A riveting combination of war memoir and analysis providing “valuable insights” into the role of military intelligence in Vietnam (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence). For the first two weeks of the Easter Offensive of 1972, the 571st Military Intelligence Detachment provided the only pertinent collateral intelligence available to American forces. Twice daily, the Detachment provided intelligence to the USS Buchanan (DDG-14), US Navy SEALS, and Special Forces units, including tactical and strategic forecasts of enemy movements, information that was otherwise unavailable to U.S. units and advisors in-country. Bob Baker was an intelligence analyst who was there. In the weeks before the offensive, vital agent reports and verbal warnings by the 571st MI Detachment had been ignored by all the major commands; they were only heeded, and then only very reluctantly, once the offensive began. This refusal to listen to the intelligence explains why no Army or USMC organizations were on-call to recover prisoners discovered or U.S. personnel downed behind enemy lines, as in the BAT-21 incident, as the last two Combat Recon Platoons in Vietnam had been disbanded six weeks before the offensive began. The lessons and experiences of Operation Lam Son 719 in the previous year were ignored, especially with regard to the NVA’s tactical use of tanks and artillery. In his memoir, Baker, the only trained military intelligence analyst with the 571st MI Detachment in 1972, reveals these and other heroics and blunders during a key moment in the Vietnam War.

The account of an intelligence analyst trying to warn US commands of the impending Easter Offensive 1972.

A unique look at American military intelligence during World War II using contemporary manuals and briefings. On December 7, 1941, an imperial Japanese carrier strike force attacked the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, taking advantage of what was one of the most profound intelligence failures in US history. Galvanized into action, the branches of the U.S. military subsequently developed one of the greatest, albeit imperfect, intelligence-gathering and analysis networks of the combatant nations, opening an invaluable window onto the intentions of their enemies. The picture of U.S. military intelligence during World War II is a complex one. It was divided between the fields of signal intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT), combat intelligence and War Department intelligence, and between numerous different organizations, including the Military Intelligence Division (MID), Military Intelligence Service (MIS), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the many intelligence units organic to Army, Navy, Army Air Forces, and Marine Corps. The documents collected in this book reveal the theoretical and practical principles behind wartime intelligence gathering and analysis, from the frontline intelligence officer to the Washington-based code-breaker. They explain fundamentals such as how to observe and record enemy activity and intercept enemy radio traffic, through to specialist activities such as cryptanalysis, photoreconnaissance, prisoner interrogation, and undercover agent operations. The painstaking work of an intelligence operator required a sharp, attentive mind, whether working behind a desk or under fire on the frontlines. The outputs from these men and women could ultimately make the difference between victory and defeat in battle.

Details how the U.S. State Department attempted, and failed, to save South Vietnam from North Vietnamese aggression and the powerful domestic political influences that ultimately led to America’s defeat. Ten years after the end of the American involvement in the Vietnam War, a career Foreign Service officer, Thomas J. Corcoran, set down in writing his thoughts on the history of US State Department policy during America’s involvement with South Vietnam. Like many Americans of his generation, he was perplexed by the failure of America to achieve its goals in South Vietnam. As an ambassador and with over 30 years of diplomatic experience—beginning in 1948 when he was assigned to Hanoi and involving other postings in Southeast Asia—he brought to his analysis a long and rich personal experience with events in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The result is a thoughtful, objective and well-researched study that chronicles the key policy decisions made by the US State Department throughout the entire period from 1945 to 1975; decisions that ultimately led to the first war lost by the United States. In his extensive study, Corcoran does an excellent job of exposing many of the myths and falsehoods found in orthodox histories of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

First full biography of MacArthur's chief intelligence officer Charles Willoughby, reflecting on the consequences of prioritizing loyalty to a superior over objectivity of intelligence. Major General Charles A. Willoughby served as Douglas MacArthur's stalwart chief intelligence officer (G-2} for over a decade, throughout World War II and the Korean War. This first full biography examines Willoughby's shadowy origins in his native Germany, his curious arrival in the United States, and his military service in World War I, as well as his work during the interwar years as a junior diplomat, budding historian, and neophyte intelligence officer. His chance encounter with MacArthur in the mid-1930s would prove to be the genesis of a near-symbiotic relationship between the two, with significant consequences for both. Throughout his life, Willoughby identified with strong, authoritarian leaders, notably Franco, and—especially—MacArthur. The author also assesses Willoughby's performance as a professional intelligence officer both in World War II and Korea, where he is often vilified for his inaccurate assessments of enemy strength and most likely courses of action, as well as his sycophantic relationship with his commander. Willoughby is most often criticized for his failing to foresee the entry of Chinese forces into the Korean War and its impact upon the US Army and the prosecution of the war. Following MacArthur’s removal by President Truman in 1951, Willoughby retired and spent the rest of his days engaged in right-wing political activity and in staunchly defending his much-maligned boss. The legacy he left is one filled with lingering and important questions about loyalty to superiors, in civilian as well as military environments, how far that loyalty should extend, and walking the tightrope involved in telling truth to power.

Our field commanders in Vietnam were lied to by generals and politicians on their own side. Bruce E. Jones' explosive account of the cover-up is gut-level history in the making--an angry eyewitness story of an elite conspiracy that smothered our chance at victory in Vietnam.

Born on the eve of China’s Cultural Revolution, Ping Fu was separated from her family at the age of eight. She grew up fighting hunger and humiliation and shielding her younger sister from the teenagers in Mao’s Red Guard. At twenty-five, she found her way to the United States; her only resources were $80 and a few phrases of English. Yet Ping persevered, and the hard-won lessons of her childhood guided her to success in her new homeland. Aided by her well-honed survival instincts, a few good friends, and the kindness of strangers, she grew into someone she never thought she’d be—a strong, independent, entrepreneurial leader. “She tells her story with intelligence, verve and a candor that is often heart-rending.” —The Wall Street Journal “This well-written tale of courage, compassion, and undaunted curiosity reveals the life of a genuine hero.” —Booklist (starred review) “Her success at the American Dream is a real triumph.” —The New York Post