Why has the United States taken such a firm stance against the International Criminal Court (ICC) and expended such diplomatic goodwill in an attempt to dismantle a tribunal that poses no serious risk to its citizens? This book critiques causal ideologies such as American exceptionalism, state sovereignty and laissez-faire capitalism to show how U.S. opposition is driven by pervasive political, legal, historic, military and economic conditioning factors. It shows how U.S. attitudes transcend partisan politics and predicts how the U.S.-ICC relationship will be affected by the economic crisis, shifting international geopolitical power structures, the crisis in the U.S. military, unfolding international human rights law and the “politics of change” promised by the nascent Obama administration.

The Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) entered into force on July 1, 2002. With the Court now established and developing a track record of engagement in situations, such as Darfur, that are of great interest to the United States, it seemed that there might be important ways in which the United States might engage and support the Court, whether joining it or short of joining it. This Task Force has undertaken such a review, hearing from more than a dozen experts and officials representing a variety of perspectives on the ICC. Our conclusion, detailed in the recommendations in this report, is that the United States should announce a policy of positive engagement with the Court, and that this policy should be reflected in concrete support for the Court's efforts and the elimination of legal and other obstacles to such support. The Task Force does not recommend U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute at this time. But it urges engagement with the ICC and the Assembly of States Parties in a manner that enables the United States to help further shape the Court into an effective accountability mechanism. The Task Force believes that such engagement will also facilitate future consideration of whether the United States should join the Court.

The International Criminal Court remains a sensitive issue in U.S. foreign policy circles. It was agreed to at the tail end of the Clinton administration, but with serious reservations. In 2002 the Bush administration ceremoniously reversed course and "unsigned" the Rome Statute that had established the Court. But recent developments in Washington and elsewhere indicate that the United States may be moving toward de facto acceptance of the Court and active cooperation in its mission. In Means to an End, Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg reassess the relationship of the United States and the ICC, as well as American policy toward international justice more broadly. Praise for the hardcover edition of Means to an End "Books of this sort are all too rare. Two experienced policy intellectuals, one liberal, one conservative, have come together to find common ground on a controversial foreign policy issue.... The book is short, but it goes a long way toward clearing the ideological air." — Foreign Affairs "A well-researched and timely contribution to the debate over America's proper relationship to the International Criminal Court. Rigorous in its arguments and humane in its conclusions, the volume is an indispensable guide for scholars and policymakers alike." —Madeleine K. Albright, former U.S. Secretary of State "Two of our nation's leading authorities on preventing atrocities have joined to make a convincing argument that closer cooperation with the International Criminal Court will help promote human rights and the values on which America was founded." —Angelina Jolie, co-chair, Jolie-Pitt Foundation

Changes to U.S. strategic policy since September 11, 2001, have shifted the focus of American security efforts toward building and maintaining strategic partnerships, as well as increasing the capacity of partner nations to respond to crises and contribute to local, regional, and international stability. These themes run throughout U.S. national security policy documents -- including the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, National Strategy for Maritime Security, and Quadrennial Defense Review -- and the military Services are being reshaped accordingly. Changes in forces include an increased emphasis on language training and cultural awareness, greater engagement/theater security cooperation, and organizational changes to support more training and engagement with partner nations. The President's 2008 budget submission to Congress includes considerable funding in support of diplomatic and military programs fostering improved international partnerships. Unfortunately, U.S. policy on the International Criminal Court (ICC), including the associated American Service-members' Protection Act (ASPA) of 2002 and Nethercutt Amendment, runs counter to this strategic partnership theme. ASPA and the Nethercutt Amendment have strained U.S. relations with many partners and have caused significant damage at the operational and strategic levels. At the operational level, ASPA has harmed military-to-military relationships, particularly in the case of international military education and training. At the strategic level, U.S. policy on the ICC separates the United States from the overwhelming majority of the world's modern societies and is further isolating America from its partners and potential partners.

One month after the International Criminal Court (ICC) officially came into existence on July 1, 2002, the President signed legislation that limits U.S. government support and assistance to the ICC, curtails military assistance to many countries that have ratified the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, and most controversially among European allies, authorizes the President to use "all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release" of certain U.S. and allied persons who may be detained or tried by the ICC. While most U.S. allies support the ICC, the Bush Administration firmly opposes it and has renounced any U.S. obligations under the treaty. The Administration initially vetoed a United Nations resolution to extend the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia because it did not contain any guarantee that U.S. participants would be immune to prosecution by the ICC. Ultimately, the Security Council and the U.S. delegation were able to reach a compromise that defers for one year any prosecution of participants in U.N. established or authorized missions, whose home countries have not ratified the Rome Statute. While the compromise falls short of the Administration's original goal of ensuring permanent immunity for U.S. citizens from the ICC, it suggests that the role of ...

American reluctance to join the International Criminal Court illuminates important trends in international security and a central dilemma facing U.S. Foreign policy in the 21st century. The ICC will prosecute individuals who commit egregious international human rights violations such as genocide. The Court is a logical culmination of the global trends toward expanding human rights and creating international institutions. The U.S., which fostered these trends because they served American national interests, initially championed the creation of an ICC. The Court fundamentally represents the triumph of American values in the international arena. Yet the United States now opposes the ICC for fear of constraints upon America's ability to use force to protect its national interests. The principal national security and constitutional objections to the Court, which the volume explores in detail, inflate the potential risks inherent in joining the ICC. More fundamentally, they reflect a belief in American exceptionalism that is unsustainable in today's world. Court opponents also underestimate the growing salience of international norms and institutions in addressing emerging threats to U.S. national interests. The misguided assessments that buttress opposition to the ICC threaten to undermine American leadership and security in the 21st century more gravely than could any international institution.