Since the early 1980s, Korea’s financial development has been a tale of liberalization and opening. After the 1997 financial crisis, great strides were made in building a market-oriented financial system through sweeping reforms for deregulation and the opening of financial markets. However, the new system failed to steer the country away from a credit card boom and bust in 2003, a liquidity crisis in 2008, and a run on its savings banks in 2011, and has been severely tested again by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Financial liberalization, clearly, has been no panacea. This study analyzes the deepening of and structural changes in Korea’s financial system since the early 1980s and presents the empirical results of the effects of financial development on economic growth, stability, and the distribution of income. It finds that, contrary to conventional wisdom, financial liberalization has contributed little to fostering the growth and stability of the Korean economy and has exacerbated income distribution problems. Are there any merits in financial liberalization? The authors answer this query through empirical examinations of the theories of finance and growth. They point to a clear need to further improve the efficiency, soundness, and stability of Korean financial institutions and markets.

This volume provides a rounded view of financial liberalization after the collapses in East Asia.

Geared towards policy makers, researchers, academics, and business and management professionals, The Gains and Pains of Financial Integration and Trade Liberalization helps readers develop new theories and models for analysing the future trends in finance and trade-related issues.

A study of 53 countries during 1980-95 finds that financial liberalization increases the probability of a banking crisis, but less so where the institutional environment is strong. In particular, respect for the rule of law, a low level of corruption, and good contract enforcement are relevant institutional characteristics. the data also show that, after liberalization, financially repressed countries tend to have improved financial development even if they experience a banking crisis. This is not true for financially restrained countries. This paper’s results support a cautious approach to financial liberalization where institutions are weak, even if macroeconomic stabilization has been achieved.

The financial liberalization thesis emerged in the 1970s and has been of considerable importance ever since, not merely in terms of its theoretical influence but, perhaps more importantly, in terms of its impact on policy makers and policy debates. Although it has encountered increasing scepticism over the years, it nevertheless had a relatively early impact on development policy, which still continues unabated, through the work of the IMF and the World Bank. The latter two institutions, perhaps in their traditional role as promoters of what were claimed to be free market conditions, were keen to encourage financial liberalization policies as part of more general reforms or stabilization programmes. This book explores what we have learned from the vast experience of the theoretical and policy aspects of the financial liberalization.

In this study, the author hopes to add to the literature concerning the distributional consequences of financial integration by focusing on the rise of non-state actors within a transformed international system. In it, he argues that structural change brought on by transnational production and post-industrialization has created space for non-state actors to acquire autonomy from sovereign entities. While finance is by no means the only specialized sector to achieve autonomy, it has perhaps the most immediate impact on the ability of governments to pursue policy. First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.