Uganda’s 2016 elections, which returned thirty-year incumbent President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) in yet another landslide, took place in an atmosphere of patronage, coercion and fraud. But is this diagnosis sufficient to understand the processes of voting and regime maintenance in Uganda today? Based on a series of detailed case studies from across Uganda, this book provides a more nuanced and complex picture of what the Museveni regime is, and how it keeps winning elections. Whilst not denying that various electoral malpractices are systemic to the regime’s survival, the authors find that these cannot be extricated from Uganda’s history, its wider social realities, and its local political cultures in which the NRM has become so embedded. In so doing, the authors – who include anthropologists, development specialists, historians, geographers, and political-scientists – develop new ways of thinking about the meaning of voting and elections in non-democratic Uganda, and elsewhere. This edition was originally published as a special issue of the Journal of Eastern African Studies.

In February 2006, Ugandans voted in the first multi-party elections in almost 26 years. President Yoweri Museveni and his ruling National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) parliamentary candidates won a decisive victory over opposition candidate Kizza Besigye and the Forum for Democracy Coalition. Nevertheless, poll results showed a notable decline in support for President Museveni from previous elections. International election observers did not condemn the election results, nor did they fully endorse the electoral process. Critics charged the government with intimidating the opposition during the pre-election period, and Besigye spent much of the campaign period in jail. The election followed a controversial move by the Ugandan parliament in July 2005 to remove the constitutional two-term limit on the presidency. In the north, the government of Uganda has long fought the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), an armed rebel group backed by the government of Sudan. Through over 20 years of civil war, the brutal insurgency has created a humanitarian crisis that has displaced over 1.5 million people and resulted in the abduction of over 20,000 children. In 2006-2008, the government of Uganda and the LRA were engaged in an effort to resolve the conflict peacefully. The government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) mediated the talks. In August 2006, the government of Uganda and the LRA signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. In February 2008, the parties agreed on a Permanent Ceasefire and amended the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions. However, the leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony, failed to show up for the final signing of the agreement on a number of occasions. The cessation of hostilities has allowed an estimated 1.4 million people to return to their homes. In November 2007, an LRA delegation went to Kampala for the first time and held talks with senior Ugandan officials.

Recent seismic shifts in Congo and Rwanda have exposed the continued volatility of the state of affairs in central Africa. As African states have shaken off their postcolonial despots, new leaders with sweeping ideas about a pan-African alliance have emerged -- and yet the internecine struggles go on. What is Africa's problem? As one of the leaders expressing a broad and forceful vision for Africa's future, Uganda's Yoweri K. Museveni is perhaps better placed than anyone in the world to address the very question his book poses. In 1986, after more than a decade of armed struggle, a rebellion led by Museveni toppled the dictatorship of Idi Amin, and Museveni, at 42, became president of Uganda, a country at that time in near total disarray. Since then, Uganda has made remarkable strides in political, civic, and economic arenas, and Museveni has assumed the role of "the eminence grise of the new leadership in central Africa" (Philip Gourevitch, The New Yorker). As such, he has proven a powerful force for change, not just in Uganda but across the turbulent span of African states. This collection of Museveni's writings and speeches lays out the possibilities for social change in Africa. Working with a broad historical understanding and an intimate knowledge of the problems at hand, Museveni describes how movements can be formed to foster democracy, how class consciousness can transcend tribal differences in the development of democratic institutions, and how the politics of identity operate in postcolonial Africa. Museveni's own contributions to the overthrow of Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko and to the political transformation of Uganda suggest the kind of change that may sweep Africa indecades to come. What Is Africa's Problem? gives a firsthand look at what those changes might be, how they might come about, and what they might mean.

“It’s not so much what you agree upon, what you write on paper, but something intangible that in the end determines the success of political cooperation,” stated the leader of the Uganda People’s Congress Dr. Olara Otunnu. Hoping to put an end to the dominant-party system of Uganda – where President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement had ruled since 1986 – in 2008, four parties of the opposition gathered under the banner of the Inter-Party Cooperation (IPC). Their intention was to field a single candidate for the 2011 general election, but the IPC collapsed five months before the election day. Through an analysis of official documents, media reports and primary data obtained from interviews with party leaders, this ePaper examines the dynamics of the negotiations which led to the formation and collapse of this coalition. It argues that the claims by party leaders that the coalition fell because of disagreements over whether or not to participate in the elections are but a veil to cover the much deeper relationship issues between coalition members, in which the real explanation for the IPC’s demise lies. Through identifying common grounds between former coalition members, this ePaper proposes new avenues for further cooperation between opposition parties. Among the several lessons to be drawn from the IPC’s downfall, the author emphasises the need for confidence building measures, in order to deal with the underlying feelings of mistrust among members.