For almost 200 years, the British perception of the Battle of Waterloo was that it was a great British victory gained over the French tyrant Napoleon which was achieved in spite of, rather than because of, the allied contingents in the Duke of Wellington’s army. Eyewitness accounts by British soldiers, encouraged by the doubts expressed in Wellington’s despatches, denigrated and vilified the courage and prowess of these allies. But in the last twenty years modern historians, with better access to the accounts and archives of the allied nations, have tried to put the record straight, and their efforts have been rewarded by changing attitudes and a greater understanding of the significant part the allies played. Andrew Field, in this the latest of his series of pioneering books on Waterloo, makes a powerful contribution to this continuing debate by analyzing in forensic detail the records of these allied forces throughout the campaign. In his balanced, nonpartisan reassessment he describes the make-up of these forces, their training and experience, and their military capability. Included are graphic accounts of their actions and performance on the battlefield. His work is essential reading for all students of the Waterloo campaign.

“An excellent account of the contribution of the newly formed (and short-lived) United Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Allied victory” (HistoryOfWar.org). The Dutch-Belgians have been variously described as inexperienced, incompetent, and cowardly, a rogue element in the otherwise disciplined Allied Army. It is only now being tentatively acknowledged that they alone saved Wellington from disaster at Quatre Bras. He had committed a strategic error in that, as Napoleon advanced, his own troops were scattered over a hundred kilometers of southern Belgium. Outnumbered three to one, the Netherlanders gave him time to concentrate his forces and save Brussels from French occupation. At Waterloo itself, on at least three occasions when the fate of the battle “hung upon the cusp,” their engagement with the enemy aided British recovery. Their commander—the Prince of Orange—has been viciously described as an arrogant fool, “a disaster waiting to happen,” and even a dangerous lunatic. According to the assessment of Wellington himself, he was a reliable and courageous subordinate. This book reveals a new dimension of the famous campaign and includes many unseen illustrations. For the first time, a full assessment is made of the challenge which Willem I faced as king of a country hastily cobbled together by the Congress of Vienna, and of his achievement in assembling, equipping, and training 30,000 men from scratch in eighteen months. “An extraordinary and impressively researched, written, organized and presented history that sheds considerable new light on one of the most influential battles of 19th century Europe.” —Midwest Book Review “A fascinating read.” —Military Heritage

-- Demonstrates the decisive German contribution to victory at Waterloo -- Unpublished German eyewitness accounts and regimental reports -- Covers the battles of Waterloo, Wavre and the taking of Paris Peter Hofschroer, in this second volume of his masterly study of 1815, challenges the accepted version of events at the battle of Waterloo. He demonstrates convincingly that Allied victory was due not to steadfast British infantry repelling the French, but to the timely arrival of Prussian troops who stole victory from Napoleon and sealed the fate of the last Grande Armee. Drawing on previously unpublished accounts, Hofschroer gives not only the Prussian perspective of their march to Waterloo and decisive attack on Napoleon's flank, but also details of the actions fought by some of the 25,000 Germans in Wellington's 'British' army -- more than a third of the Duke's force. A gripping narrative of astonishing detail captures such key episodes of Waterloo as La Haye Sainte, Papelotte, Hougoumont and the Prussian struggle with the Imperial Guard for Plancenoit. In addition, Hofschroer examines the battle at Wavre, the Allied offensive into France, the taking of Paris and the sieges across northern France. 1815: The Waterloo Campaign-The German Victory is a definitive work on an epic confrontation by one of today's leading military writers.

The army commanded by the Duke of Wellington at Quatre-Bras and Waterloo included two infantry divisions and three cavalry brigades of the newly-unified Netherlands (or 'Dutch-Belgian') army. The part played by these troops in the two battles, under experienced officers many of whom had seen long service in Napoleon's campaigns, has often been unjustly dismissed by British commentators. The organisation, uniforms, and battle record of the Belgian units are explained here in detail by an experienced researcher in Continental archives, and illustrated by a specialist in the period, who actually lives at Waterloo.

This book at last makes available in English a penetrating exchange between two of history's most famous soldiers concerning the dramatic events of the Waterloo campaign of 1815. The Duke of Wellington is one of the greatest military commanders in British history; General Carl von Clausewitz is widely regarded as the greatest military thinker in the history of Western civilization. Both men had vast experience in the Napoleonic Wars, and both were prominent participants in the campaign. Wellington commanded the Anglo-Dutch-Belgian army; the much younger Clausewitz was chief-of-staff to Prussia's 3rd Corps. Wellington went on to become prime minister of Great Britain and commander-in-chief-for-life of the British Army. Clausewitz went on to author VOM KRIEGE (ON WAR), a seminal and still hotly debated treatise on the theory and philosophy of war. He also became the founder of modern, "scientific" military history, via the work of his disciple, military historian Hans Delbrück. Oddly, Clausewitz's study of the campaign of 1815 was never published in English, and Wellington's once-famous response to it has been strangely but studiously ignored by British military historians since 1914. Hence this book. It contains Wellington's initial battle report; Clausewitz's post-battle letters to his wife Marie; correspondence within Wellington's circle concerning Clausewitz's work; Clausewitz's strategic analysis of the entire campaign (not just the Battle of Waterloo); Wellington's memorandum in response; and enlightening essays by prominent experts on Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Battle of Waterloo. Major General [U.S. Army] David T. Zabecki, Ph.D., writes in the April 2011 edition of The Journal of Military History: "Long overdue, we now have two English translations of [Clausewitz's] The Campaign of 1815 [i.e., Peter Hofschröer's translation of Clausewitz's study and Bassford, Moran, and Pedlow's edition of the full Clausewitz-Wellington exchange]. Either of these volumes would be a welcome addition to the bookshelf of any serious student of military affairs, but On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815 is clearly the richer of the two." Napoleonic expert Bruno Colson wrote [in War in History 19(3)] that Pedlow "convincingly resurrects Wellington's ideas and actions, and gives a final and excellent reply to the arguments of Peter Hofschröer, while remaining balanced, recognizing the latter's merits and quoting him courteously. Waterloo 'was neither a British victory nor a Prussian victory; it was an Allied victory, ' says Pedlow (p. 282). For Waterloo enthusiasts, this essay alone justifies buying the book." Noted Clausewitz scholar Jon Sumida (U.Md) writes that "On Waterloo is essential reading for those seeking an understanding of Clausewitz's distinctive approach to historical case study as the basis of practical knowledge of armed conflict. Clausewitz's history of the campaign of 1815 incorporates methods of critical analysis explained in Book II of On War, which were addressed primarily to the observation and assessment of past cases of strategic and operational decision-making by commanders-in chief. The Bassford, Moran, and Pedlow edition provides a highly readable translation of a work previously accessible only in German that illustrates Clausewitz's approach to the replication and evaluation of the experience of high command." The Editors: Christopher Bassford is Professor of Strategy at the National War College, in Washington, DC. Daniel Moran is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, CA. Gregory W. Pedlow is Chief of the Historical Office at NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), near Mons, Belgium.

In this compelling book, Richard Holmes tells the exhilarating story of the Duke of Wellington, Britain's greatest ever soldier.