This Element seeks to make sense of Southeast Asia's numerous armed conflicts. It makes four contributions. First, this study provides a typology, distinguishing between revolutionary, secessionist, and communal conflicts. The first two are types of insurgencies, while the latter are ethnic conflicts. Second, this study emphasizes the importance of ethnicity in shaping conflict dynamics. This is true even for revolutionary conflicts, which at first glance may appear unrelated to ethnicity. A third contribution relates to broad conflict trends. Revolutionary and secessionist conflicts feature broad historical arcs, with clear peaks and declines, while communal conflicts occur more sporadically. The fourth contribution ties these points together by focusing on conflict management. Just as ethnicity shapes conflicts, ethnic leaders and traditions can also promote peace. Cultural mechanisms are especially important for managing communal conflicts, the lone type not declining in Southeast Asia.

The Vietnam War was the bloodiest and one of the most fascinating conflicts in the history of warfare. It began with America pouring massive military aid upon the South Vietnamese in an attempt to thwart a Communist takeover, and culminated in the "peace with honour" withdrawal by the Nixon administration. This authoritative account accurately details every aspect of the Vietnam War and provides an overall view of the impact which it continues to have to this day.

Considers the various phases of the conflict in Vietnam from French rule to the U.S. military role. Details special weapons and techniques used.

Exploring the links between armed conflict and transnational crime, Florian Weigand builds on in-depth empirical research into some of Southeast Asia’s murkiest borders. The disparate voices of drug traffickers, rebel fighters, government officials and victims of armed conflict are heard in Conflict and Transnational Crime, exploring perspectives that have been previously disregarded in understanding the field.

As American operations against terrorism spread around the globe to places like Afghanistan and the Philippines, an increasing tendency has been for commentators to draw parallels with past experience in Vietnam. Even soldiers on the ground have begun to speak in such terms. The author analyzes the Army's response to that defeat in Southeast Asia and its long-term impact. Contrary to the accepted wisdom that nations which lose wars tend to learn best how to correct their mistakes, he argues that Americans tried to forget the unhappy experience with counterinsurgency by refocusing on conventional wars. While that process eventually produced the powerful force that won the Persian Gulf War, it left an Army with force structure, doctrine, and attitudes that are much less applicable to the peace operations and counterterrorism campaign it now faces. The author asserts that the Army must change in order to operate effectively in the full spectrum of future requirements, and it is time to reexamine the war in Vietnam. He also draws attention to the service's "Lessons Learned" process, and provides insights as to how the experience gained in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM should be analyzed and applied.