An essential part of the Air War College curriculum consists of the study of military history and specific campaigns. Part 1 of this manuscript presents an attempt to clarify the relationship between air power and maneuver warfare since 1939, a subject that derives its importance from the fact that maneuver warfare has been the U.S. Army's official doctrine since the early eighties and remains so to the present day. Part 2 contains the collective wisdom of the military doctrine analysis of the Air University on the same subjects, as well as the way in which we have presented them.

In the form it has finally assumed, this volume falls into two very different parts. Part 1 was written by Dr. Steve Canby, Ken Brower, and Martin van Creveld at the invitation of Air University, Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama. It represents the authors joint attempt to clarify the relationship between air power and maneuver warfare since 1939, a subject that derives its importance from the fact that maneuver warfare has been the U. S. Army?s official doctrine since the early eighties and remains so to the present day. By contrast, part 2 was added ex post facto. It contains the collective wisdom of the military doctrine analysts of the Air University on the same subjects, as well as the way in which the authors in the first section have presented them. The reader is invited to wade through the entire volume and draw his/her own conclusions about the past, present, and future of air power on the one hand and maneuver warfare on the other, assuming indeed that they do have a future.

The authors identify and discuss the fundamental concepts and principles of maneuver warfare, compare and contrast it to attrition-style warfare, and trace its origins and history. They examine the role of airpower in enhancing maneuver during the early German campaigns of World War II, in Germany's 1941 Russian campaigns, and in the Soviet version of maneuver warfare in World War II. They analyze the importance of airpower in maneuver warfare employed by Israel in the 1967 and 1973 wars and by coalition forces in the Gulf War. Dr. van Creveld forecasts what the role of airpower will be in warfare during the coming years. The book includes a response to the authors by the air doctrine analysts at Air University.

An essential part of the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama, curriculum consists of the study of military history and specific campaigns. Distinguished military scholars often visit the college to discuss and explore issues with the faculty. Martin van Creveld was one of those distinguished scholars. He had previously been commissioned by the Air Staff to investigate the effects of the US Army’s move toward a more maneuver-oriented kind of warfare and the effect that move will have on the US Air Force role on the battlefield. The Air Staff was concerned about a host of issues: logistic support for a highly mobile force; friendly force confusion on huge, rapidly changing battlefields; close air support with or without air base support; and a host of other issues. The bottom line for the Air Force concerned several issues of great impact. First, Must air combat change because land combat is changing? and, Is the decisiveness of air power increasing geometrically to the point where the twenty-first century will find it is as decisive as ground power was in the twentieth century? Our guest historian agrees that sophisticated, highly technical air and space developments may have made air power dominant on the conventional battlefield. The great exception, however, lies in the trend away from conventional to unconventional conflict. To Professor van Creveld, nation-states have lost the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. To prepare for a conventional scenario is to prepare for the last war, not the next one. The possibility of more “Lebanons” is much higher than the likelihood of future “Iraqs.”

This second edition of Military Strategy, Joint Operations, and Airpower introduces contemporary strategy at the operational level of war. Developed as foundational reading for all US Air Force Academy cadets, this textbook is designed to close the gap between military theory and practice.

The manual describes the general strategy for the U.S. Marines but it is beneficial for not only every Marine to read but concepts on leadership can be gathered to lead a business to a family. If you want to see what make Marines so effective this book is a good place to start.