Dozens of judicial opinions have held that shareholders own corporations, that directors are agents of shareholders, and even that directors are trustees of shareholders’ property. Yet, until now, it has never been proven. These doctrines rest on unsubstantiated assumptions. In this book the author performs a rigorous, systematic analysis of common law, contract law, property law, agency law, partnership law, trust law, and corporate statutory law using judicial rulings that prove shareholders do not own corporations, that there is no separation of ownership and control, directors are not agents of shareholders, and shareholders are not investors in corporations. Furthermore, the author proves the theory of the firm, which is founded on the separation of ownership and control and directors as agents of shareholders, promotes an agenda that wilfully ignores fundamental property law and agency law. However, since shareholders do not own the corporation, and directors are not agents of shareholders, the theory of the firm collapses. The book corrects decades of confusion and misguided research in corporate law and the economic theory of the firm and will allow readers to understand how property law, agency law, and economics contradict each other when applied to corporate law. It will appeal to researchers and upper-level and graduate students in economics, finance, accounting, law, and sociology, as well as attorneys and accountants.

This book is a continuation of Corporate Law and the Theory of the Firm: Reconstructing Corporations, Shareholders, Directors, Owners, and Investors. The author extends his analysis of contract law, property law, agency law, trust law, and corporate statutory law and applies that analysis to defy conventional concepts and theories in economics, finance, investment, and accounting and expose the artificial boundaries established by decades of research founded on indefensible assumptions and fallacious conclusions. Using the Humpty Dumpty principle, where words mean what the authors want them to mean, economists have created "strange new worlds" where contract law, property law, agency law, and corporate statutory law no longer apply. The author dismantles the theory of the firm by proving the theory of the firm wilfully and intentionally ignores fundamental contract law, property law, agency law, and corporate statutory law. Contrary to the theory of the firm, shareholders do not own corporations, directors are not agents of shareholders, and shareholders are not investors in corporations. The author proves that by property law and corporate law, capital is not privately owned by capitalists but by corporations. Entire economic and social systems have been constructed that have no basis in law. With the advent of publicly traded corporations, the capital is there, but both capitalists and capitalism have been rendered extinct. This book will appeal to researchers and graduate and upper-level undergraduate students in economics, finance, accounting, law, and sociology, as well as legal scholars, attorneys and accountants.

The theoretical basis of commercial law, corporate governance law, and corporate law is still unsatisfactory. There essentially is no theory of commercial law, and existing theories of corporate governance and corporate law cannot explain the behaviour of firms or the contents of existing regulation. This book proposes a coordinated solution for all three areas. The starting point is that all three areas deal with the organisation of firms. Commercial law, corporate governance, and corporate law are therefore studied from the perspective of the firm rather than that of the judge or the investor. Changing the perspective makes it easier to formulate an "umbrella" theory of commercial law, and theories of corporate governance and corporate law as applications of the main theory. The book provides examples of how the proposed theories work by studying legal corporate governance tools and practices that increase the sustainability of the firm. Sustainability can be bolstered by making the governance model more self-enforcing and ensuring that it fosters innovation.

This book advances a real entity theory of company law, in which the company is a legal entity which acts autonomously in law, and company law establishes procedures facilitating autonomous organisational decision-making. The theory builds on the insight that organisations or firms are a social phenomenon outside of the law and that these are autonomous actors in their own right. They are more than the sum of the contributions of their participants and they act independently of the views and interests of their participants. This occurs because human beings change their behaviour when they act as members of a group or an organisation; in a group we tend to develop and conform to a shared standard, and when we act in organisations habits, routines, processes, and procedures form and a culture emerges. These take on a life of their own affecting the behaviour of the participants. Participants can affect organisational behaviour but this takes time and effort. Company law finds this phenomenon and supplies it with a structure supporting autonomous action by organisations. The real entity theory advanced in this book explains company law as it stands at a positive level. Legal personality overcomes the problems that organisations are social rather than brute facts and that there is no unique physical manifestation permanently associated with an organisation. The corporate constitution is not a contract - it is best characterised as an instrument adopted on a statutory basis through private action. Shareholders cannot limit the capacity of companies or the authority of the board to bind the company in contract and companies are liable in tort and crime. The statute creates roles for shareholders, directors, a company secretary, and auditors and so facilitates a process leading to organisational action. The law also integrates the interests of creditors and stakeholders.

This book provides a scholarly and yet accessible introduction to the legal framework of modern business enterprises. It explains the legal ideas that allow for the recognition of firms as organizational "persons" having social rights and responsibilities, and how law sets the boundaries of firms.

The Theory of the Firm presents an innovative general analysis of the economics of the firm.

The Form of the Firm attempts to unveil the nature of the corporation as it exists in modern liberal societies. The author contends that economic theories understate the importance and danger of corporate power, and should be supplemented with a political analysis that foregrounds the sorts of political and moral values at stake in corporate activity.