From 1985 to 1991, Syria experienced a severe economic crisis. In response, the regime of Hafiz al-Asad implemented economic reforms designed to move the Syrian economy toward free-market capitalism. As seen in authoritarian regimes around the world during the past thirty years, political liberalization often accompanies economic reform. Yet, scholars and policymakers have typically viewed Syrian economic reform as politically unimportant: mere tactical maneuvers that strengthened the Asad regime by restoring economic growth. This thesis reevaluates the political importance of the reforms from a political economy perspective. Two surprising conclusions are reached: (1) the political legacy of the economic reforms has so weakened the Asad regime that prospects for political stability within Syria are poor; and (2) transition to democracy, or political liberalization, is the probable outcome of the coming instability. The ramifications of these conclusions are twofold. First, they serve as a warning to U.S. policymakers, suggesting that regional stability will remain elusive until the root causes of regional economic underperformance are addressed. Additionally, by explaining the political outcome of the 1985 Syrian economic crisis with a political economy model, this thesis undermines the notion of cultural exceptionalism as it is commonly applied to the Middle East.

At the same time, political repression has eased and a greater degree of participation has been introduced. Both economic and political change coincide most strikingly with Syria's participation in the Arab-Israeli 'peace process'.

Five years into the ongoing and tragic conflict, the paper analyzes how Syria’s economy and its people have been affected and outlines the challenges in rebuilding the economy. With extreme limitations on information, the findings of the paper are subject to an extraordinary degree of uncertainty. The key messages are: (1) that the devastating civil war has set the country back decades in terms of economic, social and human development. Syria’s GDP today is less than half of what it was before the war started and it could take two decades or more for Syria to return to its pre-conflict GDP levels; and that (2) while reconstructing damaged physical infrastructure will be a monumental task, rebuilding Syria’s human and social capital will be an even greater and lasting challenge.

Exploring the recent trajectory of Syria¿s economy, the authors consider the utility of the transition paradigm¿developed to study change in the former communist states¿as an explanatory approach. In the first part of the book, Samer Abboud examines Syria¿s shift to a ¿social market economy,¿ focusing on similarities in and differences between the Syrian and Chinese cases. In the second part, Ferdinand Arslanian compares empirical indicators for Syria with those from the aggregate of transition countries to predict Syria¿s economic performance and the rate of liberalization. A foreword by Raymond Hinnebusch provides context for the study.

Presents an overview and assessment of the first five years of President Bashar al-Assad's program for economic reform. This book also examines the forces for - and obstacles to - reform in Syria and outlines how the regime's goal of transition to a 'social market economy' might best be achieved.

Collusion between business communities and the state can lead to a measure of security for those in power, but this kind of interaction often limits new development. In Syria, state-business involvement through informal networks has contributed to an erratic economy. With unique access to private businessmen and select state officials during a critical period of transition, this book examines Syria's political economy from 1970 to 2005 to explain the nation's pattern of state intervention and prolonged economic stagnation. As state income from oil sales and aid declined, collusion was a bid for political security by an embattled regime. To achieve a modicum of economic growth, the Syrian regime would develop ties with select members of the business community, reserving the right to reverse their inclusion in the future. Haddad ultimately reveals that this practice paved the way for forms of economic agency that maintained the security of the regime but diminished the development potential of the state and the private sector.