A timely collection of debates concerning the major themes and topics in philosophy of mind, fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments in the field Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind provides a lively and engaging introduction to the conceptual background, ongoing debates, and contentious issues in the field today. Original essays by more than 30 of the discipline’s most influential thinkers offer opposing perspectives on a series of contested questions regarding mental content, physicalism, the place of consciousness in the physical world, and the nature of perception and mental capacities. Written to appeal to non-specialists and professional philosophers alike, the second edition of Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind features five entirely new debates on the relation between perception and cognition, whether pain is a natural kind, whether perception is best understood through representational content or direct contact with the world, whether we need imagination that goes beyond imagery and supposition, and whether perceptual contents are general, particular, or a hybrid. Presents 15 sets of specially commissioned essays with opposing viewpoints on central topics in philosophy of mind Offers head-to-head debates on central topics such as consciousness, intentionality, normativity, mental causation, materialism, and perception Provides a dynamic view of contemporary thinking about fundamental and controversial issues Includes a thorough introduction providing a comprehensive background to the issues explored in each debate Part of Wiley-Blackwell’s acclaimed Contemporary Debates in Philosophy series, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Second Edition is essential reading for undergraduate and graduate students, academics, professional philosophers, and sophisticated general readers with an interest in the subject.

Philosophy of mind is one of the most dynamic fields in philosophy, and one that invites debate around several key questions. There currently exist annotated tomes of primary sources, and a handful of single-authored introductions to the field, but there is no book that captures philosophy of mind’s recent dynamic exchanges for a student audience. By bringing compiling ten newly commissioned pieces in which leading philosophers square off on five central, related debates currently engaging the field, editor Uriah Kriegel has provided such a publication.The five debates include: Mind and Body: The Prospects for Russellian Monism Mind in Body: The Scope and Nature of Embodied Cognition Consciousness: Representationalism and the Phenomenology of Moods Mental Representation: The Project of Naturalization The Nature of Mind: The Importance of Consciousness. Preliminary descriptions of each chapter, annotated bibliographies for each controversy, and a supplemental guide to further controversies in philosophy of mind (with bibliographies) help provide clearer and richer views of active controversies for all readers.

This book presents key issues in the philosophy of mind, examined by leading figures in the field.

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science contains sixteen original essays by leading authors in the philosophy of science, each one defending the affirmative or negative answer to one of eight specific questions, including: Are there laws of social science? Are causes physically connected to their effects? Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection? Brings together fresh debates on eight of the most controversial issues in the philosophy of science. Questions addressed include: “Are there laws of social science?”; “Are causes physically connected to their effects?”; “Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection?” Each question is treated by a pair of opposing essays written by eminent scholars, and especially commissioned for the volume. Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion. Will serve as an accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary philosophy of science, whilst also capturing the imagination of professional philosophers.

This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and desires.

This collection of specially commissioned essays puts top scholarshead to head to debate the central issues in the lively and fastgrowing field of philosophy of biology Brings together original essays on ten of the most hotlydebated questions in philosophy of biology Lively head-to-head debate format sharply defines the issuesand paves the way for further discussion Includes coverage of the new and vital area of evolutionarydevelopmental biology, as well as the concept of a unified species,the role of genes in selection, the differences between micro- andmacro-evolution, and much more Each section features an introduction to the topic as well assuggestions for further reading Offers an accessible overview of this fast-growing and dynamicfield, whilst also capturing the imagination of professionalphilosophers and biologists

In "Matter and Consciousness," Paul Churchland clearly presents the advantages and disadvantages of such difficult issues in philosophy of mind as behaviorism, reductive materialism, functionalism, and eliminative materialism. This new edition incorporates the striking developments that have taken place in neuroscience, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence and notes their expanding relevance to philosophical issues. Churchland organizes and clarifies the new theoretical and experimental results of the natural sciences for a wider philosophical audience, observing that this research bears directly on questions concerning the basic elements of cognitive activity and their implementation in real physical systems. (How is it, he asks, that living creatures perform some cognitive tasks so swiftly and easily, where computers do them only badly or not at all?) Most significant for philosophy, Churchland asserts, is the support these results tend to give to the reductive and the eliminative versions of materialism. "A Bradford Book"