As President Carter's ambassador to Nicaragua from 1977-1979, Mauricio Solaún witnessed a critical moment in Central American history. In U.S. Intervention and Regime Change in Nicaragua, Solaún outlines the role of U.S. foreign policy during the Carter administration and explains how this policy with respect to the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979 not only failed but helped impede the institutionalization of democracy there. Late in the 1970s, the United States took issue with the Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza. Moral suasion, economic sanctions, and other peaceful instruments from Washington led to violent revolution in Nicaragua and bolstered a new dictatorial government. A U.S.-supported counterrevolution formed, and Solaún argues that the United States attempts to this day to determine who rules Nicaragua. Solaún explores the mechanisms that kept Somoza's poorly legitimized regime in power for decades, making it the most enduring Latin American authoritarian regime of the twentieth century. Solaún argues that continual shifts in U.S. international policy have been made in response to previous policies that failed to produce U.S.- friendly international environments. His historical survey of these policy shifts provides a window on the working of U.S. diplomacy and lessons for future policy-making.

An award-winning author tells the stories of the audacious American politicians, military commanders, and business executives who took it upon themselves to depose monarchs, presidents, and prime ministers of other countries with disastrous long-term consequences.

Lyndon Johnson invaded the Dominican Republic. Richard Nixon sponsored a coup attempt in Chile. Ronald Reagan waged covert warfare in Nicaragua. Nearly a dozen times during the Cold War, American presidents turned their attention from standoffs with the Soviet Union to intervene in Latin American affairs. In each instance, it was declared that the security of the United States was at stake-but, as Michael Grow demonstrates, these actions had more to do with flexing presidential muscle than responding to imminent danger. From Eisenhower's toppling of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 to Bush's overthrow of Noriega in Panama in 1989, Grow casts a close eye on eight major cases of U.S. intervention in the Western Hemisphere, offering fresh interpretations of why they occurred and what they signified. The case studies also include the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Reagan's invasion of Grenada in 1983, and JFK's little-known 1963 intervention against the government of Cheddi Jagan in British Guiana. Grow argues that it was not threats to U.S. national security or endangered economic interests that were decisive in prompting presidents to launch these interventions. Rather, each intervention was part of a symbolic geopolitical chess match in which the White House sought to project an image of overpowering strength to audiences at home and abroad-in order to preserve both national and presidential credibility. As Grow also reveals, that impulse was routinely reinforced by local Latin American elites-such as Chilean businessmen or opposition Panamanian politicians-who actively promoted intervention in their own self-interest. LBJ's loud lament—“What can we do in Vietnam if we can't clean up the Dominican Republic?”—reflected just how preoccupied our presidents were with proving that the U.S. was no paper tiger and that they themselves were fearless and forceful leaders. Meticulously argued and provocative, Grow's bold reinterpretation of Cold War history shows that this special preoccupation with credibility was at the very core of our presidents' approach to foreign relations, especially those involving our Latin American neighbors.

A penetrating analysis of the controversial U.S. role in the 1990 Nicaraguan elections-the most closely monitored in history-this book exposes the intervention in the electoral process of a sovereign nation by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the National Endowment for Democracy, and private U.S.-based organizations. Robins

Why has the United States repeatedly engaged in the overthrow of foreign leaders and regimes? Although most regime change interventions have neither furthered US national security nor improved the fate of targeted states, the US has turned to this foreign policy instrument in at least sixteen cases from 1906 to 2011. In The Origins of Overthrow, Payam Ghalehdar explains US-imposed regime change by focusing on its emotional underpinnings. Based on a thorough analysis of the emotional state of five US presidents, he shows how "emotional frustration"-an emotional syndrome that combines hegemonic expectations, perceptions of hatred in target state obstructions, and negative affect-has repeatedly influenced US regime change decisions. When US presidents have been gripped by this emotion, Ghalehdar argues, they have turned to the use of force and targeted perceived sources of obstruction in order to ameliorate their emotional state and discharge frustration. Examining five US regime change episodes in two world regions (Cuba 1906, Nicaragua 1909-12, and the Dominican Republic 1963-65 in the Western hemisphere, and Iran 1979-80, and Iraq 2001-03 in the Middle East), he empirically illustrates the emotional sources of US intervention decisions. A novel explanation for a puzzling phenomenon in US foreign policy, The Origins of Overthrow sheds light on how emotions play a previously overlooked role in US regime change decisions.