This first volume in a three-volume exposition of Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics" explores a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"--a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy. Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.

The Theory of Monetary Institutions covers free banking monetary thought and a theoretical account of the evolution of monetary institutions.

Money, Financial Institutions and Macroeconomics presents a comparative and international perspective on the current state of research in monetary theory, and the application of monetary theory to important policy issues. The main emphasis is on views stressing the importance of credit creation in the monetary process, in a tradition which arguably encompasses Wicksell, the later Swedes and the Austrians, through the later Hicks, the circuit school and contemporary post-Keynesians. In addition, however, there are distinguished contributions from economists with a more `mainstream' approach to the issues. The book is subdivided into four main parts: Part I reviews the theory of a monetary and credit economy; Part II explores alternative views on money and credit; Part III deals with monetary policy issues in North America; and Part IV discusses monetary policy issues in Europe. `Taken together, the contributions to this volume certainly bear out Hick's famous adage about the much closer relationship between `monetary theory' and `monetary history' than is the case in other branches of economic thought.'

This book presents Martin Shubik's important contribution to the development of game theory, and shows how game theory methods can be used in the study of prices, money and financial institutions. After introducing the reader to his career and the influences which developed his research, Professor Martin Shubik addresses the price system considering issues such as competitive equilibrium, economic exchange and production. He explores the competitive price system and the emergence of money and financial systems to develop a theory of monetary and financial institutions. Specifically, he examines the role of money in the economy using both cooperative and non-cooperative solutions in game theory. Throughout the book Martin Shubik stresses that the value of games, which can be both played and analysed, provides an important link between theory and process and institutional studies. This book will be welcomed by economists, especially those interested in game theory, as well as by money and banking professionals.

A game theoretic approach to the theory of money and financial institution is given utilizing both the strategic and coalitional forms for describing the economy. The economy is first modeled as a strategic market game, then the strategic form is used to calculate several cooperative forms that differ from each other in their utilization of money and credit and their treatment of threats. It is shown that there are natural upper and lower bounds to the monetary needs of an economy, but even in the extreme structures the concept of quot;enough moneyquot; can be defined usefully, and for large economies the games obtained from the lower and upper bounds have cores that approach the same limit that is an efficient price system. The role of disequilibrium is then discussed.