Eyes Behind the Lines: US Army Long-Range Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units is the 10th study in the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper series. This work is an outgrowth of concerns identified by the authors of On Point: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Specifically, these authors called into question the use of long-range surveillance (LRS) assets by commanders during that campaign and suggested an assessment ought to be made about their continuing utility and means of employment. This revision contains some important additional information the author received after this book was originally published Major (Retired) James Gebhardt, of CSI, researched and wrote this Occasional Paper with that end in view. In this study, Gebhardt surveys the US Army s historical experience with LRRP and LRS units from the 1960s Cold War and Vietnam War, through their resurgence in the 1980s and use in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, to the advent of the GWOT. The paper's analytical framework examines each era of LRS units in terms of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, and personnel. In doing so, the author makes a strong case for continuing the LRS capability in the Army s force structure. The variety of environments and enemies likely to be faced by the military in the GWOT continues to demand the unique human intelligence abilities of trained and organized LRS units. As the Army leads the Armed Forces of the United States in combating terrorists where they live, the lessons found in this survey remain timely and relevant.

Eyes Behind the Lines: US Army Long-Range Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units is the 10th study in the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper series. This work is an out-growth of concerns identified by the authors of On Point: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Specifically, these authors called into question the use of long-range surveillance (LRD) assets by commanders during that campaign and suggested an assessment ought to be made about their continuing utility and means of employment. Major (Retired) James Gebhardt, of CSI, researched and wrote this Occasional Paper with that end in view. IN this study, Gebhardt surveys the US Army's historical experience with LRRP and LRS units from the 1960s Cold War and Vietnam War, through their resurgence in the 1980s and use in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STROM, to the advent of the GWOT. The paper's analytical framework examines each era of LRS units in terms of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, and personnel. In doing so, the author makes a strong case for continuing the LRS capability in the Army's force structure. The variety of environments and enemies likely to be faced by the military in the GWOT continues to demand the unique human intelligence abilities of trained and organized LRS units. As the Army leads the Armed Forces of the United States in combating terrorists where they live, the lessons found in this survey remain timely and relevant.~

Long Range Surveillance Units (LRSUs) provide a unique and necessary capability to today’s commanders and to commanders who will fight in the future. In looking to the future operational environment, LRSUs must ensure their ability to operate across the full spectrum of operations at a rapid tempo and in a short-notice, force projection Army. Current LRSU doctrine is primarily built around the AirLand Battle doctrine of the Cold War, a conventional threat, linear battlefield, and employment at great distances behind enemy lines. As a result, LRSU doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) require update or change. These changes will ensure continued LRSU relevance and their maximum effectiveness. This study identifies an increased and unaddressed emphasis on target acquisition, Stability and Support Operations, and operations in urban environments. These operations lend themselves to non-traditional and creative tasking of LRSUs and will necessitate increased requirements for friendly unit coordination, vehicular insertion, and potential task organization of reconnaissance elements. This study recommends changes to doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and training based on lessons learned by LRSUs on recent operational missions and the lessons of similar units. These changes require proponent leadership, LRS community teamwork, and warrant additional Army oversight and assistance.

The Vietnamese knew the Long-Range Patrol Scouts as “the men with green faces,” a reference to the camouflage paint that they used. Operating in patrols of four to six men these men were like ghosts – scouting far behind enemy lines. This book examines the Long-Range Patrol Scout's superior stealth movement techniques, camouflage and concealment, tracking, counter-tracking, observation, and other fieldcraft skills. It also examines the occasions they participated in small-scale direct actions including ambushes and raids. Written by a Special Forces' Vietnam veteran, this book not only depicts the remarkable lives of these scouts when on campaign, but also details the training and conditioning that it took to become one of these shadow warriors.

Illustrated with 60 maps, plans and diagrams Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance are battlefield missions as old as military history itself and missions for which many armies have created specialized units to perform. In most cases, these units were trained, equipped, and used differently from the majority of an army’s fighting units. Horse cavalry performed these missions for centuries, for it had speed and mobility far in excess of main battle units. Once the horse was replaced by mechanization, however, the mobility advantage once enjoyed by the horse cavalry disappeared. Since the early 20th century, the search for the proper mix of equipment, the proper organization, and the proper employment of reconnaissance units has bedeviled armies around the world. This survey uses a diverse variety of historical cases to illustrate the enduring issues that surround the equipping, organizing, and employment of reconnaissance units. It seems that these specialized units are either too heavily or too lightly equipped and too narrowly specialized or too conventionally organized. Pre-war reconnaissance doctrines tend to undergo significant change once fighting begins, leading to post-conflict analysis that reconnaissance units were “misused” in one way or another. McGrath ends his study with an intriguing conclusion about the role that specialized reconnaissance units should have in the future that may surprise many readers.