During the Cold War, when the United States' intelligence efforts were focused on the Soviet Union, one of the primary tasks of the Central Intelligence Agency was to estimate Soviet defense spending. In Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates, 1950-1990, Noel E. Firth and James H. Noren, who spent much of their long CIA careers estimating and studying Soviet defense spending, provide a closer look at those estimates and consider how and why they were made. In the process, the authors chronicle the development of a significant intelligence analytic capability. Firth and Noren also explain what the CIA has learned since the collapse of the Soviet Union about the USSR's actual military spending during the Cold War.

Power, Threat, or Military Capabilities assesses two mainstays of international relations, balance of power and balance of threat, using the case of US balancing against the Soviet Union in the later Cold War. It also proposes balance of military capabilities, which uses offense-defense theory to argue that countries balance against the ability of others to conquer or compel them. Power, Threat, or Military Capabilities finds that the US was more powerful than the Soviet Union so US behavior is not explained by balance of power. The US did not perceive the Soviet Union as likely to initiate war or to run risks that might lead to war so US behavior is not explained by balance of threat. This book determines that the US was concerned about its ability to defend Europe and the Persian Gulf so US behavior is explained by balance of military capabilities.