This report by the Central Bank Governance Group presents information intended to help decision-makers set up governance arrangements that are most suitable for their own circumstances. The report draws on a large body of information on the design and operation of central banks that the BIS has brought together since it initiated work on central bank governance in the early 1990s. The need to deal with chronic inflation in the 1970s and 1980s prompted the identification of price stability as a formal central bank objective and led to a significant reworking of governance arrangements. The current global financial crisis could have equally important implications for central banks, particularly with respect to their role in fostering financial stability. Although it is too early to know how central banking will change as a result, the report takes an important first step in identifying governance questions that the crisis poses.

An original analysis of central banking as global governance, developing the social relations of money, credit, and debt.

This paper discusses key legal issues in the design of Board Oversight in central banks. Central banks are complex and sophisticated organizations that are challenging to manage. While most economic literature focuses on decision-making in the context of monetary policy formulation, this paper focuses on the Board oversight of central banks—a central feature of sound governance. This form of oversight is the decision-making responsibility through which an internal body of the central bank—the Oversight Board—ensures that the central bank is well-managed. First, the paper will contextualize the role of Board oversight into the broader legal structure for central bank governance by considering this form of oversight as one of the core decision-making responsibilities of central banks. Secondly, the paper will focus on a number of important legal design issues for Board Oversight, by contrasting the current practices of the IMF membership’s 174 central banks with staff’s advisory practice developed over the past 50 years.

This paper identifies issues to consider when designing the structure, size, and composition of the governing boards and management of a central bank. While central bank autonomy and accountability are generally accepted as good practice, there is less consensus regarding the structure, size, and composition of the governing bodies. This paper surveys 101 central bank laws covering 113 countries and classifies the governance structure according to degree of autonomy, functions performed, size, composition, appointment procedures, and terms of the members. The paper concludes that an appropriate balance must be struck between the functions of the governing entities, simplicity, and country specific factors. The functions of the various bodies follow logically if a greater appreciation exists for the type of autonomy delegated to the central bank.

This paper argues that nonfinancial risk management is an essential element of good governance of central banks. It provides a funnelled analysis, on the basis of selected literature, by (i) presenting an outline of central bank governance in general; (ii) zooming in on internal governance and organization issues of central banks; (iii) highlighting the main issues with nonfinancial risk management; and (iv) ending with recommendations for future work. It shows how attention for nonfinancial risk management has been growing, and how this has amplified the call for better governance of central banks. It stresses that in the area of nonfinancial risk management there are no crucial differences between commercial and central banks: both have people, processes, procedures, and structures. It highlights policy areas to be explored.

In central banking, the need for effective governance and policy transformations has never been more pressing. Central banks serve as the bedrock of a nation's financial stability, and yet, they face an array of complex challenges in the modern era. The delicate balance between autonomy from government influence and the necessity of adapting to external economic forces has become increasingly elusive. As the world grapples with the aftermath of a global pandemic and persistent economic turbulence, the demand for innovative strategies to safeguard economic and financial stability has reached a crescendo. Central bankers, economists, and policy experts are left grappling with the daunting task of navigating these treacherous waters, in dire need of a compass to guide them toward a resilient future. Governance and Policy Transformations in Central Banking is a groundbreaking book that transcends traditional boundaries to offer a comprehensive solution to the complex challenges faced by central banks worldwide. This book not only diagnoses problems, it also presents a meticulously curated collection of new empirical and theoretical chapters that illuminate the path forward. It is an invaluable resource that empowers central banks with the knowledge and tools necessary for development, governance, and policy transformation.

CONTENTS: Central Banking Governance -- Insights; Central Bank Independence & Governance: Definitions & Modelling; Central Bank Independence & Policy Results: Theory & Evidence; Communicating a Policy Path: The Next Frontier in Central Bank Transparency?; Governance Structures & Decision -- Making Roles in Inflation Targeting Central Banks; Central Bank Governance: Maintaining Arm's Length from those in Power; Risk Based Supervision: Legal & Supervisory Implications; Central Bank Financial Strength, Transparency, & Policy Credibility; Payment System Governance; Transparency & Communication Policy in Japan; Rising New Governance Regime in Monetary Policy: A Review of ECB & Fed.