriate forms of institutional recognition for sub-state national groups? How is the concept of redistributive justice affected by the presence of federal institutions and autonomous sub-state nationalities? And what are the potential sources of stability that fractious federations can call upon? As well as extensive theoretical analyses, the book is peppered throughout with examples drawn from actual multinational states including Canada, Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Contributors Jean-François Grégoire (KU Leuven), Michael Jewkes (KU Leuven), Helder De Schutter (KU Leuven), Antoon Vandevelde (KU Leuven), Alain-G Gagnon (Université du Québec à Montréal), Geneviève Nootens (Université du Québec à Chicoutimi), Philippe Van Parijs (Université Catholique de Louvain), François Boucher (University of Montreal), Jocelyn Maclure (Université Laval), Andrew Shorten (University of Limerick), David Robichaud (University of Ottawa), Ferran Requejo (Universitat Pompeu Fabra), Marc Sanjaume (Université du Québec à Montréal).

Substate nationalism is often studied as a question of political identity and cultural recognition. The same applies to the study of multinational federalism – it is mainly conceived as a tool for the accommodation of minority cultures and identities. Few works in political philosophy and political science pay attention to the fiscal and redistributive dimensions of substate nationalism and multinational federalism. Yet nationalist movements in Western countries make crucial claims about fiscal autonomy and the fair distribution of resources between national groups within the same state. In recent years, Scottish nationalists have demanded greater tax autonomy, Catalan and Flemish nationalists have viewed themselves as unfairly disadvantaged by centralized fiscal arrangements, and equalization payments and social transfers in Canada have exacerbated tensions within the federation. In Fiscal Federalism in Multinational States contributors from political philosophy and political science disciplines explore the fiscal side of substate nationalism in Canada, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Australia. Chapters examine the connection between secessionist claims and interregional redistributive arrangements, power relations in federations where taxing and spending responsibilities are shared between orders of government, the relationship between substate nationalism and fiscal autonomy, and the role of federal governments in redistributing resources among substate national groups. Fiscal Federalism in Multinational States brings together scholars of nationalism and federalism in a groundbreaking analysis of the connections between nationalist claims and fiscal debates within plurinational states.

Decentralism of political power to regions and local government occurs worldwide in response to demands from the periphery. Such devolution of power raises a number of problems - political, financial, and legal. By gathering together important papers from a series of workshops sponsored by the SNS Constitutional Project and the Center for European Integration Studies, this volume presents a number of these problems from a truly interdisciplinary perspective. The authors believe that fiscal federalism, while originating in formally federal states, is relevant also to the analysis of state-local relationships in unitary states with some degree of regional or local authority. Among the topics they cover are the division of responsibilities and powers of taxation, bailouts, systems of equalization, and state grants, as well as problems related to democracy and citizens' rights. While the book's primary focus is Nordic, its international perspective is enhanced by contributions from Europe, Canada, and the U.S.

The nation-state is a double sleight of hand, naturalizing both the nation and the state encompassing it. No such naturalization is possible in multinational states. To explain why these countries experience political crises that bring their very existence into question, standard accounts point to conflicts over resources, security, and power. This book turns the spotlight on institutional symbolism. When minority nations in multinational states press for more self-government, they are not only looking to protect their interests. They are asking to be recognized as political communities in their own right. Yet satisfying their demands for recognition threatens to provoke a reaction from members of majority nations who see such changes as a symbolic repudiation of their own vision of politics. Secessionist crises flare up when majority backlash reverses symbolic concessions to minority nations. Through a synoptic historical sweep of Canada, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, The Symbolic State shows us that institutions may be more important for what they mean than for what they do. A major contribution to the study of comparative nationalism and secession, comparative politics, and social theory, The Symbolic State is particularly timely in an era when the power of symbols – exemplified by Brexit, the Donald Trump presidency, and the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement – is reshaping politics.

What makes a country attractive to foreign investors? To what extent do conditions of governance and politics matter? This book provides the most systematic exploration to date of these crucial questions at the nexus of politics and economics. Using quantitative data and interviews with investment promotion agencies, investment location consultants, political risk insurers, and decision makers at multinational corporations, Nathan Jensen arrives at a surprising conclusion: Countries may be competing for international capital, but government fiscal policy--both taxation and spending--has little impact on multinationals' investment decisions. Although government policy has a limited ability to determine patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, political institutions are central to explaining why some countries are more successful in attracting international capital. First, democratic institutions lower political risks for multinational corporations. Indeed, they lead to massive amounts of foreign direct investment. Second, politically federal institutions, in contrast to fiscally federal institutions, lower political risks for multinationals and allow host countries to attract higher levels of FDI inflows. Third, the International Monetary Fund, often cited as a catalyst for promoting foreign investment, actually deters multinationals from investment in countries under IMF programs. Even after controlling for the factors that lead countries to seek IMF support, IMF agreements are associated with much lower levels of FDI inflows.

This electronic version has been made available under a Creative Commons (BY-NC-ND) open access license. Building on earlier work, this text combines theoretical perspectives with empirical work, to provide a comparative analysis of the electoral systems, party systems and governmental systems in the ethnic republics and regions of Russia. It also assesses the impact of these different institutional arrangements on democratization and federalism, moving the focus of research from the national level to the vitally important processes of institution building and democratization at the local level and to the study of federalism in Russia.