Kenneth Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on the use and success of coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between the government and opposition parties influences the decision to use threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. The relative transparency of their political processes means that, while democratic governments cannot easily conceal domestic constraints against using force, they can also credibly demonstrate resolve when their threats enjoy strong domestic support. As a result, compared to their non-democratic counterparts, democracies are more selective about making threats, but those they do make are more likely to be successful - that is, to gain a favorable outcome without resort to war. Schultz develops his argument through a series of game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case studies.

"As Robert Art makes clear in a groundbreaking conclusion, those results have been mixed at best. Art dissects the uneven performance of coercive diplomacy and explains why it has sometimes worked and why it has more often failed."--BOOK JACKET.

Russia's place in the world as a powerful regional actor can no longer be denied; the question that remains concerns what this means in terms of foreign policy and domestic stability for the actors involved in the situation, as Russia comes to grips with its newfound sources of might.

George examines seven cases--from Pearl Harbor to the Persian Gulf--in which the United States has used coercive diplomacy in the past half-century.

Power Plays argues that international institutions prevent extortion in some areas, but cause states to shift coercive behavior into less effective policy domains.

The concept of a "middle ground" between simple peace enforcement and traditional peacekeeping by lightly armed observers has been both ill defined and controversial. But the authors of this thoughtful yet challenging volume make a strong case for both the practicability and the desirability of such operations. "Coercive inducement"--the term was suggested by Kofi Annan, when he was undersecretary general for peacekeeping--is a form of coercive diplomacy that relies more on the deployment and demonstration of military force than on the use of force per se. In the absence of such an option, the international community finds it hard to respond to a variety of crises, including ones that can spiral into genocide. After first laying out general principles, the book explores four recent UN operations (in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Haiti) in which coercive inducement was particularly relevant, and then presents operational guidelines for its use. Clear-sighted and pragmatic throughout, the authors conclude by suggesting when and to what extent the international community should commit itself to undertake coercive inducement.