This book fills a gap in academic literature on the politics and public policy aspects of central banking in Europe, by conducting a theoretically-informed and empirically-grounded analysis of central banking governance before and after the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The main framework for analysis is a ‘multi-level institutionalist approach’, articulated on three interconnected levels: the ‘systemic-level’, which encompasses the European, transnational and international arenas; the ‘national-level’, which considers the configuration of the domestic socio-economic and political environment in which each central bank operates; and the ‘micro-institutional level’, which deals with the specific features of each central bank. Methodologically, the research engages in a structure-focused comparison, using qualitative methods. In order to do so, it conceptually develops and empirically applies the notion of ‘mode’ of central banking governance, operationalised through four main components: the legal framework central bank ‘autonomy’ (or de facto independence) from the political authorities central bank ‘policy capacity’ in three policy areas that are crucial for central banking governance, namely monetary and exchange rate policies, financial regulation and supervision central bank legitimacy. Empirically, this monograph focuses on the Bank of England, the Bundesbank, the Banca d'Italia and the ECB over the period 1979 to present, with particular attention paid to the last decade. It is grounded in in-depth and extensive primary research, enriched by interviews with policy-makers. Central Banking Governance in the European Union will be of interest to students and researchers of Politics, Economics and Political Economy.

Following the financial and public debt crisis, the EU's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been under intense political scrutiny. The measures adopted in response to the crisis have granted additional powers to the EU (and national) authorities, the exercise of which can have massive implications for the economies of the Member States, financial institutions and, of course, citizens. The following questions arise: how can we hold accountable those institutions that are exercising power at the national and EU level? What is the appropriate level, type and degree of accountability and transparency that should be involved in the development of the EU's governance structures in the areas of fiscal and economic governance and the Banking Union? What is the role of parliaments and courts in holding those institutions accountable for the exercise of their duties? Is the revised EMU framework democratically legitimate? How can we bridge the gap between the citizens - and the institutions that represent them - and those institutions that are making these important decisions in the field of economic and monetary policy? This book principally examines the mechanisms for political and legal accountability in the EMU and the Banking Union. It examines the implications that the reforms of EU economic governance have had for the locus and strength of executive power in the Union, as well as the role of parliaments (and other political fora) and courts in holding the institutions acting in this area accountable for the exercise of their tasks. It further sets out several proposals regarding transparency, accountability, and legitimacy in the EMU.

Comprehensive 200-page overview of the ECB from its inception in June 1998 until the present day.

When the term “governance” is associated with money, the mind goes directly to the traditional regulatory paradigm, i.e. the nation State-Central Banking-Currency. However, over time, there has been a steady erosion of the nation states’ sovereignty, also in the area of monetary law. This process of erosion is still working from within and externally to the nation State or, in other words, from upwards to downwards and vice versa. Moving from upwards to downwards, highly interconnected financial markets have urged the national competent authorities to improve the global level of coordination in terms of sharing regulatory standards, supervisory models and risk-monitoring procedures. In the downwards-upwards direction, the concept of sovereignty is critically revised from the perspective of new and alternative means of payment, thanks to the growth of e-commerce and mobile commerce and new complementary currency projects. The European Union is a feasible institutional context in which to investigate the development of the governance of money. Indeed, the EU, considered as a “unique economic and political partnership”, has not laid down a clear-cut definition of money, but the Member States have been carrying on a varying transfer of sovereignty and, in particular, of monetary sovereignty. This book examines money as a means of payment and a reserve of value within the framework of the European Union, with particular attention to community-based currencies. This book will prove an interesting and informative read for academics, students and policymakers with an interest in the development of monetary and financial systems.

The SDN elaborates the case for, and the design of, a banking union for the euro area. It discusses the benefits and costs of a banking union, presents a steady state view of the banking union, elaborates difficult transition issues, and briefly discusses broader EU issues. As such, it assesses current plans and provides advice. It is accompanied by three background technical notes that analyze in depth the various elements of the banking union: a single supervisory framework; a single resolution and common safety net; and urgent issues related to repair of weak banks in Europe.

An examination of the debates on European Central Bank monetary policy, focusing on issues of transparency, credibility, and accountability and the effect of the ECB's decentralized structure. The adoption of the euro in 1999 by 11 member states of the European Union created a single currency area second in economic size only to the United States. The euro zone's monetary policy is now set by the European Central Bank (ECB) and its Governing Council rather than by individual national central banks. This CESifo volume examines issues that have arisen in the first years of ECB monetary policy and analyzes the effect that current ECB policy strategy and structures may have in the future. After a detailed description and assessment of ECB monetary policy making that focuses on such issues as price stability and the predictability of policy decisions, the book turns to two important issues faced by European central bankers: the transparency and credibility of decision making and the ECB's decentralized structure. After showing that transparency in decision making enhances credibility, the book discusses the ECB's efforts at openness, its political independence as guaranteed by law, and its ultimate accountability. The book then considers the effects of the decentralized ECB structure, focusing on business cycle synchronization, inflation differentials, and differences in monetary policy transmission in light of the enlargement of the monetary union. The book also discusses options for ECB institutional reforms, including centralization, vote weighting, and cross-border regional banks.

ÔThis Handbook is a must read for policy makers and practitioners alike as well as excellent reading for advanced academic courses in international banking.Õ Ð Allard Bruinshoofd, SUERF ÔThis collection of papers is essential reading for anyone interested in central banking, regulation and supervision. Sylvester Eijffinger and Donato Masciandaro have brought together contributions from the leading academics, central bankers and regulators, providing the most up-to-date analysis of this critical subject.Õ Ð Paul Mizen, University of Nottingham, UK This stimulating and original Handbook offers an updated and systematic discussion of the relationship between central banks, financial regulation and supervision after the global financial crisis. The crisis has raised new questions about the compatibility of monetary and financial stability, which are changing the face of central banking and its relationships with the architecture of financial regulation and supervision. The Handbook explores on both the economics and political economy of the topic, in order to understand how and why reforms of the role of the central banks can be designed and implemented. The general suggestion is that future effectiveness of the central banking architecture will depend on its ability to ensure the consistency between the monetary actions in normal and extraordinary times. Consequently the possible paths in the central bank strategies and tactics, as well as in the classic concepts of independence, accountability and transparency, are analyzed and discussed. With chapters written by outstanding scholars in economics, this lucid Handbook will appeal to academics, policymakers and practitioners, ranging from central bankers and supervisory authorities to financial operators. Among the academics it would be of particular interest to financial and monetary economists (including postgraduate students), but the institutional slant and the central theme of relations between economics, institutional settings and politics will also be invaluable for political scientists.