The book offers articles by senior jurists on important aspects of judicial independence and judicial process in many jurisdictions, including indicators of justice. It comes at the time of serious challenges to the judiciary, the rule of law and democracy.

This book is an academic continuation of the previous five volumes on judicial independence edited by Shimon Shetreet, with others: Jules Deschenes, Christopher Forsyth, Wayne McCormack, Hiram E. Chodosh and Eric Helland, all books were published by Brill Nijhoff: Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate (1985), The Culture of Judicial Independence: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Challenges (2012), The Culture of Judicial Independence: Rule of Law and World Peace (2014), The Culture of Judicial Independence in a Globalised World (2016), Challenged Justice: In Pursuit of Judicial Independence (2021). This volume offers studies by distinguished scholars and judges from different jurisdictions on numerous dimensions regarding the essential role of judicial independence in democracy. It includes analyses of basic constitutional principles and contemporary issues of judicial independence and judicial procces in many jurisdictions and analyses of international standarts of judicial independence and judicial ethics.

2011 Winner of the Selection for Professional Reading List of the U.S. Marine Corps The judiciary in the United States has been subject in recent years to increasingly vocal, aggressive criticism by media members, activists, and public officials at the federal, state, and local level. This collection probes whether these attacks as well as proposals for reform represent threats to judicial independence or the normal, even healthy, operation of our political system. In addressing this central question, the volume integrates new scholarship, current events, and the perennial concerns of political science and law. The contributors—policy experts, established and emerging scholars, and attorneys—provide varied scholarly viewpoints and assess the issue of judicial independence from the diverging perspectives of Congress, the presidency, and public opinion. Through a diverse range of methodologies, the chapters explore the interactions and tensions among these three interests and the courts and discuss how these conflicts are expressed—and competing interests accommodated. In doing so, they ponder whether the U.S. courts are indeed experiencing anything new and whether anti-judicial rhetoric affords fresh insights. Case studies from Israel, the United Kingdom, and Australia provide a comparative view of judicial controversy in other democratic nations. A unique assessment of the rise of criticism aimed at the judiciary in the United States, The Politics of Judicial Independence is a well-organized and engagingly written text designed especially for students. Instructors of judicial process and judicial policymaking will find the book, along with the materials and resources on its accompanying website, readily adaptable for classroom use.

This volume The Culture of Judicial Independence in a Globalised World, is an academic continuation of the previous three volumes: Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate, edited by Professor Shimon Shetreet and Chief Justice Deschenes (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985), The Culture of Judicial Independence: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Challenges, edited by Professor Shimon Shetreet and Professor Christopher Forsyth (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012), and The Culture of Judicial Independence: Rule of Law and World Peace edited by Professor Shimon Shetreet (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2014). This volume offers papers and studies by academics, judges and practitioners from many jurisdictions on judicial independence – both national and international.

What motivates political actors with diverging interests to respect the Supreme Court's authority? A popular answer is that the public serves as the guardian of judicial independence by punishing elected officials who undermine the justices. Curbing the Court challenges this claim, presenting a new theory of how we perceive the Supreme Court. Bartels and Johnston argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom, citizens are not principled defenders of the judiciary. Instead, they seek to limit the Court's power when it suits their political aims, and this inclination is heightened during times of sharp partisan polarization. Backed by a wealth of observational and experimental data, Bartels and Johnston push the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical boundaries of the study of public opinion of the courts. By connecting citizens to the strategic behavior of elites, this book offers fresh insights into the vulnerability of judicial institutions in an increasingly contentious era of American politics.

The impartial administration of justice and the accountability of government officials are two of the most strongly held American values. Yet these values are often in direct conflict with one another. At the national level, the U.S. Constitution resolves this tension in favor of judicial independence, insulating judges from the undue influence of other political institutions, interest groups, and the general public. But at the state level, debate has continued as to the proper balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability. In this volume, constitutional scholar G. Alan Tarr focuses squarely on that debate. In part, the analysis is historical: how have the reigning conceptions of judicial independence and accountability emerged, and when and how did conflict over them develop? In part, the analysis is theoretical: what is the proper understanding of judicial independence and accountability? Tarr concludes the book by identifying the challenges to state-level judicial independence and accountability that have emerged in recent decades, assessing the solutions offered by the competing sides, and offering proposals for how to strike the appropriate balance between independence and accountability.

Traditional separation of powers theories assumed that governmental despotism will be prevented by dividing the branches of government which will check one another. Modern governments function with unexpected complicity among these branches. Sometimes one of the branches becomes overwhelming. Other governmental structures, however, tend to mitigate these tendencies to domination. Among other structures courts have achieved considerable autonomy vis-à-vis the traditional political branches of power. They tend to maintain considerable distance from political parties in the name of professionalism and expertise. The conditions and criteria of independence are not clear, and even less clear are the conditions of institutional integrity. Independence (including depolitization) of public institutions is of particular practical relevance in the post-Communist countries where political partisanship penetrated institutions under the single party system. Institutional integrity, particularly in the context of administration of justice, became a precondition for accession to the European Union. Given this practical challenge the present volume is centered around three key areas of institutional integrity, primarily within the administration of justice: First, in a broader theoretical-interdisciplinary context the criteria of institutional independence are discussed. The second major issue is the relation of neutralized institutions to branches of government with reference to accountability. Thirdly, comparative experience regarding judicial independence is discussed to determine techniques to enhance integrity.