In this important work, Marc Moore critically analyses the core dimensions of corporate governance law in the USA and UK, seeking to determine the fundamental nature of corporate governance as a subject of legal enquiry.

Over recent decades corporate governance has developed an increasingly high profile in legal scholarship and practice, especially in the US and UK. But despite widespread interest, there remains considerable uncertainty about how exactly corporate governance should be defined and understood. In this important work, Marc Moore critically analyses the core dimensions of corporate governance law in these two countries, seeking to determine the fundamental nature of corporate governance as a subject of legal enquiry. In particular, Moore examines whether Anglo-American corporate governance is most appropriately understood as an aspect of 'private' (facilitative) law, or as a part of 'public' (regulatory) law. In contrast to the dominant contractarian understanding of the subject, which sees corporate governance as an institutional response to investors' market-driven private preferences, this book defines corporate governance as the manifestly public problem of securing the legitimacy – and, in turn, sustainability – of discretionary administrative power within large economic organisations. It emphasises the central importance of formal accountability norms in legitimating corporate managers' continuing possession and exercise of such power, and demonstrates the structural necessity of mandatory public regulation in this regard. In doing so it highlights the significant and conceptually irreducible role of the regulatory state in determining the key contours of the Anglo-American corporate governance framework. The normative effect is to extend the state's acceptable policy-making role in corporate governance, as an essential supplement to private ordering dynamics. Shortlisted for The Peter Birks Prize for Outstanding Legal Scholarship 2013.

An analytical overview of the regulation of shareholder activism in the UK and Germany. The book shows how the comparative legal method can be used in the study of the corporate governance systems of different countries. It deals with the regulation of the governance of listed companies within a wide framework that recognises the importance of company law, securities markets law, standards and internal rule-making.

This textbook on corporate governance is written for advanced undergraduate and graduate law students, as well as scholars working in the field. It offers clear insight into this fascinating area of financial law, from the analysis of the legal and regulatory framework of corporate governance in the UK to the core laws and regulatory principles that determine the allocation of decision-making power in UK public companies. This book also highlights how prevailing corporate governance norms operate within their broader market and societal context. In doing so, it seeks to encourage readers to develop their own critical opinions on the topic by reference to leading strands of theoretical and inter-disciplinary literature, along with relevant comparative and historical insights.

Within corporate governance the accountability of the board of directors is identified as a major issue by governments, international bodies, professional associations and academic literature. Boards are given significant power in companies, and as a consequence it is argued that they should be accountable for their actions. Drawing on political science, public administration, accounting, and ethics literature, this book examines the concept of accountability and its meaning in the corporate governance context. It examines the rationale for making boards accountable, and outlines the obstacles and drawbacks involved in providing for accountability. The book goes on to examine how current mechanisms for ensuring accountability are assessed in terms of fairness, justice, transparency, practicality, effectiveness and efficiency, before discussing the ways that accountability might be improved. Andrew Keay argues that enhanced accountability can provide better corporate governance, helping to reduce the frequency and severity of financial crises, and improve confidence in company practice. As an in depth study of a key element within the exercise of authority and management in corporate entities, this book will be of great use and interest to researchers and students of corporate governance, business and management, and corporate social responsibility.

Regulation by public and private organizations can be hijacked by special interests or small groups of powerful firms, and nowhere is this easier than at the global level. In whose interest is the global economy being regulated? Under what conditions can global regulation be made to serve broader interests? This is the first book to examine systematically how and why such hijacking or "regulatory capture" happens, and how it can be averted. Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods bring together leading experts to present an analytical framework to explain regulatory outcomes at the global level and offer a series of case studies that illustrate the challenges of a global economy in which many institutions are less transparent and are held much less accountable by the media and public officials than are domestic institutions. They explain when and how global regulation falls prey to regulatory capture, yet also shed light on the positive regulatory changes that have occurred in areas including human rights, shipping safety, and global finance. This book is a wake-up call to proponents of network governance, self-regulation, and the view that technocrats should be left to regulate with as little oversight as possible. In addition to the editors, the contributors are Kenneth W. Abbott, Samuel Barrows, Judith L. Goldstein, Eric Helleiner, Miles Kahler, David A. Lake, Kathryn Sikkink, Duncan Snidal, Richard H. Steinberg, and David Vogel.

This book advances a real entity theory of company law, in which the company is a legal entity which acts autonomously in law, and company law establishes procedures facilitating autonomous organisational decision-making. The theory builds on the insight that organisations or firms are a social phenomenon outside of the law and that these are autonomous actors in their own right. They are more than the sum of the contributions of their participants and they act independently of the views and interests of their participants. This occurs because human beings change their behaviour when they act as members of a group or an organisation; in a group we tend to develop and conform to a shared standard, and when we act in organisations habits, routines, processes, and procedures form and a culture emerges. These take on a life of their own affecting the behaviour of the participants. Participants can affect organisational behaviour but this takes time and effort. Company law finds this phenomenon and supplies it with a structure supporting autonomous action by organisations. The real entity theory advanced in this book explains company law as it stands at a positive level. Legal personality overcomes the problems that organisations are social rather than brute facts and that there is no unique physical manifestation permanently associated with an organisation. The corporate constitution is not a contract - it is best characterised as an instrument adopted on a statutory basis through private action. Shareholders cannot limit the capacity of companies or the authority of the board to bind the company in contract and companies are liable in tort and crime. The statute creates roles for shareholders, directors, a company secretary, and auditors and so facilitates a process leading to organisational action. The law also integrates the interests of creditors and stakeholders.