Special Forces forward operational bases (FOB) are essential for mission and contingency planning as well as for the preparation, infiltration and exfiltration of Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA). Therefore, the defense of this command and control headquarters is critical for preserving combat power and synchronizing military actions in a theater of operations. Because the enemy has the capability of projecting forces with the objective of disrupting US military operations, FOBs have become likely targets. According to SF doctrine, FOBs should be located in secure areas with MP or host-nation personnel providing the bulk of the security force. Although this situation is preferable, it is by no means assured. FOBs should be able to provide their own security in the event other forces are not available or when rapid deployment restricts the flow of conventional forces into a theater of operations. After-action review results from the Joint Readiness Training Center demonstrate that many SF battalions are not prepared to execute base defense tasks without the assistance of other forces. Many SF commanders do not consider base defense a mission essential task and the result is a lack of training by many of their personnel. This study analyzes joint and SF doctrine, observations from the field, and the effects of the contemporary operating environment to identify weaknesses in the readiness of SF battalions.

According to Special Forces doctrine, forward operational bases (FOB) should be located in secure areas with MPs or host-nation personnel providing the security force. Although this situation is preferable, it is not assured. FOBs should provide their own security when forces are not available or rapid deployment restricts the flow of conventional forces into theater. AAR results from the JRTC demonstrate that many SF battalions are not prepared to execute base defense tasks independently. Many commanders do not consider base defense mission essential and the result is a lack of training by many of their personnel. This study analyzes joint and SF doctrine, observations from the field, and the effects of the contemporary operating environment to identify weaknesses in the readiness of SF battalions. This project attempts to answer the primary research question that is the basis for the research: With the emergence of an asymmetrical threat in the contemporary operating environment, does current doctrine adequately and realistically address base defense measures at the FOB? This study leads to conclusions that SF should make base defense a priority, modify its doctrine, implement new training strategies, and procure security equipment.

The Afloat Forward Operating Base (AFOB) Concept: A Paradigm Shift in Force Planning. As the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld articulated in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), there has to be a paradigm shift in Force Planning that strengthens joint force operations, and concomitantly, causes the military apparatus to transform the joint team into a design that will answer the call of the challenges of the 21st Century threats. The National Security Strategy states the fact that Power Projection is and will remain an indispensable means of achieving and sustaining our position of Global Power dominance. The concept of Sea Basing being pursued by the Navy-Marine Corps Team, and the joint experimentation with the High Speed Vessel by the Army and Navy, are but two additional examples that testify to the focus on employment of national military element of power from the largest maneuver area in the world -- the seas. For maximum effectiveness, Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTF) need a dedicated naval vessel to serve as a rapidly deployable, self-contained forward operating base which allows freedom of action, surprise, flexibility, and interoperability, while not being constrained by absence of host nation support, overflight/basing rights, and ever-increasing access denial strategies. Our ability to quickly and deliberately enforce the National Security Strategy through the use of force when deterrence fails is the forte of the aircraft carrier. The carrier-JSOTF team therefore remains an indispensable instrument of national power.

This anthology discusses the converging operational issues of air base defense and counterinsurgency. It explores the diverse challenges associated with defending air assets and joint personnel in a counterinsurgency environment. The authors are primarily Air Force officers from security forces, intelligence, and the office of special investigations, but works are included from a US Air Force pilot and a Canadian air force officer. The authors examine lessons from Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflicts as they relate to securing air bases and sustaining air operations in a high-threat counterinsurgency environment. The essays review the capabilities, doctrine, tactics, and training needed in base defense operations and recommend ways in which to build a strong, synchronized ground defense partnership with joint and combined forces. The authors offer recommendations on the development of combat leaders with the depth of knowledge, tactical and operational skill sets, and counterinsurgency mind set necessary to be effective in the modern asymmetric battlefield.

At the request of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology, Powering the U.S. Army of the Future examines the U.S. Army's future power requirements for sustaining a multi-domain operational conflict and considers to what extent emerging power generation and transmission technologies can achieve the Army's operational power requirements in 2035. The study was based on one operational usage case identified by the Army as part of its ongoing efforts in multi-domain operations. The recommendations contained in this report are meant to help inform the Army's investment priorities in technologies to help ensure that the power requirements of the Army's future capability needs are achieved.