This book presents an introduction to model theory in 15 lectures. It concentrates on several key concepts: first-order definability, classification of complete types, elementary extensions, categoricity, automorphisms, and saturation; all illustrated with examples that require neither advanced alegbra nor set theory. A full proof of the compactness theorem for countable languages and its applications are given, followed by a discussion of the Ehrefeucht-Mostowski technique for constructing models admitting automorphisms. Additional topics include recursive saturation, nonstandard models of arithmetic, Abraham Robinson's model-theoretic proof of Tarski's theorem on undefinability of truth, and the proof of the Infinite Ramsey Theorem using an elementary extension of the standard model of arithmetic.

Model theory begins with an audacious idea: to consider statements about mathematical structures as mathematical objects of study in their own right. While inherently important as a tool of mathematical logic, it also enjoys connections to and applications in diverse branches of mathematics, including algebra, number theory and analysis. Despite this, traditional introductions to model theory assume a graduate-level background of the reader. In this innovative textbook, Jonathan Kirby brings model theory to an undergraduate audience. The highlights of basic model theory are illustrated through examples from specific structures familiar from undergraduate mathematics, paying particular attention to definable sets throughout. With numerous exercises of varying difficulty, this is an accessible introduction to model theory and its place in mathematics.

Assumes only a familiarity with algebra at the beginning graduate level; Stresses applications to algebra; Illustrates several of the ways Model Theory can be a useful tool in analyzing classical mathematical structures

Model theory is an important area of mathematical logic which has deep philosophical roots, many philosophical applications, and great philosophical interest in itself. The aim of this book is to introduce, organise, survey, and develop these connections between philosophy and model theory, for the benefit of philosophers and logicians alike.

Translated from the French, this book is an introduction to first-order model theory. Starting from scratch, it quickly reaches the essentials, namely, the back-and-forth method and compactness, which are illustrated with examples taken from algebra. It also introduces logic via the study of the models of arithmetic, and it gives complete but accessible exposition of stability theory.

According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.