When the Revolutionary War began, Congress established a national army and appointed George Washington its commander in chief. Congress then took it upon itself to choose numerous subordinate generals to lead the army’s various departments, divisions, and brigades. How this worked out in the end is well known. Less familiar, however, is how well Congress’s choices worked out along the way. Although historians have examined many of Washington’s subordinates, Washington’s Revolutionary War Generals is the first book to look at these men in a collective, integrated manner. A thoroughgoing study of the Revolutionary War careers of the Continental Army’s generals—their experience, performance, and relationships with Washington and the Continental Congress—this book provides an overview of the politics of command, both within and outside the army, and a unique perspective on how it affected Washington’s prosecution of the war. It is impossible to understand the outcome of the War for Independence without first examining America’s military leadership, author Stephen R. Taaffe contends. His description of Washington’s generals—who they were, how they received their commissions, and how they performed—goes a long way toward explaining how these American officers, who were short on experience and military genius, prevailed over their professional British counterparts. Following these men through the war’s most important battles and campaigns as well as its biggest controversies, such as the Conway Cabal and the Newburgh Conspiracy, Taaffe weaves a narrative in the grand tradition of military history. Against this backdrop, his depiction of the complexities and particulars of character and politics of military command provides a new understanding of George Washington, the War for Independence, and the U.S. military’s earliest beginnings. A unique combination of biography and institutional history shot through with political analysis, this book is a thoughtful, deeply researched, and an eminently readable contribution to the literature of the Revolution.

Discusses George Washington's military strategies during the American Revolution and how his particular tactics aided in defeating the British army, including his utilization of European training techniques and his moral leadership.

At the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775, the colonies faced the daunting task of creating the first American army, and its requisite leadership, capable of combating a global superpower whose standing army and general ship were among the finest in the world. Built largely from state and local militias, the colonial army performed surprisingly well and produced a number of fine generals. Some were experienced before the war, like George Washington of the Virginia Militia and the British-born Horatio Gates, while others were as green as the soldiers they led. This book presents basic biographical information about America's first generals in the Revolutionary War. Included are all generals of the Continental Army, along with those commissioned in the colonies' militias. Drawn from primary sources, including death and census records, records of the Continental Congress, and contemporary writings, each biographical sketch provides date and place of birth, prewar education and occupation, wartime service, date and place of death, and place of burial. Portraits of each general are included where available, and appendices display important statistics, including comparative ages; occupations; officers lost by death, resignation, murder or changing loyalty; and states or countries of origin.

The First Comprehensive Historical Investigation into the Conway Cabal, the Attempt to Remove George Washington from Command In the spring of 1778, General George Washington wrote to his friend Landon Carter about a rumored "disposition in the Northern Officers to see me superceded in my Command." This was as candid a statement as the general ever made about the so-called "Conway Cabal" of patriot officers and politicians critical of his leadership. Most early historians of the Revolution took the threat to Washington seriously, but by the mid-twentieth century interpretations had reversed, with the plot--if one existed--posing no real danger to the commander-in-chief. Yet, as historian Mark Edward Lender reveals in his compelling Cabal! The Plot Against General Washington, clues found in original new research provide a more comprehensive understanding of the personalities and political maneuverings of those involved in the Cabal, and the real nature of the challenge to Washington. Rather than the "classic Cabal" of Generals Horatio Gates, Thomas Mifflin, and Thomas Conway in a plot to remove Washington quickly, the threat to Washington's command was a gradual administrative attempt by the Board of War and political allies to take over the war effort. Reorganized in late 1777 under the leadership of Mifflin, with Gates assuming the board presidency in January 1778, the Board of War sought authority to determine military policy and strategic goals, all training, organizational, personnel, and logistical functions, and even the assignment of theater commanders. Had they succeeded, Washington's title of commander-in-chief would have been utterly hollow. The Cabal tested Washington as few other things did during the war and perhaps tempered him into the man we remember today. Washington adroitly navigated the challenges to his leadership, meeting and defeating every attempt to curtail his authority. His response revealed a leadership style that saw him safely through the war, and gave him overwhelming support from his countrymen to become their first president.

Historians have long considered the Battle of Monmouth one of the most complicated engagements of the American Revolution. Fought on Sunday, June 28, 1778, Monmouth was critical to the success of the Revolution. It also marked a decisive turning point in the military career of George Washington. Without the victory at Monmouth Courthouse, Washington's critics might well have marshaled the political strength to replace him as the American commander-in-chief. Authors Mark Edward Lender and Garry Wheeler Stone argue that in political terms, the Battle of Monmouth constituted a pivotal moment in the War for Independence. Viewing the political and military aspects of the campaign as inextricably entwined, this book offers a fresh perspective on Washington’s role in it. Drawing on a wide range of historical sources—many never before used, including archaeological evidence—Lender and Stone disentangle the true story of Monmouth and provide the most complete and accurate account of the battle, including both American and British perspectives. In the course of their account it becomes evident that criticism of Washington’s performance in command was considerably broader and deeper than previously acknowledged. In light of long-standing practical and ideological questions about his vision for the Continental Army and his ability to win the war, the outcome at Monmouth—a hard-fought tactical draw—was politically insufficient for Washington. Lender and Stone show how the general’s partisans, determined that the battle for public opinion would be won in his favor, engineered a propaganda victory for their chief that involved the spectacular court-martial of Major General Charles Lee, the second-ranking officer of the Continental Army. Replete with poignant anecdotes, folkloric incidents, and stories of heroism and combat brutality; filled with behind-the-scenes action and intrigue; and teeming with characters from all walks of life, Fatal Sunday gives us the definitive view of the fateful Battle of Monmouth.

This biography attempts to set the record straight for a misunderstood military figure from the American Revolution. Historians and biographers of Charles Lee have treated him as either an enemy of George Washington or a defender of American liberty. Neither approach is accurate; objectivity is required to fully understand the war’s most complicated general. In George Washington’s Nemesis, author Christian McBurney uses original documents (some newly discovered) to combine two dramatic stories to create one balanced view of one of the Revolutionary War’s most fascinating personalities. General Lee, second in command in the Continental Army led by George Washington, was captured by the British in December, 1776. While imprisoned, he gave his captors a plan on how to defeat Washington’s army as quickly as possible. This extraordinary act of treason was not discovered during his lifetime. Less well known is that throughout his sixteen months of captivity and even after his release, Lee continued communicating with the enemy, offering to help negotiate an end to the rebellion. After Lee rejoined the Continental Army, he was given command of many of its best troops together with orders from Washington to attack British general Henry Clinton’s column near Monmouth, New Jersey. But things did not go as planned for Lee, leading to his court-martial for not attacking and for retreating in the face of the enemy. McBruney argues the evidence clearly shows Lee was unfairly convicted and had, in fact, done something beneficial. But Lee had insulted Washington, which made the matter a political contest between the army’s two top generals—only one of whom could prevail.