Discusses a range of philosophical questions about fictional characters and fictional objects, with implications for metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.

Eleven original essays discuss a range of puzzling philosophical questions about fictional characters, and more generally about fictional objects. For example, they ask questions like the following: Do they really exist? What would fictional objects be like if they existed? Do they exist eternally? Are they created? Who by? When and how? Can they be destroyed? If so, how? Are they abstract or concrete? Are they actual? Are they complete objects? Are they possible objects? How many fictional objects are there? What are their identity conditions? What kinds of attitudes can we have towards them? This volume will be a landmark in the philosophical debate about fictional objects, and will influence higher-level debates within metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.

God and fictional objects are central topics within philosophy, but rarely do the respective discussions overlap. Until now the two fields have remained independent. Applying the debate about fictional objects to issues of theology for the first time, John-Mark L. Miravalle bridges these two fields and presents a new approach to notions of God, creatures, and existence. Miravalle explains why meinongianism, which holds that certain things can serve as intentional objects with properties, even though they do not exist, can facilitate talk of nonexistence better than other metaphysical viewpoints, such as platonism, modal realism and pretense-theory. He identifies points of connection between theology and nonexistents and uses meinongianism to buttress the cosmological and ontological arguments for God's existence. As a result he is able to explore fresh solutions to problems of classical theism, from the necessary existence of God and creation ex nihilo to free will and the problem of evil. By revealing how a particular account of fictional objects is especially harmonious with and supportive of the major claims of traditional theism, Miravalle makes a major contribution to theistic metaphysics.

Intentionality is one of the most frequently discussed topics in contemporary phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This book investigates intentionality from the point of view of intentional objects. According to the classical approach to this concept, whatever can be consciously experienced is regarded as an intentional object. Thus, not only ordinary existing individuals but also various kinds of non-existents and non-individuals are considered as intentional (including such bizarre entities as quantifier objects: `some dog', `every dog'). Alexius Meinong, an Austrian philosopher, is particularly well-known as the `inventor' of an abundant ontology of objects among which even incomplete and impossible ones, like `the round square', find their place. Drawing inspirations from Meinong's ideas, the author develops a simple logic of intentional objects, M-logic. M-logic closely resembles classical first-order logic and, as opposed to the formally complicated contemporary theories of non-existent objects, it is much more friendly in apprehending and applications. However, despite this resemblance, the ontological content of M-logic far exceeds that of classical logic. In this book formal investigations are intertwined with philosophical analyses. On the one hand, M-logic is used as a tool for investigating formal features of intentional objects. On the other hand, the study of intentionality phenomena suggests further ways of extending and modifying M-logic. Audience: The book is addressed to logicians, cognitive scientists, philosophers of language and metaphysics with either a phenomenological or an analytic background.

Amie Thomasson argues that fiction has far-reaching implications for central problems of metaphysics.

Meinong-Studies, Vol. 6, contains papers focusing on the connections between intentionality and nonexistent objects, presenting historical analyses on the background of Meinong’s philosophical position up to the Meinong-Russell-Debate. It also contains systematic studies of fictional characters, of Kripke’s alternative theory of fiction, and of the relevance of fictions playing the role of assumptions in scientific contexts. The volume is completed by biographical sketches of Christian von Ehrenfels, founder of Gestalt-theory and Meinong’s close friend, and of Ernst Mally, disciple of Meinong and successor to his chair.

This book presents a collection of studies by Romanian philosophers, addressing foundational issues currently debated in contemporary philosophy of science. It offers a historical survey of the tradition of scientific philosophy in Romania. It examines some problems in the foundations of logic, mathematics, linguistics, the natural and social sciences. Among the more specific topics, it discusses scientific explanation, models, and mechanisms, as well as memory, artifacts, and rules of research. The book is useful to those interested in the philosophy of real science, but also to those interested in Romanian philosophy.