Keeping in mind the necessity as well as the urgency of reform, this volume brings together practitioners as well as researchers on defence issues, on the key issue of defence reforms. The aim is not just to interrogate the status of reforms in current times but to also place the issue before a wider readership.

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has embarked on its most wide-ranging and ambitious restructuring since 1949, including major changes to most of its key organizations. The restructuring reflects the desire to strengthen PLA joint operation capabilities- on land, sea, in the air, and in the space and cyber domains. The reforms could result in a more adept joint warfighting force, though the PLA will continue to face a number of key hurdles to effective joint operations, Several potential actions would indicate that the PLA is overcoming obstacles to a stronger joint operations capability. The reforms are also intended to increase Chairman Xi Jinping's control over the PLA and to reinvigorate Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organs within the military. Xi Jinping's ability to push through reforms indicates that he has more authority over the PLA than his recent predecessors. The restructuring could create new opportunities for U.S.-China military contacts.

The UK spends approximately £20bn annually on military goods and services, around two-thirds of the total Defence Budge The challenges are constantly evolving, and there has been a succession of reforms to the acquisition process, each building on the last, and between them delivering significant improvement: more recent equipment projects show less tendency towards cost growth and time slippage; there is a more holistic, 'throughlife' approach to providing capability (Chapter 5); and a stronger and more mutually beneficial relationship with industry (Chapter 6). Around 98 per cent of major projects deliver the operational performance needed at the front line. But they also tend to increase in cost - by an average of 2.8 per cent each year - and to suffer delay averaging 5.9 months. More projects must be delivered to cost and time. An independent report into defence acquisition by Bernard Gray (available at: http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/78821960-14A0-429E-A90A-FA2A8C292C84/0/ReviewAcquisitionGrayreport.pdf) concluded that overall plans for new equipment were too ambitious, and needed to be scaled down to match the funding likely to be available; and management of equipment portfolios must be improved. This strategy is built around those conclusions. The framework is designed so that the Ministry of Defence will make better decisions about what equipment (and wider services) to buy, how to ensure they are delivered on time, to cost and provide the desired performance; and in doing so, recognise and properly manage all the other strands (training, personnel, information, doctrine, organisation, infrastructure and logistics) needed to deliver and sustain effect on the ground.

The Defence Reform was launched in August 2010 as a fundamental review of how Defence is structured and managed. Many of the issues are not new and have been noted by similar reviews. The Steering Group believes an effective MOD is one which builds on the strengths of the individual Services and the Civil Service and does so within a single Defence framework that ensures the whole is more than the sum of its parts. A key driver for this review has been the Department's over-extended programme, to which the existing departmental management structure and management structure and behaviours contributed. Many of the Steering Group's proposals are designed to help prevent the Department from getting into such a poor financial position in the future and to put it in the position to make real savings. There are 53 recommendations the key ones of which are: to create a new and smaller Defence Board chaired by the Defence Secretary to strengthen top level decision making; to clarify the responsibilities of senior leaders, including the Permanent Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff; make the Head Office smaller and more strategic, to make high level balance of investment decisions, set strategic direction and a strong corporate framework; focus the Service Chiefs on running their Services and empower them to perform their role effectively with greater freedom to manage; strengthen financial and performance management throughout the Department to ensure future plans are affordable; create a 4 star led Joint Forces Command; create single, coherent Defence Infrastructure and Defence Business Services organisations; manage and use less senior military and civil personnel more effectively, people staying in post longer, more transparent and joint career management.

This major comparative study examines the challenges faced by countries of postcommunist Europe in reforming and professionalizing their armed forces. It explores how the interaction of the common challenges of postcommunism and the diverse circumstances of individual countries are shaping professionalization processes in this changing region. The detailed country case studies in this volume, written by leading experts to a common analytical framework, compare the experiences of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, FRY, Russia and Ukraine.

Dyson explains the convergence and divergence between British, French and German defence reforms in the post-Cold War era. He engages with cultural and realist theories and develops a neoclassical realist approach to change and stasis in defence policy, bringing new material to bear on the factors which have affected defence reforms.

This book examines defence reform in Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro since 2000, focussing particularly on the institution and consolidation of democratic and civilian control of the armed forces, the reform of conflict-era forces structures, and the influence of the West including defence assistance and political conditionality.