Some scholars argue that the free movement of capital across borders enhances welfare; others claim it represents a clear peril, especially for emerging nations. In Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies, an esteemed group of contributors examines both the advantages and the pitfalls of restricting capital mobility in these emerging nations. In the aftermath of the East Asian currency crises of 1997, the authors consider mechanisms that eight countries have used to control capital inflows and evaluate their effectiveness in altering the maturity of the resulting external debt and reducing macroeconomic vulnerability. This volume is essential reading for all those interested in emerging nations and the costs and benefits of restricting international capital flows.

This paper investigates why controls on capital inflows have a bad name, and evoke such visceral opposition, by tracing how capital controls have been used and perceived, since the late nineteenth century. While advanced countries often employed capital controls to tame speculative inflows during the last century, we conjecture that several factors undermined their subsequent use as prudential tools. First, it appears that inflow controls became inextricably linked with outflow controls. The latter have typically been more pervasive, more stringent, and more linked to autocratic regimes, failed macroeconomic policies, and financial crisis—inflow controls are thus damned by this “guilt by association.” Second, capital account restrictions often tend to be associated with current account restrictions. As countries aspired to achieve greater trade integration, capital controls came to be viewed as incompatible with free trade. Third, as policy activism of the 1970s gave way to the free market ideology of the 1980s and 1990s, the use of capital controls, even on inflows and for prudential purposes, fell into disrepute.

Capital flight - the unrecorded export of capital from developing countries - often represents a significant cost for developing countries. It also poses a puzzle for standard economic theory, which would predict that poorer countries be importers of capital due to its scarcity. This situation is often reversed, however, with capital fleeing poorer countries for wealthier, capital-abundant locales. Using a common methodology for a set of case studies on the size, causes and consequences of capital flight in developing countries, the contributors address the extent of capital flight, its effects, and what can be done to reverse it. Case studies of Brazil, China, Chile, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and the Middle East provide rich descriptions of the capital flight phenomena in a variety of contexts. The volume includes a detailed description of capital flight estimation methods, a chapter surveying the impact of financial liberalization, and several chapters on controls designed to solve the capital flight problem. The first book devoted to the careful calculation of capital flight and its historical and policy context, this volume will be of great interest to students and scholars in the areas of international finance and economic development.

This paper examines country experiences with the use and liberalization of capital controls to develop a deeper understanding of the role of capital controls in coping with volatile capital flows, as well as the issues surrounding their liberalization. Detailed analyses of country cases aim to shed light on the motivations to limit capital flows; the role the controls may have played in coping with particular situations, including in financial crises and in limiting short-term inflows; the nature and design of the controls; and their effectivenes and potential costs. The paper also examines the link between prudential policies and capital controls and illstrates the ways in which better prudential practices and accelerated financial reforms could address the risks in cross-border capital transactions.

Free capital movements played an important part in the economic integration and globalisation of the nineteenth century. This work analyses historical experience with capital controls, in Britain and elsewhere, and reviews the theory. It concludes that such controls are damaging and that there is no case for reviving them.

Using a panel data set for international corporate bonds and capital account restrictions in advanced and emerging economies, we show that restrictions on capital inflows produce a substantial and economically meaningful increase in corporate bond spreads. A number of heterogeneities suggest that the effect of capital controls on inflows is particularly strong for more financially constrained firms, establishing a novel channel through which capital controls affect economic outcomes. By contrast, we do not find a robust significant effect of restrictions on outflows.

How effective are capital account restrictions? We provide new answers based on a novel panel data set of capital controls, disaggregated by asset class and by inflows/outflows, covering 74 countries during 1995-2005. We find the estimated effects of capital controls to vary markedly across the types of capital controls, both by asset categories, by the direction of flows, and across countries' income levels. In particular, both debt and equity controls can substantially reduce outflows, with little effect on capital inflows, but only high-income countries appear able to effectively impose debt (outflow) controls. The results imply that capital controls can affect both the volume and the composition of capital flows.