This book offers new insights into the excesses and uncanniness of the ‘War on Terror’ via an engagement with the pleasures of risk. Engaging with the unconscious, the excess, the uncanny and the spectacular dimensions of the ‘War on Terror’ – as made evident, for example, in the 2012 London Olympic Games and the 2013 manhunt for the Boston Marathon bombers – leads this book to probe the so-called order of things that has made this war intelligible in both mainstream and critical approaches to Security Studies and International Relations. Specifically, this book brings to light and theorizes the obscene pleasures of the ‘War on Terror’ and its supplementary precautionary risk logic. Coming to grips with this (i.e., the pleasures of risk), ultimately via an engagement with critical psychoanalytic theory, leads this book to argue that we may be other than we think we are within critical International Relations (IR) traditions. Furthermore, albeit without discounting the madness, if not desolation, of the present (extending from the ‘War on Terror’ to the politics of Brexit and Donald Trump), it suggests there may be some relief in that yet. This book will be of much interest to students of critical terrorism studies, critical security studies, political theory and International Relations broadly.

Developing ideas established in the successful first edition, this new version of America's War on Terror updates and expands the original collection of essays, allowing the reader to fully understand how the causes of the war on terror, both the domestic and foreign policy implications, and the future challenges faced by the United States have moved on since 2003. Features include: " Four specifically designed sections which examine the topic from different perspectives and orientations to provide a balanced and nuanced understanding of the issues. " New material takes into account events through the election of Barack Obama and potential changes in the US-led war on terror. " Four additional core chapters look at Homeland Security, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia, Iraq and the Persian Gulf and Globalization, all with a focus on the War on Terror. " A robust introduction builds on the previous preface, while the editors have also developed a concluding section that brings together the major themes of the work and provides an overview of future policy challenges and options. The book's existing tables and appendices are also completely updated. " Essays written from a variety of perspectives provide instructors with a useful tool to supplement course materials. " The book also offers the student an analytical means with which to understand the factors behind the attacks, the nation's response to them, and the continuing evolving impact of terrorism on domestic and international politics. America's War on Terror, Second Edition will be of interest and utility to academics, the general public and most significantly to students as a reader for such courses as US foreign policy, international security, terrorism, Islamic studies, American politics and international relations.

Terrorism kills far fewer Americans annually than automobile accidents, firearms, or even lightning strikes. Given this minimal risk, why does the U.S. continue expending lives and treasure to fight the global war on terror? In Monsters to Destroy, Navin A. Bapat argues that the war on terror provides the U.S. a cover for its efforts to expand and preserve American control over global energy markets. To gain dominance over these markets, the U.S. offered protection to states critical in the extraction, sale, and transportation of energy from their "terrorist" internal and external enemies. However, since the U.S. was willing to protect these states in perpetuity, the leaders of these regimes had no incentive to disarm their terrorists. This inaction allowed terrorists to transition into more powerful and virulent insurgencies, leading the protected states to chart their own courses and ultimately break with U.S. foreign policy objectives. Bapat provides a sweeping look at how the loss of influence over these states has accelerated the decline of U.S. economic and military power, locking it into a permanent war for its own economic security.

Pt. 1. Risk, precaution, governance -- pt. 2. Crime, deviance, exception -- pt. 3. Biopolitics, biometrics, borders -- pt. 4. Risks, tactics, resistances.

A decade after 9/11, it is increasingly difficult to deny that terror has prevailed - not as a specific enemy, but as a way of life. This book examines the social, cultural, and political drivers of the war on terror through the framework of a 'political moral panic'.

"The [Bush] administration has squandered the opportunity to eliminate al Qaeda....A new al Qaeda has emerged and is growing stronger, in part because of our own actions and inactions. It is in many ways a tougher opponent than the original threat we faced before September 11, and we are not doing what is necessary to make America safe from that threat." No one has more authority to make that claim than Richard Clarke, the former counterterrorism czar for both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. The one person who knows more about Usama bin Laden and al Qaeda than anyone else in this country, he has devoted two decades of his professional life to combating terrorism. Richard Clarke served seven presidents and worked inside the White House for George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush until he resigned in March 2003. He knows, better than anyone, the hidden successes and failures of the Clinton years. He knows, better than anyone, why we failed to prevent 9/11. He knows, better than anyone, how President Bush reacted to the attack and what happened behind the scenes in the days that followed. He knows whether or not Iraq presented a terrorist threat to the United States and whether there were hidden costs to the invasion of that country. Most disturbing of all are Clarke's revelations about the Bush administration's lack of interest in al Qaeda prior to September 11. From the moment the Bush team took office and decided to retain Clarke in his post as the counterterrorism czar, Clarke tried to persuade them to take al Qaeda as seriously as had Bill Clinton. For months, he was denied the opportunity even to make his case to Bush. He encountered key officials who gave the impression that they had never heard of al Qaeda; who focused incessantly on Iraq; who even advocated long-discredited conspiracy theories about Saddam's involvement in previous attacks on the United States. Clarke was the nation's crisis manager on 9/11, running the Situation Room -- a scene described here for the first time -- and then watched in dismay at what followed. After ignoring existing plans to attack al Qaeda when he first took office, George Bush made disastrous decisions when he finally did pay attention. Coming from a man known as one of the hard-liners against terrorists, Against All Enemies is both a powerful history of our two-decades-long confrontation with terrorism and a searing indictment of the current administration.