More than thirty years later, the Vietnam War still stands as one of the most controversial events in the history of the United States, and historians have so far failed to come up with a definitive narrative of the wartime experience. With competing viewpoints already in play, Mark Moyar’s recent revisionist approach in Triumph Forsaken has created heated debate over who "owns" the history of America’s war in Vietnam. Triumph Revisited: Historians Battle for the Vietnam War collects critiques of Triumph Forsaken from both sides of this debate, written by an array of Vietnam scholars, cataloguing arguments about how the war should be remembered, how history may be reconstructed, and by whom. A lively introduction and conclusion by editors Andrew Wiest and Michael Doidge provide context and balance to the essays, as well as Moyar’s responses, giving students and scholars of the Vietnam era a glimpse into how history is constructed and reconstructed.

More than thirty years later, the Vietnam War still stands as one of the most controversial events in the history of the United States, and historians have so far failed to come up with a definitive narrative of the wartime experience. With competing viewpoints already in play, Mark Moyar's recent revisionist approach in Triumph Forsaken has created heated debate over who ""owns"" the history of America's war in Vietnam.Triumph Revisited: Historians Battle for the Vietnam War collects critiques of Triumph Forsaken from both sides of this debate, written by.

An overview of the revisionist case on the Vietnam War, showing how it could have been won by the US at a lower cost than was suffered in defeat.

This book is a follow-up to the ETUI 2012 volume 'The triumph of failed ideas'. The focus of the book is the weight attributed to the different economic and social development paths in ten individual EU countries, and their interaction with the austerity regime established at EU level which in fact is deepening the crisis rather than paving ways out of it. The most dangerous implication of this policy approach is, according to this study, that it is driving countries apart - misleadingly in the name of 'Europe', hence the title of the book 'divisive integration'. The main message of the book is that a gradual recovery is possible only if there is a change of course in individual countries that then triggers reactions in the policies of other countries and perturbations at the EU level. However, these changes in individual countries is no longer feasible without a green light or at least toleration from the level of the European institutions.

In time for the bimillennium of Ovid's relegation to Tomis on the Black Sea by the emperor Augustus in 8 AD, Jo-Marie Claassen here revises and integrates into a more popular format two decades of scholarship on Ovid's exile. Some twenty articles and reviews from scholarly journals have been shortened, rearranged and merged into seven chapters, which, together with some new material, offer a wide-ranging overview of the exiled poet and his works. "Ovid Revisited" treats the poems from exile as the literary culmination of Ovid's oeuvre, ascribing the poet's resilience in the face of extreme hardship to the relief that his poetry afforded him. An introduction considers the phenomenon of Ovid's continued popularity, explains the importance of chronology in reading the exilic poems and gives a brief summary of the contents of the 'Tristia' and 'Epistulae ex Ponto'. The rest of the book ranges from consideration of Ovid's relationship with the emperor and with his own poetry, to his ubiquitous humour, to his skill in metrics, vocabulary and verbal play, and to his use of mythological figures from earlier parts of his oeuvre. The degree to which Ovid universalised the sufferings of the dispossessed is assessed in a chapter comparing his exilic works with modern exilic literature. An excursus considers various directions in Ovidian studies today.

During the presidency of Lyndon Johnson, the British government sought to avoid escalation of the war in Vietnam and to help bring about peace. The thinking that lay behind these endeavours was often insightful and it is hard to argue that the attempt was not worth making, but the British government was able to exert little, if any, influence on a power with which it believed it had, and needed, a special relationship. Drawing on little-used papers in the British archives, Nicholas Tarling describes the making of Britain’s Vietnam policy during a period when any compromise proposed by London was likely to be seen in Washington as suggestive of defeat, and attempts to involve Moscow in the process over-estimated the USSR’s influence on a Hanoi determined on reunification.

The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, for the first time fully explores the most sustained, intensive use of psychological operations (PSYOP) in American history. In PSYOP, US military personnel use a variety of tactics—mostly audio and visual messages—to influence individuals and groups to behave in ways that favor US objectives. Informed by the author’s firsthand experience of such operations elsewhere, this account of the battle for “hearts and minds” in Vietnam offers rare insight into the art and science of propaganda as a military tool in the twentieth century. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, focuses on the creation, capabilities, and performance of the forces that conducted PSYOP in Vietnam, including the Joint US Public Affairs Office and the 4th PSYOP Group. In his comprehensive account, Mervyn Edwin Roberts III covers psychological operations across the entire theater, by all involved US agencies. His book reveals the complex interplay of these activities within the wider context of Vietnam and the Cold War propaganda battle being fought by the United States at the same time. Because PSYOP never occurs in a vacuum, Roberts considers the shifting influence of alternative sources of information—especially from the governments of North and South Vietnam, but also from Australia, Korea, and the Philippines. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, also addresses the development of PSYOP doctrine and training in the period prior to the introduction of ground combat forces in 1965 and, finally, shows how the course of the war itself forced changes to this doctrine. The scope of the book allows for a unique measurement of the effectiveness of psychological operations over time.