Much attention has been paid to globalization, yet little has been focused on the relationship between the national and sub-national levels of politics. This publication has separate sections on the state in transition; on regionalism, nationalism and separatism; and on the security forces and the maintenance of order. The three states chosen - Britain, France and Spain - have historical similarities as ex-imperial, Atlantic seaboard states with weighty historical and institutional traditions. But they also differ in their institutions, in their centre-periphery relations and in their varying responses to the new phase of change. The authors assess the new constitutional configurations in each state - decentralisation, devolution or autonomous governments - and analyse the effect on the peripheries and the maintenance of order. The book also includes chapters on conflict in Northern Ireland and the Spanish Basque country and discussion of nationalist identity and assertion in the three countries.

In this final chapter we look again at the questions about the character of the new configuration of states and regions. We begin by asking if the very preconditions of centre-periphery conflict have changed in the new world order: have the changing powers of states or the changing character of peripheral identities undermined the conditions which led to conflict? We assess the degree to which the new elected regional institutions can provide a level of regional autonomy which defuses (or diffuses) older centre-periphery conflicts. We move on to the question of characterizing the new conjuncture. Does it represent a convergence towards a new European regionalism or is it no more than an adaptation of the historical traditions and institutions of the individual states and regions to contemporary pressures? Should it be seen as 'strong' globalization, where the states adopt common institutional innovations and are changed by common pressures, or 'weak' globalization in which new elements are indigenized in older systems? Does it represent an introduction of new institutional elements, a new conjunctural set of relations, or a change in the structures of the longue durée? In the concluding section of the chapter, we return to the issue of continuity and change in the new world order.

This book proposes that the European Union should craft a grand strategy to navigate the new world order based on a four-pronged approach. First, European decision-makers (both in Brussels and across EU capitals) should take a broader view of their existential interests at stake and devote greater time and resources to serving them within the wider cause of the liberal order. Second, Europe needs to help reinvigorate the West by restoring a sense of solidarity through fairer distribution of benefits and burdens. Third, it should develop separate strategies for parts of the world, such as Russia and China, where liberal values are not likely to be attainable in the foreseeable future yet order is still necessary. Fourth, Europe needs to clarify its core interests elsewhere and help stabilize the Middle East and Africa. With this book, the author seeks to lay the essential building blocks for developing a European strategy, which is a complex process involving multiple decision-makers and institutions.

The dramatic decline of democracy in East-Central Europe has attracted great interest world-wide. Going beyond the narrow spectrum of the extensive literature on this topic, this book offers a comprehensive analysis of ECE region – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia – from systemic change in 1989 to 2019 to explain the reasons of the collapse of ECE democratic systems in the 2010s.

In this original and timely book, Bruno Maçães argues that the best word for the emerging global order is 'Eurasian', and shows why we need to begin thinking on a super-continental scale. While China and Russia have been quicker to recognise the increasing strategic significance of Eurasia, even Europeans are realizing that their political project is intimately linked to the rest of the supercontinent - and as Maçães shows, they will be stronger for it. Weaving together history, diplomacy and vivid reports from his six-month overland journey across Eurasia from Baku to Samarkand, Vladivostock to Beijing, Maçães provides a fascinating portrait of this shifting geopolitical landscape. As he demonstrates, we can already see the coming Eurasianism in China's bold infrastructure project reopening the historic Silk Road, in the success of cities like Hong Kong and Singapore, in Turkey's increasing global role and in the fact that, revealingly, the United States is redefining its place as between Europe and Asia. An insightful and clarifying book for our turbulent times, The Dawn of Eurasia argues that the artificial separation of the world's largest island cannot hold, and the sooner we realise it, the better.

The fourth volume of The Cambridge History of America and the World examines the heights of American global power in the mid-twentieth century and how challenges from at home and abroad altered the United States and its role in the world. The second half of the twentieth century marked the pinnacle of American global power in economic, political, and cultural terms, but even as it reached such heights, the United States quickly faced new challenges to its power, originating both domestically and internationally. Highlighting cutting-edge ideas from scholars from all over the world, this volume anatomizes American power as well as the counters and alternatives to 'the American empire.' Topics include US economic and military power, American culture overseas, human rights and humanitarianism, third-world internationalism, immigration, communications technology, and the Anthropocene.

What accounts for the rise of the state, the creation of the first global system, and the dominance of the West? The conventional answer asserts that superior technology, tactics, and institutions forged by Darwinian military competition gave Europeans a decisive advantage in war over other civilizations from 1500 onward. In contrast, Empires of the Weak argues that Europeans actually had no general military superiority in the early modern era. J. C. Sharman shows instead that European expansion from the late fifteenth to the late eighteenth centuries is better explained by deference to strong Asian and African polities, disease in the Americas, and maritime supremacy earned by default because local land-oriented polities were largely indifferent to war and trade at sea. Europeans were overawed by the mighty Eastern empires of the day, which pioneered key military innovations and were the greatest early modern conquerors. Against the view that the Europeans won for all time, Sharman contends that the imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a relatively transient and anomalous development in world politics that concluded with Western losses in various insurgencies. If the twenty-first century is to be dominated by non-Western powers like China, this represents a return to the norm for the modern era. Bringing a revisionist perspective to the idea that Europe ruled the world due to military dominance, Empires of the Weak demonstrates that the rise of the West was an exception in the prevailing world order.