A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.

A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.

An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.

ICALP 2008, the 35th edition of the International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, was held in Reykjavik, Iceland, July 7–11, 2008. ICALP is a series of annual conferences of the European Association for Th- reticalComputer Science(EATCS) which ?rsttook placein 1972.This year,the ICALP program consisted of the established Track A (focusing on algorithms, automata,complexityandgames)andTrackB(focusing onlogic,semanticsand theory of programming), and of the recently introduced Track C (focusing on security and cryptography foundations). In response to the call for papers, the Program Committees received 477 submissions, the highest ever: 269 for Track A, 122 for TrackB and 86 for Track C. Out of these, 126 papers were selected for inclusion in the scienti?c program: 70 papers for Track A, 32 for Track B and 24 for Track C. The selection was made by the Program Committees based on originality, quality, and relevance to theoretical computer science. The quality of the manuscripts was very high indeed, and many deserving papers could not be selected. ICALP 2008 consisted of ?ve invited lectures and the contributed papers.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems, APPROX 2002, held in Rome, Italy in September 2002. The 20 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 54 submissions. Among the topics addressed are design and analysis of approximation algorithms, inapproximability results, online problems, randomization techniques, average-case analysis, approximation classes, scheduling problems, routing and flow problems, coloring and partitioning, cuts and connectivity, packing and covering, geometric problems, network design, and applications to game theory and other fields.

Vijay Krishna’s 2e of Auction Theory improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.