In this unique study of China s militarism, Andrew Scobell examines the use of military force abroad - as in Korea (1950), Vietnam (1979), and the Taiwan Strait (1995 1996) - and domestically, as during the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s and in the 1989 military crackdown in Tiananmen Square. Debunking the view that China has become increasingly belligerent in recent years because of the growing influence of soldiers, Scobell concludes that China s strategic culture has remained unchanged for decades. Nevertheless, the author uncovers the existence of a Cult of Defense in Chinese strategic culture. The author warns that this Cult of Defense disposes Chinese leaders to rationalize all military deployment as defensive, while changes in the People s Liberation Army s doctrine and capabilities over the past two decades suggest that China s twenty-first century leaders may use military force more readily than their predecessors.

This book explains why China has resorted to the use of large-scale military force in foreign affairs. How will China use its growing military might in coming crisis and existing conflicts? This book contributes to the current debate on the future of the Asia-Pacific region by examining why China has resorted to using military force in the past. Utilizing fresh theoretical insights on the causes of interstate war and employing a sophisticated methodological framework, the book provides detailed analyses of China’s intervention in the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, China’s border clashes with the Soviet Union and the Sino-Vietnamese War. It argues that China did not employ military force in these wars for the sake of national security or because of material issues under contestation, as frequently claimed. Rather, the book’s findings strongly suggest that considerations about China’s international status and relative standing are the principal reasons for China’s decision to engage in military force in these instances. When reflecting the study’s central insight back onto China’s contemporary territorial conflicts and problematic bilateral relationships, it is argued that the People’s Republic is still a status-seeking and thus highly status-sensitive actor. As a result, China’s status ambitions should be very carefully observed and well taken into account when interacting with the PRC. This book will be of much interest to students of Chinese foreign policy, Asian politics, military and strategic studies and IR in general.

Andrew Scobell examines the use of Chinese military force abroad as in Korea (1950), Vietnam (1979), and the Taiwan Strait (1995-1996) and domestically, as during the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s and in the 1989 military crackdown in Tiananmen square. Scobell warns that a "Cult of Defense" disposes Chinese leaders to rationalize all military deployment as defensive. However, changes in the People's Liberation Army's doctrine and capabilities over the past two decades suggest that China's 21st Century leaders may use military force more readily than their predecessors.

A RAND study analyzed Chinese and U.S. military capabilities in two scenarios (Taiwan and the Spratly Islands) from 1996 to 2017, finding that trends in most, but not all, areas run strongly against the United States. While U.S. aggregate power remains greater than China’s, distance and geography affect outcomes. China is capable of challenging U.S. military dominance on its immediate periphery—and its reach is likely to grow in the years ahead.

This book provides a comprehensive assessment of China's military capabilities in 2000 and 2010, with projections for 2020. Recognizing that military power encompasses more than weaponry, it develops an original empirical framework for measuring militaries that also includes doctrine, training, and organizational structure.