Seminar paper from the year 2016 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 1,7, University of Lisbon, language: English, abstract: In my paper, I want to investigate to which extent Austrian neutrality is still existing. Is it yet more than a romantic picture of our home country? How has this concept been affected by the membership in various International Organizations, especially the EU? And how does a neutral state cope with its security in a globalized world? My hypotheses are that in the course of time, Austria has quietly given up neutrality in favor of the benefits of being part of the international community. Security Policies are coordinated and in a globalized world, that is continuously moving closer together, cannot work independently. Therefore Austria has to participate and cannot hide behind it’s neutrality.

After Stalin's death, during a respite in Cold War tensions in 1955, Austria managed to rid itself of a quadripartite occupation regime and become a neutral state. As the Cold War continued, Austria's policy of neutrality helped make this small country into an important mediator of East-West differences, and neutrality became a crucial part of Austria's postwar identity. In the post-Cold War era Austrian neutrality seems to demand redefinition. The work addresses such issues as what neutrality means when Austria's neighbors are joining NATO? What is the difference between Austrian neutrality in 1955 and 2000? In remaining apart from NATO, do Austrian elites risk their nation's national security? Is Austria a "free rider," too stingy to contribute to Western defense? Has the neutralist mentalit become such a crucial part of Austrian postwar identity that its abandonment will threaten civil society? These questions are addressed in this latest in the prestigious Contemporary Austrian Studies series. The volume emerged from the Wittgenstein Research Center project on "Discourse, Politics, and Identity," an interdisciplinary investigation of the meaning of Austrian neutrality. The first two chapters analyze the current meaning of Austrian neutrality. Karin Liebhart records narrative interviews with former presidents Rudolf Kirchschlger and Kurt Waldheim, both central political actors present at the creation and implementation of Austria's postwar neutrality. Gertraud Benke and Ruth Wodak provide in-depth analysis of a debate on Austrian National Television on "NATO and Neutrality," a microcosm of Austrian popular opinion that exposed all positions and ideological preferences on neutrality. The historian Oliver Rathkolb surveys international perceptions of Austrian neutrality over the past half-century. For comparative contrast David Irwin and John Wilson apply Foucault's theoretical framework to the history and debates on neutrality in Ireland. Political scientists Heinz Grtner and Paul Luif provide examples of how Austrian neutrality has been handled in the past and today. Michael Gehler analyzes Austria's response to the Hungarian crisis of 1956 and Klaus Eisterer reviews the Austrian legation's handling of the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis. Gnter Bischof is professor of history and executive director of Center Austria at the University of New Orleans. Anton Pelinka is professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck and director of the Institute of Conflict Research in Vienna. Ruth Wodak is professor in the linguistics department at the University of Vienna and director of the research center "Discourse, Politics, Identity" at the Austrian Academy of Science.

In this new Brookings Marshall Paper, Michael O'Hanlon argues that now is the time for Western nations to negotiate a new security architecture for neutral countries in eastern Europe to stabilize the region and reduce the risks of war with Russia. He believes NATO expansion has gone far enough. The core concept of this new security architecture would be one of permanent neutrality. The countries in question collectively make a broken-up arc, from Europe's far north to its south: Finland and Sweden; Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and finally Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as possibly several other Balkan states. Discussion on the new framework should begin within NATO, followed by deliberation with the neutral countries themselves, and then formal negotiations with Russia. The new security architecture would require that Russia, like NATO, commit to help uphold the security of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other states in the region. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from those countries in a verifiable manner; after that, corresponding sanctions on Russia would be lifted. The neutral countries would retain their rights to participate in multilateral security operations on a scale comparable to what has been the case in the past, including even those operations that might be led by NATO. They could think of and describe themselves as Western states (or anything else, for that matter). If the European Union and they so wished in the future, they could join the EU. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination in every sense of the word. But NATO would decide not to invite them into the alliance as members. Ideally, these nations would endorse and promote this concept themselves as a more practical way to ensure their security than the current situation or any other plausible alternative.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1959.

This inventive collection explores Austria's international position after the end of the Cold War. Austria joined the European Union in 1995 and aligned its foreign policy with the EU. Unlike its neighbors to the East, it did not join NATO but continued its policy of neutrality. Austria strengthened its investments in Central and Eastern Europe. Austria experienced devastating wars in its neighborhood in the Balkans and Austrian diplomats served as mediators in the region.

This title explores paradoxical perceptions about Austria in regard to its approach to immigration, the EU and historical events.