Two Crises, Different Outcomes examines East Asian policy reactions to the two major crises of the last fifteen years: the global financial crisis of 2008–9 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. The calamity of the late 1990s saw a massive meltdown concentrated in East Asia. In stark contrast, East Asia avoided the worst effects of the Lehman Brothers collapse, incurring relatively little damage when compared to the financial devastation unleashed on North America and Europe. Much had changed across the intervening decade, not least that China rather than Japan had become the locomotive of regional growth, and that the East Asian economies had taken numerous steps to buffer their financial structures and regulatory regimes. This time Asia avoided disaster; it bounced back quickly after the initial hit and has been growing in a resilient fashion ever since. The authors of this book explain how the earlier financial crisis affected Asian economies, why government reactions differed so widely during that crisis, and how Asian economies weathered the Great Recession. Drawing on a mixture of single-country expertise and comparative analysis, they conclude by assessing the long-term prospects that Asian countries will continue their recent success.

Some analysts looked at the 1997/98 East Asian crisis not as one crisis but as a combination of crises, beginning with a crisis of confidence and evolving into a currency crisis, a financial crisis, an economic crisis, a social crisis and a political crisis. This book is a multidisciplinary study of financial crises, in particular, the Asian crisis of 1997 and the more recent global financial crisis of 2008. Looking at financial crises not as one crisis, but as a combination of crises beginning with a crisis of confidence, this study steps out of the traditional mould and examines financial crises from novel perspectives. The book highlights that since the origin of a financial crisis is a confidence crisis, either in the whole economy or a particular sector, the Asian and recent global crises could have backward and forward linkages to political regimes and institutions, culture and tradition, the role of the media, society and societal evolution and development processes of regulatory regimes. Through contributions by authors in fields ranging from sociology and political science, media and Islamic banking, to law and regulation, this study adopts a broad framework for understanding financial crises, and sheds light on the interwoven and complex structures and often overlooked aspects which contribute to the holistic understanding of this topic.

Before 2007, economists thought that financial crises would never happen again in the United States, that such upheavals were a thing of the past. Gary B. Gorton, a prominent expert on financial crises, argues that economists fundamentally misunderstand what they are, why they occur, and why there were none in the U.S. from 1934 to 2007. Misunderstanding Financial Crises offers a back-to-basics overview of financial crises, and shows that they are not rare, idiosyncratic events caused by a perfect storm of unconnected factors. Instead, Gorton shows how financial crises are, indeed, inherent to our financial system. Economists, Gorton writes, looked from a certain point of view and missed everything that was important: the evolution of capital markets and the banking system, the existence of new financial instruments, and the size of certain money markets like the sale and repurchase market. Comparing the so-called "Quiet Period" of 1934 to 2007, when there were no systemic crises, to the "Panic of 2007-2008," Gorton ties together key issues like bank debt and liquidity, credit booms and manias, moral hazard, and too-big-too-fail--all to illustrate the true causes of financial collapse. He argues that the successful regulation that prevented crises since 1934 did not adequately keep pace with innovation in the financial sector, due in part to the misunderstandings of economists, who assured regulators that all was well. Gorton also looks forward to offer both a better way for economists to think about markets and a description of the regulation necessary to address the future threat of financial disaster.

WINNER OF THE LIONEL GELBER PRIZE A NEW YORK TIMES NOTABLE BOOK OF 2018 ONE OF THE ECONOMIST'S BOOKS OF THE YEAR A NEW YORK TIMES CRITICS' TOP BOOK "An intelligent explanation of the mechanisms that produced the crisis and the response to it...One of the great strengths of Tooze's book is to demonstrate the deeply intertwined nature of the European and American financial systems."--The New York Times Book Review From the prizewinning economic historian and author of Shutdown and The Deluge, an eye-opening reinterpretation of the 2008 economic crisis (and its ten-year aftermath) as a global event that directly led to the shockwaves being felt around the world today. We live in a world where dramatic shifts in the domestic and global economy command the headlines, from rollbacks in US banking regulations to tariffs that may ignite international trade wars. But current events have deep roots, and the key to navigating today’s roiling policies lies in the events that started it all—the 2008 economic crisis and its aftermath. Despite initial attempts to downplay the crisis as a local incident, what happened on Wall Street beginning in 2008 was, in fact, a dramatic caesura of global significance that spiraled around the world, from the financial markets of the UK and Europe to the factories and dockyards of Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, forcing a rearrangement of global governance. With a historian’s eye for detail, connection, and consequence, Adam Tooze brings the story right up to today’s negotiations, actions, and threats—a much-needed perspective on a global catastrophe and its long-term consequences.

"Aftershocks was written in the midst of the deepest economic crisis since the Great Depression. Although it would be premature to presume to identify the repercussions of the crisis, it is clear that it will have profound aftershock effects in the political, economic, and social spheres. The book contains essays based on semi-structured interviews with leading scholars, European politicians and representatives from the world of business. They reflect on the origins of the crisis as well as the possible social, economic, and political transformations it may engender."--Publisher's description.

Some analysts looked at the 1997/98 East Asian crisis not as one crisis but as a combination of crises, beginning with a crisis of confidence and evolving into a currency crisis, a financial crisis, an economic crisis, a social crisis and a political crisis. This book is a multidisciplinary study of financial crises, in particular, the Asian crisis of 1997 and the more recent global financial crisis of 2008. Looking at financial crises not as one crisis, but as a combination of crises beginning with a crisis of confidence, this study steps out of the traditional mould and examines financial crises from novel perspectives. The book highlights that since the origin of a financial crisis is a confidence crisis, either in the whole economy or a particular sector, the Asian and recent global crises could have backward and forward linkages to political regimes and institutions, culture and tradition, the role of the media, society and societal evolution and development processes of regulatory regimes. Through contributions by authors in fields ranging from sociology and political science, media and Islamic banking, to law and regulation, this study adopts a broad framework for understanding financial crises, and sheds light on the interwoven and complex structures and often overlooked aspects which contribute to the holistic understanding of this topic.

Latvia stands out as the East European country hardest hit by the global financial crisis; it lost approximately 25 percent of its GDP between 2008 and 2010. It was also the most overheated economy before the crisis. But in the second half of 2010, Latvia returned to economic growth. How did this happen so quickly? Current Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis, who shepherded Latvia through the crisis, and renowned author Anders slund discuss why the Latvian economy became so overheated; why an IMF and European Union stabilization program was needed; what the Latvian government did to resolve the financial crisis and why it made these choices; and what the outcome has been. This book offers a rare insider's look at how a national government responded to a global financial crisis, made tough choices, and led the country back to economic growth.