A cogent analysis of the failings and potential of private military contractors.

Private military contractors, especially those in Iraq, have taken on far more than their original mandates required. Initially intended for combat support, they have become full-fledged warriors, many with little experience, scant oversight, and no accountability to the rules of engagement that constrain the U.S. military and coalition forces. When the occupation of Iraq turned into a fight against an insurgency, overwhelming U.S. and coalition military forces, the demand for private military contractors skyrocketed in 2003 and 2004. The explosive growth of such firms as Blackwater, Crescent, and others resulted in a relaxation of recruitment standards at precisely the same time that the U.S. military's own standards of recruitment began to falter, but the standards for private military contractors fell much further and faster. The predictable result included excessive civilian casualties, a human tragedy whose full dimensions have yet to be seen by the American public. Shawn Engbrecht has been training and recruiting private military contractors for more than a decade. Acknowledging that some private military contractors are out of control, he argues that the oft-made suggestion to fire them all is not the solution. Instead, Engbrecht contends that with proper training and development of recruits, along with enforceable regulation and oversight, private security companies can be successfully integrated into a total force package with a professional operational staff.

During the Vietnam War, the ClA created and trained small teams of elite fighting men reconnaissance and covert combat patrols in the areas where the American military were forbidden to operate. These patrols operated in North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and even mainland China. Cryptically they were known as FRAM 16, and their super-secret story has never been told -- until now. -- This account of Smith's Vietnam days is rich in suspense and adventure, replete with stories of secret intelligence missions that went unrecorded by reporters...(a) spine tingling story -- Publishers Weekly

Charley Castillo and the former members of Presidential Agent’s Office of Organizational Analysis are officially “retired.” But that doesn’t mean they’re out of action… At a Mexican roadblock, a US Embassy SUV is stopped at gunpoint, three of its passengers murdered, and a fourth kidnapped. Everything points to the drug cartels, especially when the kidnappers say they will return the hostage if a cartel kingpin is released from US federal prison. But when word gets to Castillo and his group of retired spies and special operators, they have their doubts. They believe that it's a diversion—that the murders and kidnapping were ordered by someone to lure Castillo & Company to their deaths. But even knowing that may not save them. Powerful forces in the US government are arrayed against them as well, and if one side doesn't get them...the other side will.

Relates experiences in Vietnam as part of a CIA-created covert combat unit

States seldom resort to war to overthrow their adversaries. They are more likely to attempt to covertly change the opposing regime, by assassinating a foreign leader, sponsoring a coup d’état, meddling in a democratic election, or secretly aiding foreign dissident groups. In Covert Regime Change, Lindsey A. O’Rourke shows us how states really act when trying to overthrow another state. She argues that conventional focus on overt cases misses the basic causes of regime change. O’Rourke provides substantive evidence of types of security interests that drive states to intervene. Offensive operations aim to overthrow a current military rival or break up a rival alliance. Preventive operations seek to stop a state from taking certain actions, such as joining a rival alliance, that may make them a future security threat. Hegemonic operations try to maintain a hierarchical relationship between the intervening state and the target government. Despite the prevalence of covert attempts at regime change, most operations fail to remain covert and spark blowback in unanticipated ways. Covert Regime Change assembles an original dataset of all American regime change operations during the Cold War. This fund of information shows the United States was ten times more likely to try covert rather than overt regime change during the Cold War. Her dataset allows O’Rourke to address three foundational questions: What motivates states to attempt foreign regime change? Why do states prefer to conduct these operations covertly rather than overtly? How successful are such missions in achieving their foreign policy goals?

A British journalist specializing in defense topics offers a readable, useful addition to the literature on American special operations forces.